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1 INTRODUCTION 
This Study will address various key legal aspects of data protection and on­
line services. The mission for this Study is to identify the implications of the 
development of on­line services for data protection and to compare the regulatory 
treatment of critical issues across several member states of the European Union. The 
comparison will search for the application of the basic principles of data protection 
enunciated in the European Union's directive1 and will examine the regulation and 
doctrine in four Member States. The methodology will identify particular themes and 
analyse the national results. The Study concludes with a strategic assessment of data 
protection regulation in the on­line environment that will draw out the convergences 
and divergences of the application of existing national laws, address the capabilities 
of law to resolve data protection issues and recommend various regulatory options 
to preserve European data protection norms within a framework of robust developing 
on­line services. 
1.1 Study mission 
The earlier reports to the Commission on the evolution and development of 
on­line services2 as well as the specific information flows3 associated with particular 
services raise important risks and opportunities for the rules of data protection. As 
seen in these earlier reports, the on­line environment has a broad variety of actors, an 
extraordinarily rapid pace of change, a significant decentralization of information 
1 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, O.J. L281 (23 nov. 1995) [hereinafter "European Directive".] 
ARETE, Les services en ligne et la protection des données et de la vie privée: Rapport no. 
1— Situation Globale (Etude ETD/96/B5­3000/142 pour la Commission des Communautés 
Européennes, DGXV)(Juin 1997) [Hereinafter "Part I".] 
ARETE, Les services en ligne et la protection des données et de la vie privée: Rapport no. 
2— Etudes de Cas (Etude ETD/96/B5­3000/142 pour la Commission des Communautés 
Européennes, DGXV)(Dec. 1997) [Hereinafter "Part Π"]. 
processing activity and a lack of reverence for territorial boundaries. A single session 
on the Internet may involve web sites located in different Member States of the 
European Union as well as sites found in third party states. Moreover, even the visit 
to a single web site can result in global transmissions of data. The architecture of on­
line services on the Internet is intercontinental.4 Search engines5, "cookies,"6 on­line 
shopping,7 payments,8 webcasting9, log analysis,10 games,11 and medical diagnoses­12 
to identify just a few of the activities and infrastructure elements­ each highlight the 
increasing tendancy, capability and commercial pressure to collect and use personal 
information on­line. The information flows illustrated in case studies reported earlier 
to the Commission reflect an ever critical need to apply basic principles to on­line 
services. These case studies show an enormous positive need exists for reliable 
personal information and that the commercial value creates a strong pressure for 
massive citizen surveillance. Data protection is a necessity if trust and confidence are 
to exist for on­line services.13 Yet, the characteristics of the market and information 
For example, the Marché de France, which sells French gastronomic products on the world 
wide web, contracts in France with those companies whose merchandise it offers for sale, maintains 
its website in Hong Kong where it is registered to do business, and manages the site and orders 
through an American server located in Arizona. See Part I, Section II. 1.1. 
5 See Part I, Section 1.4.1. 
6 See Part I, Section 1.3.2 
7 See Part I, Section II. 1 
8 See Part I, Section II. 1.3. 
9 See Part I, Section 1.4.3. 
10 See Part I, Section 1.3.1. 
" Part I, Section II.2.4. 
12 Part I, Section Π.2.2. 
13 See European Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European Initiative in 
Electronic Commerce, 13, 18 (COM(97) 157)(Apr. 15, 1997), available at 
flows pose a fundamental challenge to European data protection law. The 
implementation of fair information practice principles becomes exceedingly complex 
in the fluid context of the Internet. 
At the same time that the technical and commercial development of on-line 
services pose substantial risks to privacy, technologies also offer new opportunities 
for the protection of personal information. Communications, for example, can be 
encrypted to preserve the confidentiality as well as the anonymity of the participants.14 
Electronic payments can be structured anonymously to minimize or eliminate the 
collection of personal data. Privacy preferences can be incorporated into Internet 
browser technologies which, combined with labelling and filtering of web site 
information practices, can assure respect for data protection.15 The key questions, 
thus, revolve around the extent to which infrastructure arrangements create data 
protection problems and the extent to which data protection can be built within the 
architecture of on-line services. 
In light of these new risks and opportunities, the objective of this comparative 
regulatory analysis is first to examine the current and likely future responses of 
European Union Member States to critical issues. The identification of any 
differences in the treatment by Member States of on-line services will be a prime 
focus. This identification will allow an evaluation of the potential for data protection 
to create obstacles to the free movement of on-line services within the Community. 
Finally, the comparison will be used to develop options for convergent treatment of 
data protection in an on-line environment. 
1.2 Basic Principles of European Data Protection 
<http://www.ispo.cec.be/Ecommerce>. 
14 See Information and Privacy Protection Commission of Ontario and Dutch Data Protection 
Commissions, Privacy Enhancing Technologies: The Path to Anonymity (1995); International 
Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, Data Protection on the Internet Report 
and Guidance,;)) Hie, (Budapest Draft)(May 21, 1996); Resolution of the Conference of Data 
Protection Commissioners of the Federation and the Laender on key points for the regulation in 
matters of data protection of online services, <j> 1 (Apr. 29, 1996). 
15 See Minutes of the 21 st Meeting of the International Working Group on Data 
Protection in Telecommunications (Paris: April 3, 1997)(Presentation of Joel R. Reidenberg on 
"Internet Labeling: Adapting PICS for Data Protection). 
On-line services raise regulatory issues under the basic set of existing 
principles for European data protection. These core principles have been established 
within a number of international documents and within the national law of Member 
States. The critical international documents include the European Directive on Data 
Protection, the Council of Europe's Convention No. 108, and the OECD's privacy 
guidelines. Other international documents seek to express these principles within 
specific sectors of data use. An example of such a sectoral international measure is 
the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers Recommendation on regulations for 
automated medical data banks. 
For purposes of this analysis, the critical elements of European data protection 
law will be divided into four main groups. These are: (1) the establishment of 
obligations and responsibilities for those who process personal information; (2) the 
maintenance of transparent processing of personal information; (3) the creation of 
special protection for sensitive data; and (4) the establishment of enforcement rights 
and effective oversight of the treatment of personal data.16 These elements create the 
comprehensive European approach to the protection of personal information. This 
section will briefly describe each traditional principle of European data protection law 
and follow each description with an indication of how on-line services challenge 
existing regulatory ideas.17 
1.2.1 The Establishment of Obligations and Responsibilities for 
the Treatment of Personal Information 
The first element of the European principles is the creation of a series of fair 
information practices that define obligations and responsibilities with respect to the 
processing of personal information. The threshold component of this element is that 
These groupings were first identified in a prior report to the European Commisison, 
Directorate General XIII comparing U.S. data protection law and practice to European norms. See 
Paul Schwartz & Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law: A Study of U.S. Data Protection (Michie: 
1996). 
These descriptions draw directly from the prior study for the Commission. See id 
personal information should only be collected legitimately for specific purposes.18 
This requirement is the most basic element of fairness for the use of personal 
information. 
The Internet, however, challenges the establishment of obligations and 
responsibilities with respect to the processing of personal information. Under current 
practices, the basic principle of a "purpose limitation" for personal information has 
become the exception rather than the rule in the on-line environment. Where paper 
records themselves had provided a physicial barrier of sorts to any further use, 
information generated by individuals on the Internet is digital from the start and 
available for any number of further kinds of sharing and combination. Once on-line, 
the individual generates enormous amount of personal data and further use has not 
been limited to compatible purposes. As an earlier report to the Commission has 
noted, for example, a large amount of transactional information is collected by service 
providers who make various kinds of further use of these data. 
As a corollary to the specification of the purpose for collection, another basic 
element of the European data protection framework is that personal information may 
only be used in a manner compatible with the purpose of collection. This second 
component requires the placing of limitations on secondary uses and restricting 
incompatible uses. The European Directive expresses both the need for specific 
purpose use and for limits on incompatible uses as one of its chief principles related 
to data quality. It requires that personal data be "collected for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with these 
purposes."19 The open structure of the Internet, however, challenges this concept. 
The network was built around the idea of accessibility and multiple uses of 
information. 
The third component in the basic structure of fair information practices 
precludes the collection of unnecessary personal information. While this component 
does not offer specific guidance for determining whether particular information is 
necessary for an identified collection purpose, collectors of personal information 
within Europe do not have unfettered discretion to determine whether information is 
necessary. Rather than trying to maximize their collection of personal information, 
organizations must try to minimize their data gathering and collect only the least 
Directive 95/46/EC, at Art. 6(1 )(a) and Art. 6(1 )(b). 
Directive 95/46/EC, at Art. 6(1)0). 
amount of personal information consistent with the intended goals. As the European 
Directive states, personal data are to be "adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed."20 
Yet, the on-line environment also threatens the requirements that unnecessary 
personal information not be collected. Here, current technical standards generally 
permit the maximization of the quantity of personal information that is collected. An 
example of such maximization is the collection of the clickstream information 
generated as an individual goes from web site to web site. This collected data can 
even extend to how long an individual has looked at a given page on a particular web 
site. 
The basic structure of data protection also imposes obligations on the 
treatment of personal information once collected. A critical component places limits 
on the duration of storage of personal information. Any collection of personal 
information will lose accuracy and relevancy with time; as a result, organizations are 
not permitted to warehouse personal data for unlimited periods. European data 
protection principles require that personal information not be stored any longer than 
necessary to accomplish the purpose for collection.21 In the network environment, 
restrictions on data storage are necessary because a computer may not "forget" any 
information that is stored on it. Thus, the Internet, as any digital medium, requires 
that both collection and storage restrictions be created through technical measures. 
Restrictions on data storage may sometimes be created, however, due to concerns 
other than data protection. Thus, to the extent that an on-line service views older 
information as less relevant for its commercial purposes, it may limit the storage of 
personal information. As an illustration of this kind of storage limitation, some web 
sites have placed an expiration date on the cookies that they place on hard drives. 
In addition, under the basic principles of data protection, individuals must have 
a right to access their personal information and to correct inaccurate data.22 These 
rights contribute to securing accuracy of personal information. With respect to these 
access rights, the Internet has great potential for increasing data protection. On-line 
services technically have the capacity to permit inexpensive access of individuals to 
Directive 95/46EC, at Art. 6(1 )(c). 
Directive 95/46/EC, at Art. 6(1 )(e). 
Directive 95/46/EC, at Art. 12. 
personal data that are generated in interactions with these services. Such access is not 
provided, however, as a general matter. Finally, the basic set of rights and 
obligations provides that measures must be taken to assure the integrity of personal 
information.23 These measures are necessary to protect personal information against 
destruction or unauthorized alteration. Not surprisingly, the security ofinformation 
on the Internet is a matter of some controversy. Without special measures of data 
security, Internet communications are as a general matter insecure. This lack of 
security follows from the basic structure of the Internet. Information sent through the 
Internet travels over nondedicated lines in packets to its destination, and such data are 
capable of interception at numerous points. Moreover, the architecture of client-
server systems can raise critical security issues. Thus, the spoofing of web sites and 
servers provides a significant threat to the security of personal data on-line. 
Nevertheless, commercial on-line services have a considerable economic incentive to 
increase data security on the Internet. Continuing electronic commercial transactions 
will depend on consumer confidence in this medium. One of the most important ways 
to increase this confidence is through use of encryption. But, the law enforcement 
community has raised serious objections to encryption because of the potential for 
criminals to mask effectively their illegal activities from prosecuting or investigatory 
authorities. The kinds of encryption that will be allowed is currently a matter of 
considerable international debate; this Study will examine this subject in section 2.5 
below 
1.2.2 The Maintenance of Transparent Processing of Personal 
Data 
The second key element in the European principles of data protection is the 
maintenance of transparent processing systems for personal information.24 This 
essential norm requires that processing activities be structured in a manner that will 
be open and understandable. European consensus finds that individuals must be able 
to comprehend the treatment of their personal information to participate in social and 
political life. Secretive processing of personal information risks the suppression of an 
23 Directive 95/46/EC, at Art. 17. 
24 See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, at Art. 18 (notification to a central registry of data 
processing systems required). 
individual's free choice. Thus, the first component of this element is to require notice 
to individuals of the collection of personal information.25 In some cases, a second 
component further provides that consent from individuals must be obtained for certain 
kinds of processing and uses of personal information. 
Growth in on-line services has not been accompanied by an increase in the 
kinds of information about data use that is provided to individuals who use these 
services. Thus, in the age of the Internet, the transparency standard is being 
challenged. 
Transparency remains of critical importance, however, for a number of 
reasons. To begin with, in its absence, an individual's consent to the data processing 
practices of on-line services cannot be considered to be valid. Transparency issues 
are also raised in the context of consent by the issue of whether relevant information 
will be provided only in English, the most popular language on the World Wide Web, 
or also in the national language. 
Another reason for the importance of transparency as a fair information 
practice is that its absence will cause a systematic underrepresentation of the desire 
for data protection of consumers who use on-line services. Without knowledge of 
how their personal data are being used, individuals will not be able to create a robust 
market for privacy. 
While transparency is now being challenged by the Internet, this digital 
medium does have the potential for increasing individual knowledge of the different 
kinds of processing of personal data. Thus, as an earlier report to the Commission has 
noted, one world wide web site permits individuals to test in real time the information 
that a server can collect about the visit, (<http://www.anonymiser.com>). Other 
sites may also have a link offering a description about their data processing practices. 
More recently, industry coalitions have begun to prepare technical 
infrastructures that would provide greater transparency to individuals. The "Platform 
for Privacy Preferences" ("P3P")under development by the World Wide Web 
Consortium and the Open Profile Standard ("OPS") being promoted by a number of 
on-line services companies are two examples. P3P would enable the rating and 
Directive 95/46/EC, at Art. 10. 
filtering of Internet sites based on their privacy practices.26 OPS would encourage the 
collection by web browsers of personal information and the disclosure ofthat personal 
information to web sites after individuals selected options for the use of particular 
bits of personal information. These examples significantly demonstrate that technical 
means can easily be furnished to provide access and correction rights. Nevertheless, 
at the moment, these access and corrections rights are not generally provided on the 
Internet. 
1.2.3 The Creation of Special Protection for Sensitive Data 
The third element of the European principles requires the creation of special 
protection for sensitive data.27 This principle consists of the establishment of greater 
scrutiny and protection for certain types ofinformation, specifically those dealing with 
race, religion, health or political beliefs. Yet, the creation of special protection is also 
understood as requiring attention not only to whether information identifies particular 
aspects of a person's life that are sensitive, but how data will actually be used. The 
ability of information technology to combine and share data makes impossible any 
abstract, noncontextual evaluation of the impact of disclosing a given piece of 
personal information. The impact of bureaucratic use of personal information, 
whether merely personal or highly sensitive, depends on the means of processing, the 
kinds of databases linked together, and the ends to which information will be used. 
At present, a great deal of sensitive information is available on-line. Alone the 
popularity of different kinds of pornographic web sites has led to the creation of 
highly sensitive on-line data— specifically information about personal sexual 
preferences and interests. In addition, web sites and on-line chat groups exist that are 
devoted to race, religion, health and political beliefs. Visitors to these web sites and 
participants in these chat groups will generate considerable traces of sensitive 
information. 
Due to the lack of transparency regarding on-line processing practices, 
26 See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Use of Technology to Assure Internet Privacy: 
Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection, Lex Electronica, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1997) 
<www.lex-electronica.org>(analyzing the benefits and hurdles to the use of labelling and filtering for 
privacy). 
27 Directive 95/46/EC, at Art. 8. 
individuals are generally unaware of any further use made of the personal data that 
on-line activities may generate. Indeed, there may also be a lack of knowledge 
regarding the extent to which these on-line activities create sensitive information. 
1.2.4. The Establishment of Enforcement Rights and Effective 
Oversight of the Treatment of Personal Information 
The final element of European fair information practices is the establishment 
of enforcement rights and effective oversight of the treatment of personal 
information.28 This element is recognized in Europe as a critical part of the 
implementation of fair information practices. The basic component of this norm is 
that a remedy must exist for individuals in the event that rights, obligations or 
responsibilities with respect to personal information are abridged. In Europe, damage 
awards are possible under certain circumstances. 
Moreover, this element requires effective external oversight of fair information 
practices. The European Directive requires creation of an independent governmental 
body to carry out this oversight.29 These authorities monitor the development and 
implementation of national data protection law as well as international measures that 
affect global information transfers. Such agencies must be able to act with 
indépendance in carrying out their assigned functions. 
In the global environment of the Internet, any enforcement rights provided 
under national law face challenges from international data flows. In a similar fashion, 
the effectiveness of any national oversight body will be made considerably more 
difficult. The development of on-line services poses the question of how effective any 
national regulation can be in a period of global communication services. 
1.3 Identification of target countries 
The regulatory responses to on-line services will be studied within four 
Member States.30 Three large Member States, where the market for on-line services 
Directive 95/46/EC, at Art. 22 -24. 
Directive 95/46/EC, at Art. 28(1). 
The study considers regulations, laws and decisions through December 1997. 
10 
is more economically significant, and which have well established laws in the field of 
data protection, have been chosen: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. One 
smaller Member State, Belgium, has been chosen because it has existing data 
protection law and already significant development of on-line servies. These four 
countries also present an interesting cross-section of legal systems represented in the 
European Union. 
1.3.1 Belgium 
The legal system of Belgium is based on the civil law. The country has a 
constitutional monarchy and is organized as a federal state consisting of 
"Communities" and "Regions."31 The "Communities" consist of three groups based 
on language and cultural identity: (1) the Wallons or French Community, (2) the 
Flemings or Flemish Community and (3) the German-speaking Community. There are 
also three "Regions" that are geographically defined areas: the Flemish Region, the 
Brussels-Capital Region and the Walloon Region. The power to issue laws and 
regulations is shared among the federal government, federal parliament as well as the 
different Communities and Regions. Foreign affairs, defense, justice, finances, social 
security, public health and domestic affairs are each matters of federal power. The 
Regions and Communities, however, have power to conduct foreign relations 
independently in those areas where they have competence such as language and 
education. The resulting legal structure and its institutions are multilayered. At the 
federal level, legal authority vests in a House of Representatives, Senate, and 
government ministers nominated by the King. At the community level, there are 
Flemish, French, and German Community Councils as well as a Joint Commission. 
On the Regional and Community levels, each Region and each Community has a 
governing body. 
The Belgian constitution requires that law respect privacy and family life.32 
Data protection in Belgium is within federal competence and assured by federal 
31 Belgium was redefined as a "federal" state by constitutional amendment in 1994. 
Modification à la Constitution du 31 janvier 1994 (Moniteur belge du 12 février 1994). 
32 Belgian Constition, Art. 22(2). 
11 
Statute and Royal Decree. In 1992, Belgian enacted a data protection law33 that was 
largely inspired by French law. The Belgian statute progressively entered into force 
and became fully effective on June 1, 1996. The law applies to computer processed 
personal data as well as manual files organized for retrieval. The law establishes 
rights and obligations associated with the use of personal data, delegates authority for 
Royal Decrees, creates a declaration system as a precondition to the processing of 
personal information, and establishes the Commission de la protection de la vie privée 
(hereinafter "CPVP") as a semi-independent supervisory authority.34 Decisions of 
the Commission are public, but have not been published an any one collection. 
Nevertheless, in late 1997, the Commission released a series of annual reports 
covering its first five years of existence. In addition, statutory measures may offer 
sectoral data protection provisions such as those dealing with consumer credit,35 
telephone wire tapping,36 the social security system,37 the national register,38 driver's 
license records39 
1.3.2 France 
Loi du 8 décembre 1992 relative à la protection de la vie privée à l'égard des traitements de 
données à caractère personnel. 
See infra 2.2.1 (discussion of 'independence' of the CPVP) 
Loi du 12 juin 1991 relative au crédit à la consommation. 
Loi du 30 juin 1994 relative à la protection de la vie privée contre les écoutes, la 
prise de connaissance et l'enregistrement de communications et de télécommunications privées, M.B., 
24 janvier 1994, pp. 1542 et seq. 
Loi du 15 janvier 1990 modifiant la loi relative à l'institution et à l'organisation 
d'une Banque-carrefour de la sécurité sociale, M.B. 22 février 1990, pp. 3295 et seq. 
Loi du 8 août 1983 organisant un registre national des personnes physiques, M.B. 
21 avril 1984, pp. 5247 et seq. 
Loi du 18 juillet 1990 modifiant la loi relative à la police de la circulation routière, 
coordonnée le 16 mars 1968 et la loi du 21 juin 1985 relative aux conditions techniques auxquelles 
doivent répondre tout vehicle de transport par terre, ses éléments, ainsi que les accessoires de 
sécurité, M.B. 8 novembre 1990, pp. 21184 et seq. 
12 
France is a constitutional democracy with a legal tradition anchored in civil 
law. Under the French Constitution of 1958, laws are promulgated by the President 
of the Republic after being voted jointly by the National Assembly and the Senate.40 
Under the Constitution of 1958, the Parliament has the sole and exclusive power to 
establish rules for particular subject areas.41 Other areas not reserved for statutory 
enactment may be regulated by government decree after consultation with the Conseil 
d'État.42 This regulatory power is confered upon the Prime Minister who directs the 
government.43 
The French Constitution provides for respect of human rights and requires that 
legislation elaborate civil rights and the fundamental constitutional guarantees granted 
to citizens for the exercise of their public liberties.44 In 1978, France enacted one of 
the first national laws to regulate fair information practices.45 More recently, in the 
context of a case on videosurveillance, the Conseil Constitutionnel46 decided that the 
protection of privacy was part of the group of basic freedoms guaranteed by the 
constitution.47 As a result, data protection must be derived exclusively from statute 
in France. 
40 See Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Arts. 10, 24, 34, 45. 
41 Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Art. 34 (2). These areas include the protection of 
civil rights and fundamental rights of citizens, nationality, civil status, inheritance, the definition of 
criminal acts and penalties, taxation, electoral ruels and procedures. 
42 Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Art. 37. 
43 Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Art. 21. 
44 Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Art. 34 (2). 
Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux 45 
libertés. 
.16 If required, as in the case of certain organic laws, or if requested in conformity with 
consitutional procedures, the Conseil Constitutionnel decides on the constitutionality of laws prior to 
their taking effect. Consitution du 4 octobre 1958, Art. 61. Any law judged unconstitutional may not 
be promulgated and may not be applied. Id. 
47 Décision 94-352 du Conseil Constitutionnel du 18 janvier 1995 
13 
The existing 1978 data protection law is a comprehensive law of general 
application that offers wide-ranging protections to citizens. The law applies to the 
public and private sectors, and imposes obligations and responsibilities on those 
processing personal information. The law imposes civil as well as criminal penalties 
for violations. The statute establishes a large independent regulatory commission, the 
Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (the CNIL), that supervises 
the registration of data processing in the public as well as private sectors and 
supervises regulatory compliance for both the public and private sectors. The CNIL 
publishes an annual report as well as its decisions and guidance notes. 
1.3.3 Germany 
Germany is a federal republic that consists of sixteen states (Laender). 
Legislative power in Germany may be exercised at the state or federal level 
(exclusive), or, in some cases, concurrent and framework legislation may also be 
possible. At the federal level, the Bundestag, the federal parliament, enacts legislation 
with the states participating in the legislative process through the Bundesrat. 
Data protection in Germany has both constitutional and statutory roots. In its 
"Census" decision in 1983, the German Constitutional Court identified a "right of 
informational self-determination" based on the first two articles of the Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz), the German constitution.48 These articles of the Basic Law compel 
the State to take positive action to protect both human dignity (Article 1) and the 
development of human personality (Article 2).49 The Constitutional Court found that 
these two provisions, which form the basis of a "right of personality," protect the 
individual from borderless collection, storage, application, transmission of personal 
data. The "Census" decision also establishes an obligation that the state create 
legislation that authorizes and regulates the collection and processing of personal 
48 65 Bundesverfassungsgericht 1 (1983). 
49 Art 1(1), Basic Law: "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it 
shall be the duty of all state authority." Article 2(1), Basic Law: "Everyone shall have the right to free 
development of his personality in so far as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the 
constitutional order or the moral code." Id. 
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data.50 The right of informational self-determination prevents any processing of 
personal data that would lead to an inspection of or an influence on a person that is 
capable of destroying an individual capacity for self-governance.51 
In addition to the right of informational self-determination, the Basic Law 
contains other provisions that can protect data privacy. In this context, the most 
important of these measures is its Article 10, which protects the privacy of 
communications.52 Due to Article 10, the ongoing German debate about encryption 
has an added constitutional dimension. 
Beyond these constitutional elements, German data protection contains 
significant statutory elements at both the state and federal level. In 1970, the state 
legislature in Hesse enacted the world's first data protection law.53 All sixteen 
German states now have their own data protection laws. In 1977, the Bundestag, the 
German federal parliament, enacted a federal data protection law, which has since 
been subject to amendment.54 In addition to the federal omnibus statutes and these 
state laws, numerous sectoral and subsectoral data protection laws have been enacted 
in Germany. These laws include the privacy provisions of the German Social Welfare 
Code's Book V, which concern personal medical information, and of the Social 
Welfare Code's Book X, which concern social welfare information. 
Finally, data protection oversight agencies have been created at both the 
federal and state levels in Germany. The federal data protection law (BDSG) assigns 
to the federal commissioner of data protection an oversight role for federal agencies.55 
50 65 Bundesverfassungsgerichtentscheidungen 1, at 41-52. 
51 Id. 
52 Article 10(1), Basic Law: "Privacy of correspondence, posts, and telecommunications is 
inviolable." Article 10(2) adds, "Restrictions may only be ordered pursuant to a law." 
53 This statute has since been amended, see Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz, vom 11. 
November 1986 in der Fassung des Gesetzes zur Änderung des Hessischen Datenschutzgesetzes vom 
21. Dezember 1988. 
54 The most significant of these amendments took place in 1990. BDSG, vom 20.Dezember 
1990, BGBl. I S.2954 zuletzt geändert durch das Postneuordnunggesetz v. 14.9.1994, BGBl. I, S. 
2325,2385. 
55 BDSG, §§ 22-26. 
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German law assigns a parallel oversight role over state agencies to state data 
protection commissioners.56 The federal data protection commissioner is also to 
advise the federal government (Bundesregierung) and the Bundestag on data 
protection.57 Finally, the commissioner is to keep a register of the public sector's 
automated data files.58 
As to the private sector, the federal data protection law assigns governmental 
oversight over it to the so-called "Supervisory Authorities."59 It requires each state 
government to appoint its own Supervisory Authority. In some instances, states have 
assigned this oversight role to existing state data protection commissioners, who, as 
noted above, also have power over state agencies; other states have assigned these 
duties to a different governmental body. Like the federal and the state commissioners, 
the Supervisory Authorities have oversight authority.60 In addition, the Supervisory 
Authority keeps a register of entities that store personal data for business purposes.61 
Finally, the Federal Data Protection Law requires companies in the private sector that 
regularly employ at least five full time employees for the purpose of processing 
personal data to appoint an internal data protection officer.62 
For on-line services, Germany has a new and comprehensive statutory 
regulation of on-line services in the Information and Communication Services Act 
(Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz ("IuKDG").63 This law contains 
three new acts: (1) the Teleservices Law; (2) the Teleservices Data Protection Law, 
56 See, e.g., Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz, §§21-31. 
BDSG, § 26. 
BDSG, § 24. 
BDSG, § 38. 
BDSG, § 38. 
61 BDSG, §(2). 
62 BDSG, §§ 36-37. 
r 
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60 
M The German Parliament passed this Bill on June 13,1997 and it entered into force on 
August 1, 1997.The text of this statute can be found at http://www.iid.de. The English text cited in 
this Study is the official translation found at this web site. 
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and (3) the Digital Signature Law. It also carries out amendments to several existing 
statutes, such as the Penal Code and the Copyright Act.64 
The IuKDG has generally been welcomed as a successful data protection law. 
The Federal Data Protection Commissioner, Dr. Joachim Jacob, has greeted this law 
as one that "does not fix regulation within the status quo, but that meaningfully 
encourages further development."65 In the words of Hans-Jürgen Garstka, the Data 
Protection Commissioner of Berlin, this law's promulgation "dramatically improves 
the legal position of the individual user of multimedia services."66 
The IuKDG explicitly applies to on-line services, which fall under this law's 
definition of "teleservices." The law defines "teleservices" as "all electronic 
64 With the enactment of the IuKDG, Germany has assumed a pioneer role for the legal 
regulation of on-line services. As Jürgen Rüttgers, the German Minister of Education, Science, 
Research and Technology has stated, the IuKDG "creates the preconditions for our transition from an 
industrial society to an knowledge society." Rede von Dr.Juergen Ruetters MdB, 2. und 3. Lesung des 
IUKDG im Deutschen Bundestag am 13. Juni 1997 in Bonn, 
http://www.iid.de/rahmen/redel30697.html. As this quotation indicates, one primary justification for 
this statutory regulation of on-line services is on economic grounds. The IuKDG states that its 
purpose "is to establish uniform economic conditions for the various applications of electronic 
information and communication services." IuKDG, Article 1, § 1. 
The notion of "uniform economic conditions" was explained in more detail by the 
Bundestag's Committee for Education, Science, Research, Technology and the Assessment of Results 
of Technology. In introducing the IuKDG, this Committee pointed to the need for "removal of 
obstructions to the free development of market forces in the sector of new information and 
communication services and the guarantee of a uniform economic framework for the offer and the 
utilization of these services." Beschlußempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses für Bildung, 
Wissenshaft, Forschung, Technologie und Technikfolgenabschätzung (19. Ausschuß), Bericht der 
Abgeordneten Dr. Mayer, Tauss, Kiper, Dr. Laermann und Bierstadt 24 (1997) [hereinafter cited as 
Committee Report]. The IuKDG regulates on-line services to create the necessary preconditions for 
successful economic development of this area. 
The IuKDG also contains strong data protection provisions. In addition to pointing to 
economic justifications for the IuKDG, the Bundestag Committee stressed the need for effective data 
protection measures. Id. Data protection in the on-line world was seen as absolutely essential for 
creating the confidence necessary for widespread use of this medium. 
65 Der Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz, 16. Tätigkeitsbericht 1995-1996 143 (1997) 
[hereinafter cited as Federal Data Protection Commissioner, 16th Activity Report]. 
66 Berliner Datenschutzbeauftragter, Information zum Datenschutz, Bereich Recht IL 
711.141.2 (August 1, 1997). 
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information and communication services which are designed for the individual use of 
combinable data such as characters, images or sounds and are based on transmission 
by means of telecommunication."67 As this definition makes clear, this law does not 
concern telecommunications per se, which are regulated by other statutes, but a 
certain kind of use of telecommunications, namely the "individual use of combinable 
data."68 The Federal Government spoke of the law as regulating the "autonomous and 
self-determined utilization ... of digitalized data of different representation forms (for 
example text, graphics, languages, pictures, the succession of pictures, etc)."69 In a 
similar fashion, in introducing the law, members of the responsible legislative 
committee stated that it regulated "new services that are individually utilized by the 
user through the path of new information and communication services."70 
The Teleservices Law does not apply, however, to so-called "media services." 
These are regulated by the Media Services Interstate Agreement, which entered into 
67 IuKDG, Article 1, § 2(1). 
68 Id. 
69 Drucksache 13/7385 (pg 17). 
70 Id. at p. 25. 
The Teleservices Law, which is the first part of the IuKDG, also provides explicit examples 
of the kinds of services to which it applies. This statutory list of the on-line services within the law's 
jurisdiction is not intended to be exclusive. The Teleservices Law states that the relevant services 
"include in particular" five general groups. These are: 
" 1. services offered in the field of individual communication (e.g, telebanking, data 
exchange), 
"2. services offered for information or communication unless the emphasis is on 
editorial arrangement to form public opinion (data services providing e.g. traffic, 
weather, environ- mental and stock exchange data, the dissemination of 
information on goods and services), 
"3. services providing access to the Internet or other networks, 
"4. services offering access to telegames, 
"5. goods and services offered and listed in electronically accessible data bases with 
interactive access and the possibility for direct order." 
On-line services are covered by the law whether or not one pays for them or receives them for free. 
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force on the same day as the IuKDG.71 The Media Services Interstate Agreement is 
a treaty that is based on the Länder'?, jurisdiction over the mass media. This 
agreement between the individual German states regulates such new media as 
electronic press information, television text, and teleshopping to choose television 
events (pay per view).72 In contrast to the IuKDG, the Media Services Interstate 
Agreement concerns itself with electronic mass media that does not require the user 
to manipulate and combine information.73 The Media Services Interstate Agreement 
also contains data protection provisions, which intentionally seek to track those of the 
IuKDG in order to provide a uniform level of privacy protection irrespective of a 
categorization as a "teleservice" or "media service."74 In one area, namely that of 
provisions for independent data protection audits, however, the Media Services 
Interstate Agreement contains an important additional data privacy measure beyond 
that in the IuKDG.75 
1.3.4 United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary 
democracy. The country's head of government is the prime minister, who leads the 
political party that commands a majority in the House of Commons. Political power 
is concentrated in the prime minister and the Cabinet. The prime minister chooses 
members of the Cabinet from members of his political party in the Parliament. 
71 Staatsvertrag über Mediendienste, Drucksache 12/1954 [hereinafter cited as Media 
Services Multistate Agreement]. 
72 Media Services Interstate Agreement, § 2. The sixteen German states continue to have 
regulatory authority over traditional media. For a discussion of these jurisdiction issues in German 
federalism in the age of the Internet, see Ralf Roeger, Internet und Verfassungsrecht, 1997 Zeitschrift 
für Rechtspolitik 203. 
73 Media Services Interstate Agreement, § 2(2). 
74 Media Services Interstate Agreement, §§12-17. 
75 Media Services Interstate Agreement, § 17. 
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Data protection in the UK is regulated by the Data Protection Act of 1984.76 
Data protection supervision is carried out in the UK through the Data Protection 
Registrar, who has power through the registration process and through her ability to 
seek prosecution for violations of the Data Privacy Act.77 Through the registration 
process, the Data Protection Registrar can serve an Enforcement Notice that directs 
a registered person to take specific steps to comply with the Data Privacy Act, and, 
in particular, with the data protection principles.78 The Registrar's powers also permit 
the issuance of a De-registration Notice that cancels the whole or part of any 
registration entry from the Register. Finally, the Registrar can issue a Transfer 
Prohibition Notice that prevents the transfer of personal data overseas.79 If the 
Registrar issues any of these notices, the data user may appeal the enforcement action 
to the independent Data Protection Tribunal.80 
The Registrar may also seek prosecution of violators of the Data Privacy Act. 
Where the Registrar has reasonable grounds for suspecting a criminal offense, or a 
breach of a principle, she may apply for a search warrant to enter and search any 
premises.81 Prosecutions can also be made for failure to register.82 In the most recent 
year for which data are available, the Registrar secured fifty-two convictions against 
unregistered data users.83 In 1996, the Data Protection Registrar brought the first 
prosecution for the unlawful procuring and selling of data, which led to a conviction 
76 Data Protection Act 1984, enacted 12th July 1984. 
77 Data Protection Act 1984, Part II, 4-20. 
78 Id. at 10. 
79 Id. at 10-12. 
80 Id. at 13-14. The Data Protectional Tribunal consists of a chairman, deputy chairmen, 
and members to represent the interests of data users and data subjects. Id. at Part I, 3. The Tribunal 
can overturn the Registrar's decision and substitute its own decision. Id. at Part II, 14. For a 
discussion, see Data Protection Registrar, The Guidelines Third Series 10 (1994). 
81 Id. at 16 & Schedule 4. 
82 Id. at 19. 
83 Data Protection Registrar, The Thirteenth Annual Report 45 (1997). 
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and a fining of the plaintiff, who was a part-time private investigator.84 
1.4 Methodology 
The methodology for the comparative analysis of these countries will follow 
the "functional" approach.85 The analysis will search to find regulatory treatment in 
national law that responds to a set of themes identified from the earlier phases of this 
Report. These themes address critical problems for the regulatory treatment of on-
line services. 
For each country, the comparative analysis relies on published reports from 
the national data protection authority, published regulatory decisions, interviews with 
members of the relevant data protection commission, as well as contacts with other 
national experts and various European and international studies.86 
Since national responses to on-line services appear on the whole to be only 
first emerging, this Study, in keeping with the functional approach, also examines 
other existing data protection rules that may give guidance for the treatment of on-line 
services. In addition, to the extent that specific data protection rules for on-line 
services are under development in any of the countries, the analysis of the country 
seeks to examine these emerging regulatory actions. In the absence of specific 
regulatory initiatives or actions, the views of data protection authorities, government 
administrators and other experts have also been explored to present conclusions on 
the current expectations for the treatment of on-line services under existing legal 
rules. 
84 News Release, http://www.open.gov.uk/dpr/news.htm 
85 See Paul Schwartz & Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law: A Study of U.S. Data 
Protection, 24-25 (Michie: 1996). 
86 Joel Reidenberg had primary responsibility for the analysis of Belgium and France, while 
Paul Schwartz had primary responsibility for Germany and the United Kingdom. 
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2. EUROPEAN REGULATORY RESPONSES 
This section will focus on a current assessment of European regulatory 
responses to data protection for on-line services. The assessment is organized around 
a set of fundamental, recurring issues for the application of data protection principles 
to on-line services. The first two sub-sections treat jurisdictional questions. The 
analysis first looks to the basic scope of data protection law as a form of subject 
matter competence over the disaggregated data flows associated with many on-line 
services. For example, to the extent that on-line service activities might avoid the use 
or creation of "personal data" through anonymity, data protection regulations may be 
wholly inapplicable. 
Next the jurisdictional inquiry turns to the territorial applicability of data 
protection rights, obligations and supervision. This subsection will try to determine 
how data protection regulators react to the simultaneous foreign, yet local, activities 
on the Internet as seen through registration and supervision practices. 
The third subsection analyzes transparency issues such as notice and consent 
as well as data subject access and correction of erroneous data. In particular, this 
section seeks to understand how the four different countries implement these rules in 
the face of decentralized, diverse and complex information use on the Internet. 
The next subsection examines profiling and sensitive data. This inquiry looks 
to determine how issues such as finality, consent, and data storage are treated in the 
four countries. 
Finally, the last subsection turns to security issues. With the vital importance 
of cryptography to electronic commerce and the vigorous debate over law 
enforcement access to network data, an analysis of the data protection framework on 
these questions is crucial. 
2.1 Jurisdiction: Scope of "Personal data" and Clickstream 
Information 
As a threshold issue of statutory competence, data protection regulation only 
applies to the processing of "personal data." The European Directive defines 
"personal data" as: 
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any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data 
subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or 
more psychological factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity.87 
For on-line services, the determination of whether particular information relates to an 
"identifiable person" is unlikely to be straightforward. For example, a dynamic 
Internet Protocol address is a numeric routing number uniquely associated with a 
particular session on the Internet and a particular computer being used for that 
session. An Internet service provider can associate the numeric address with a 
specific subscriber. However, the sites that are being visited by the user can only 
associate the numeric address with the Internet service provider. In the absence of 
other information obtained either by disclosures from the user88 or from the Internet 
service provider, the host cannot specifically identify the user. In contrast, a fixed IP 
address will always identify the same specific computer for every session on the 
Internet and the identity of the owner will customarily be publicly available.89 
The recitals in the European Directive recommend that "account should be 
taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any 
other person to identify the said person."90 The recitals also advise that the data 
protection rules should not be applicable to "data rendered anonymous in such a way 
that the data subject is no longer identifiable."91 Both interpretive guidance 
provisions indicate that the definition of the scope of "personal data" represents a 
critical issue for the treatment of on-line services. The European Commission is, for 
example, looking to anonymization as a means for protecting privacy in electronic 
87 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 2(a). 
88 Such disclosures, however, may be made without the user's knowledge. For example, an e-
mail address stored in the user's browser may be transmitted to a visited site. 
89 The domain name registries and routing tables can be used like a reverse directory 
to identify the owner of the computer with a fixed IP address. 
90 Directive 95/46/EC, Preamble # 26. 
91 Directive 95/46/EC, Preamble # 26. 
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commerce and Member States are also considering "identity protectors."92 Yet, for 
data protection regulation, the means of anonymizing data or hiding the original user's 
identity may be subject to different national interpretations and, thus, impose varying 
obligations. 
In addition to the definitional threshold, the jurisdictional competence of 
national data protection law over clickstream data poses a second critical question. 
The European Directive sets out a basic choice of law provision.93 However, the 
allocation of responsibility for clickstream data may be difficult to discern. The 
clickstream data generated by on-line activities is initially processed by an Internet 
access or service provider. The bits and bytes are then shared with a myriad of parties 
to on-line service transactions. The localization of relevant processing activities may 
be quite variable. Consequently, the determination by various Member States of their 
authority to apply national law to all or parts of the clickstream will have a significant 
impact on the development of on-line services. 
2.1.1 Belgium 
Belgium does not have any data protection legislation that specifically targets 
on-line services. The general data protection law, the Law of December 8, 1992,94 
will nevertheless apply to information used in connection with on-line services. This 
law has contradictory tendencies for the scope of personal information covered by the 
data protection rules. Under the general data protection law, personal information 
must satisfy two criteria to fall within the scope of protection. First, the information 
must-be of a "personal character" and relate to an "identified or identifiable natural 
92 See John Borking, Back to Anonymity— Privacy Enhancing Technologies in Proceedings of 
the 17th International Conference of Data Protection Commissioners (Copenhagen: 1996) 
93 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 4. 
Loi du 8 décembre 1992 relative à la protection de la vie privée à l'égard des 
traitements de données à caractère personnel, M.B., 18 mars 1993, pp. 5801-5614 [hereinafter, Loi 
du 8 décembre 1992], 
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person."95 Second, this qualifying information must be in a "file" defined as having 
been collected or stored with a logical organization that permits systematic 
consultation.96 This concept of "file" distinguishes innocuously stored information 
from personal information subject to data protection principles.97 Information stored 
only for occasional consultation will not qualify for protection.98 Incidental 
processing of personally identifiable information also does not come within the 
statute.99 The various sectoral data protection provisions contained in other laws such 
as the consumer credit statute100 do not contain any rules specific to on-line services 
with respect to the definition of "personal information" or the treatment of clickstream 
data. 
Unlike other countries' data protection laws, the Belgian statute contains a 
series of exclusions from substantive coverage whether or not "personal character" 
information is implicated. These exclusions, in effect, remove specific types of 
information from the scope of regulated personal information. Specifically, the data 
protection law does not apply to the following categories ofinformation: 
• those used exclusively for private, family or household purposes; 
95 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 1er, j 5. The CPVP notes that the legal definition 
implies three elements: (1) data; (2) relating to a natural person; and, (3) the natural person be 
identified or identifiable. CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1992-1993, p. 24 (1997). 
96 Commission de la protection de la vie privée, Protection des données à caractère 
personnel en Belgique: Quelle Commission? Pour quelle vie privée? p. 2 (3 mai 1993). 
97 See, e.g., CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1994-1995, p. 13 (1997); CPVP, Rapport 
d'activité 1996, pp. 28-29 (1997). 
98 A recent decision of the Cour de Cassation declined to apply the data protection 
law to a job candidate's file. Cour de Cassation du 16 mai 1997. See also CPVP, Revue de Presse 
Septembre 1997, p. 8 (excerpting Alain Heyrendt, Un dossier de candidature n'est pas un ficier, La 
libre Belgique and reprinting the decision). 
99 See Cour d'appel d'Anvers, 1ère Chambre, 27 septembre 1995 cited in CPVP, 
Rapport d'activité 1996, pp. 28-29 (1997) 
100 Loi du 12 juin 1991 relative au crédit à la consommation. 
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• those published in compliance with legislative or regulatory obligation. 
• those published or assured publication by the person concerned, 
provided that the processing respects the purposes for the publication; 
• those processed in compliance with the law concerning public 
statistics.101 
The exclusion for information made public by the person concerned is likely to be 
significant for on-line services. This exemption effectively removes certain "public 
data" from the scope of "personal information."102 While the exemption is limited by 
the finality of the public purpose,103 participating on open networks such as the 
Internet often publishes otherwise personal information. For example, a message 
posting to a discussion group publicly associates the individual's identity with the 
content of the message and the topic of the discussion group. On-line services will, 
thus, shift debate to the finality of publication rather than the identifiable aspects of 
the information in order to determine if the law applies to the data. 
The extent to which the Belgian law will regulate the treatment of critical 
information related to online services, such as an IP address and clickstream data, is 
ambiguous. There is no clear guidance from the statutory provisions, Royal Decrees, 
or the Commission de protection de la vie privée ("CPVP") regarding the identifiable 
nature of online services data. The rules for caller identification would ordinarily 
provide useful guidance on the interpretation of the jurisdictional scope of "personal 
information." Yet, these services are just being introduced within Belgium. The 
CPVP has, for the moment, chosen not to issue any public policy with respect to 
caller identification. For example, the CPVP's Annual Report for 1996 seeks to 
advance anonymity as a basic principle for telephone communications and notes that 
101 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 3, § 2. 
102 CPVP, Recommandation No. 02/93 du 7 septembre 1993 (applying the law to the 
commercial sale of address lists by BELGACOM as a breach of the finality of the original publication 
of those addresses.) 
103 CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1994-1995, p. 48 (1997). 
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anyone should be able to place a call without communicating his own number.104 The 
CPVP then merely indicates that no regulation currently covers this problem. The 
CPVP is, however, in consultation with Belgacom, the national telephone company, 
to develop notices that explain the available services for telephone subscribers. 
In addition, the scope of the Belgian law seems to encompass even the 
treatment of anonymous data. Although the data protection law does exclude the 
treatment of personal information "rendered anonymous for the exclusive purpose of 
disseminating anonymous statistics," 105 the exclusion applies only to the law's 
provisions on notice, access and correction.106 The exclusion does not apply to other 
obligations under the data protection law such as the declaration requirement.107 This 
suggests that anonymity will not suffice to bring the processing of information 
completely outside the scope of the data protection principles and thereby allows the 
data protection law to regulate what is otherwise considered to be anonymous data. 
Moreover, by the terms of the statute, the purpose of anonymity is critical for the 
exemption; the anonymity must be for a statistical dissemination purpose. For 
example, an anonymous payment transaction made over the Internet would not be for 
a statistical purpose and would, therefore, be unlikely to meet the conditions for the 
exemption. Nevertheless, the CPVP recognizes that the data protection law should 
not apply to anonymous data.108 The CPVP has noted, however, that data cannot be 
considered truly anonymous unless the choice of criteria (e.g. location, age, etc.) 
prevents the person responsible for the treatment from re-identifying the person 
concerned without special effort.109 The CPVP has not elaborated specifically on the 
scope of 'special effort.' The CPVP has, however, said that, in making a 
104 CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1996, p. 61 (1997). 
105 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 11. 
106 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 11. 
107 See infra 2.2.2. 
ios CPVP, Recommandation No. 01/96 du 23 septembre 1996 à propos de l'analyse 
de la consommation de médicaments en Belgique basée sur des informations issues des prescriptions 
médicales, p. 5 
109 I d 
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determination of true anonymity, it will look to the availability to the person 
responsible for the processing of any other information from external sources.110 
Thus, if any external information is available that might lead to the re-identification 
of the individual, the data cannot be considered anonymous. As a consequence of this 
strict interpretation of anonymity, the electronic traces left behind on-line services may 
preclude them from being structured in a sufficiently anonymous way. An IP address, 
for example, will generally allow tracing back to the individual. 
In contrast to the narrow limitation for anonymous information, the concept 
of "file" may prove to exclude significant data processing for online services from the 
scope of the data protection principles. As noted in the previous parts to this Study, 
information related to individuals on-line is highly decentralized and flexible in terms 
of the structure of information processing arrangements. These technical 
characteristics run counter to the definition of information stored for systematic 
consultation with a logical organization; dynamic databases may, in fact, have no true 
"organization" and consultation may be ad hoc rather than systematic in the sense of 
the statute. For example, the use of any of the many search engines, such as Lycos, 
Hotbot, or Excite, available on the World Wide Web entails an ad hoc consultation 
ofinformation stored in diverse sites with no organization particularly relevant to the 
search criteria. As a result, the substantive reach of the data protection law has some 
ambiguity for on-line services. This lack of clarity means, for example, that dynamic 
databases might escape the Belgian rules for data protection. 
2.1.2 France 
The comprehensive French regime of data protection law has neither a 
statutory provision specific to the Internet nor a statutory definition explicitly setting 
out the scope of "personal data" in connection with on-line services. The general data 
protection law, Law No. 78-17 of January 6, 1978, takes a broad view of the type of 
data that qualifies for treatment as personal information, and both the CNIL and the 
Conseil d'État111 have made a number of important decisions that confirm the 
expansive scope of the statute. This doctrine supports a conclusion that an extremely 
Id. 
The Conseil d'état is the highest court of administrative appeal in France. Appeals 
from decisions of the CNIL may be brought to the Conseil d'état. 
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wide range of processing activities for on-line services will be subject to the rights and 
obligations of the French data protection law. As a result, French data protection law 
may apply to a larger range ofinformation flows on the Internet than other European 
data protection laws, especially the British law.112 This poses an inherent problem for 
European harmonization. 
Yet, at the same time, the trend for data protection and on-line services in 
France seems to open the way for narrowing the coverage of French data protection 
law. The emerging Internet policy of the CNIL seeks to promote anonymity as a 
means to protect the individual's control over personal information, and this 
anonymity may be used to differentiate electronic commerce activities that implicate 
basic rights and those that fall outside the scope of data protection concerns. 
Law No. 78-17 defines information as "nominative" if in any way it directly 
or indirectly permits the identification of a natural person.113 In the context of on-line 
services, the traceability of any information back to an individual can classify that 
information as "nominative," even if the entity processing that information did not 
actually know the identity of the data subject. For information that indirectly 
identifies an individual, the French law makes no distinction between information that 
can easily be linked to an individual and information that can only be linked with 
extraordinary means or with the cooperation of third parties. In contrast, the 
European Directive's policy restricts the scope of "indirectly" identifiable information 
to that which can reasonably be linked to an identified person.114 In effect, under the 
French legal standard, if information can be identified with an individual, then the law 
says information will be considered nominative data; the data protection law will apply 
to anyone processing such indirectly identifiable data. 
The CNIL interpretations confirm an expansive definition and application of 
French law. In a publication dedicated to summarizing its first decade of experience 
with the data protection law, the CNIL expressly stated that it "gives a very broad 
112 See infra 2.1.3. 
113 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 Janvier, 1978, article 4 ("sont réputées nominatives au sens de 
la présente loi les information qui permettent, sous quelques forme que ce soit, directement ou non 
l'identification des personnes physiques auxquelles elles s'appliquent") 
114 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital # 26. 
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interpretation to the term 'nominative information.'"115 The CNIL, for example, has 
even indicated that a telephone number and the place of pick-up for a taxi reservation 
are indirectly nominative information without questioning whether the telephone 
number relates to the name of the person making the reservation or whether the pick-
up address can be related to a specific individual.116 
A set of decisions in 1997 illustrates that the CNIL intends to continue the 
expansive philosophy for on-line services. Under its authority to review public sector 
data processing,117 the CNIL examined a series of three applications by government 
offices seeking permission to establish Internet web sites and Internet connections.118 
In three of these decisions, the CNIL addressed the log files that were needed for 
security purposes and emphasized that they would only contain each visitor's IP 
address, each visitor's domain name, the web page requested by the visitor and the 
115 CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertés, p. 42 (1988). 
116 See Délibération No. 90-93 du 10 juillet 1990 portant adoption d'une 
recommandation concernant les traitements automatisés mis en oeuvre par les sociétés de taxis, 
reprinted in J.O. Informatiques et Libertés No. 1473 (1991). Under the terms of this 
Recommandation, the CNIL would appear to consider a pick-up address on the Champs Elysées and a 
restaurant's phone number to be nominative information for the person making the reservation, even 
though neither can be linked to an individual in the absence of further information. 
117 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 Janvier, 1978, article 15 (requires the advice of the CNIL prior 
to the implementation of government data processing). 
118 See Délibération No. 97-051 du 30 juin 1997 concernant une demande d'avis 
présenté par la Mairie de Paris relative à un traitement d'informations nominatives mis en oeuvre 
dans le cadre du site Internet de la Ville de Paris; Délibération No. 97-050 du 24 juin 1997 relative à 
une demande d'avis présenté par France Télécom concernant un traitement automatisé d'informations 
nominatives dénommé "Minitelnet;" Délibération No. 97-32 du 6 mai 1997 relative à la demand 
d'avis présenté par le premier ministre concernant un modèle-type de traitements d'informations 
nominatives opérés dans le cadre d'un site Internet ministériel; Délibération No. 97-009 du 4 février 
1997 relative à la demande d'avis du Service d'information du Gouvernement concernant le 
traitement d'informations nominatives opéré dans le cadre du site Internet du Premier Ministre et du 
Gouvernement. 
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date and time of the page request.119 While the visitor's Internet service provider 
might be able to determine the identity of the particular user from this information, the 
web sites themselves would not have access to that identity information. 
Nevertheless, the CNIL noted with approval that these log files would be deleted after 
fifteen days.120 By examining the purpose for the existence of the log files and by 
accepting their deletion within a short time period, the CNIL may be implicitly 
treating the data as nominative information subject to the storage limitation in the data 
protection law. Such a conclusion follows the logic for treating telephone 
reservations for taxis as personal information. Together, these decisions suggest that 
the CNIL may regard any IP address, whether fixed or dynamic, and all clickstream 
data as nominative information for the recipients or holders ofthat information. 
Similarly, representatives of the CNIL view "cookies"121 information as 
nominative because web servers place this information on the personal computers of 
visitors in order to identify those visitors when they return to the site. "Cookies," 
however, do not independently identify any particular user; the data pertains to use 
of a particular computer rather than use by a particular person. Instead, to be able to 
identify a particular user, the information in the file must be linked with other data 
such as a registration entry at the web site.122 Although the CNIL has no decision 
explicitly addressing "cookies," the CNIL's authorization for government web sites 
119 See Délibération No. 97-051 du 30 juin 1997 concernant une demande d'avis 
présenté par la Mairie de Paris relative à un traitement d'informations nominatives mis en oeuvre 
dans le cadre du site Internet de la Ville de Paris; Délibération No. 97-32 du 6 mai 1997 relative à la 
demand d'avis présenté par le premier ministre concernant un modèle-type de traitements 
d'informations nominatives opérés dans le cadre d'un site Internet ministériel; Délibération No. 97-
009 du 4 février 1997 relative à la demande d'avis du Service d'information du Gouvernement 
concernant le traitement d'informations nominatives opéré dans le cadre du site Internet du Premier 
Ministre et du Gouvernement. 
120 Id. 
121 See Part I, § 1.3.2 (complete description of "cookies" protocol.) 
122 This is increasingly a typical practice for web sites. See Part II, New York Times 
case study. 
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does not grant authority for these sites to place "cookies" on visitors' hard drives.123 
The CNIL also has well articulated views on anonymity that are highly 
relevant for the application of data protection principles to electronic commerce. For 
electronic traces associated with a group of individuals, the information will not be 
considered anonymous if the aggregation is too small. The CNIL rejected, for 
example, a proposed intelligent transport system in part because of the reliance on 
collecting and tracking data matched by license plate number.124 The CNIL's position 
emphasized the right of citizens to travel anonymously on public roads. Yet, license 
plate numbers are only indirectly linked to drivers; the license plate number merely 
identifies the owner of the car and not the actual person driving the car. The 
significance of treating the license plate number as personal data for the actual driver 
of the car is that information linked to a small group of people (possible drivers of a 
particular car) cannot be treated as anonymous, but rather will be considered 
"nominative." 
Along the same lines, the CNIL has interpreted the scope of nominative 
information for statistical research. The earliest decisions treated aggregations of 
census data to be sufficiently anonymous if the aggregation pertained to more than 
5,000 people.125 More recently, the CNIL has authorized the release of census data 
See Délibération No. 97-051 du 30 juin 1997 concernant une demande d'avis 
présenté par la Mairie de Paris relative à un traitement d'informations nominatives mis en oeuvre 
dans le cadre du site Internet de la Ville de Paris; Délibération No. 97-32 du 6 mai 1997 relative à la 
demand d'avis présenté par le premier ministre concernant un modèle-type de traitements 
d'informations nominatives opérés dans le cadre d'un site Internet ministériel; Délibération No. 97-
009 du 4 février 1997 relative à la demande d'avis du Service d'information du Gouvernement 
concernant le traitement d'informations nominatives opéré dans le cadre du site Internet du Premier 
Ministre et du Gouvernement.. 
Délibération no. 96-069 du 10 septembre 1996 relative à la demande d'avis 
portant création à titre expérimental d'un traitement automatisé d'informations nominatives ayant 
pour finalité pincipale la lecture automatique des plaques d'immatriculation des véhicules en 
mouvement par la société des autoroutes Paris-Rhin-Rhône (SAPR). 
125 See CNIL, 16e Rapport d'activité, p. 378-382 (1996). The particular prohibition 
on disclosing census data for aggregations of less than 5,000 people was, however, successfully 
challenged before the Conseil d'état for flaws in administrative procedures. See Arrêt du Conseil 
d'état du 26 juillet, 1996; CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, at 33-34 (1997). Another decision in 
connection with the release of census data allows smaller aggregations in tabular form with specified 
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for an academic research project aggregating information for only 150 people in a 
relatively homogenous grouping.126 This approach suggests that the CNIL may 
eventually view dynamic IP addresses differently than fixed IP address in the future. 
A dynamic IP address is much like a statistical aggregation for any recipient other 
than the Internet service provider since the address may pertain to anyone of millions 
of subscribers to the Internet service provider. A dynamic IP address masks the 
identity of the individual subscriber behind the mass of all subscribers to the service 
provider. 
In contrast to these decisions, the CNIL rulings on caller identification suggest 
that French data protection law may treat all IP addresses as nominative information. 
The CNIL initially refused to allow France Telecom, a national telephone company, 
to reveal the full detail of calls to subscribers in order to protect information that 
might relate to others in the household.127 Subsequently, the CNIL granted 
authorization for the release of such information only for the purpose of the 
subscriber's account. While the billing information relates to the subscriber, since the 
subscriber must pay the charge, the billing information does not implicitly indicate 
who placed the call. Additional information must be ascertained by the subscriber to 
indirectly link the transaction to an individual within the household who may have 
placed the call. In many ways, the caller identification information resembles a 
dynamic IP address. An Internet service provider assigns a temporary number to its 
data fields for particular uses where re-identification, though possible, was precluded by a 'use 
agreement. ' Délibération No. 93-092 du 12 octobre 1993 portant avis sur la demande présentée par 
l'INSEE, relative à la diffusion des données aggrégées issues de l'exploitation du rencensement 
général de la population de 1990, in CNIL, 14e Rapport d'activité, 212-215 (1994). Earlier 
decisions in the context of epidemological studies treated aggregations that could not lead to the 
identification of groups less than 5 people would be treated as anonymous information. See CNIL, 
Dix ans d'informatique et liberté, p. 49 (1988). 
126 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, at 33-34 (1997). 
127 Initially, the CNIL authorized the disclosure of called numbers on a subscriber's 
bills only if the numbers were truncated to anonymize the identity of the call recipient. Deliberation 
No. 82-104 du 6 juillet, 1982. More recently, the CNIL rescinded the obligation to truncate numbers 
provided that the subscriber requested the full numbers and certified that the only use would be for 
managing telephone use. Délibération No. 95-005 relative à la demande de modification de 
traitement présenté par France Télécom concernant la facturation détaillée; CNIL, 16e Rapport 
d'activité, at 402-403 (1996). 
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subscriber and anyone receiving that number, such as visited web sites, will only know 
that it belongs to the Internet service provider. Only the Internet service provider 
with additional information can link the address to an individual subscriber. 
In short, the French data protection law and the CNIL's doctrine leave little 
room to differentiate information flows on the Internet between anonymous 
information outside the scope of data protection concerns and identifiable information 
subject to the full array of rights and obligations. Because clickstream data is 
ultimately capable of being traced back to an individual, each element of this data 
appears to be "personal information" anywhere it flows. The practical difficulties and 
incentives inhibiting actual traces of clickstream data back to particular individuals do 
not appear to have relevance. 
Nevertheless, France appears to face a contradiction with the expansive 
definition of personal information and the recent French trend providing 
encouragement for anonymous on-line services. The CNIL appears strongly to 
support anonymity as a possible solution to data protection in the network 
environment. For example, the CNIL recently criticized an Internet discussion group 
maintained by a financial services organization because it did not offer users the 
opportunity to make anonymous message postings.128 Moreover, the European 
Directive suggests that data rendered anonymous is no longer subject to the 
substantive rights and obligations embodied in the European Directive.129 Yet, 
anonymity in a network environment is not necessarily absolute. The mapping 
functions that render data anonymous are not always irreversible. In a set of 1994 
cases, the CNIL noted that coded identities for pay-per-view customers still 
constituted indirectly nominative information.130 For example, reversal may be 
accomplished through exceedingly difficult and onerous means such as cracking an 
algorithm that randomizes information records. More recently, the CNIL addressed 
anonymity for on-line transactions and praised a proposed electronic payment service 
128 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, p. 91 ( 1997)(stating that the Caisse nationale de 
prévoyance should have structured its discussion group to allow anonymous posts, though recognizing 
that sophisticated users have the technical means to "borrow a third party's identity in order to 
participate in the discussion.") 
129 See Directive 95/46/EC, Recital # 26. 
130 See CNIL, 15e Rapport d'activité, pp. 62-63 (1995). 
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that masked the identity of on-line product and service purchasers from merchants by 
assigning codes to buyers.131 Although the buyer's information was anonymous with 
respect to the merchant, the information was "nominative" with respect to the 
payment service provider. The CNIL did not address whether the merchants could 
nevertheless treat the information acquired from the electronic payment service as 
outside the scope of the data protection law. 
To the extent that information related to an individual appears incidental to an 
electronic commerce activity, French law seems to place such information outside the 
scope of the data protection law. In an early decision, for example, the CNIL found 
that the processing by a business of account data that might reference individuals did 
not by itself involve nominative data.132 More recently, the Conseil d'État found that 
the data protection law did not apply to protect celebrities who were to be the subject 
of national opinion polls.133 The Conseil d'État ruled that the reference to celebrities 
was incidental to the purpose of the poll— measuring public opinion— and, 
consequently, the poll results could not be considered personal information with 
respect to the celebrities. 
The CNIL has also indicated that pseudonyms might be outside the scope of 
personal information. However, recent decisions seem to include a number of 
contradictory elements. In its authorization of a web site for the Paris Mayor's office, 
the CNIL appears to treat all e-mail addresses as 'nominative' information whether 
or not the e-mail address uses a pseudonym or an anonymous re-mailer; the CNIL's 
authorization seeks to encourage pseudonymous and anonymous communications 
with the Mayor's Office, but makes no distinction for the treatment of such 
communications by the site.134 In another case, the CNIL granted permission to 
France Telecom to proceed with an e-mail service, Minitelnet, linking the Minitel to 
131 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, pp. 92-93 (1997)(describing Kieline's system for 
electronic payments.) 
132 CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertés, 97 (1988). 
133 Conseil d'état, Décision No. 148975 relative à la Chambre Syndicale Syntec 
Conseil du 9 juillet 1997. 
134 Délibération No. 97-051 du 30 juin 1997 concernant une demande d'avis présenté 
par la Mairie de Paris relative à un traitement d'informations nominatives mis en oeuvre dans le cadre 
du site Internet de la Ville de Paris. 
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the Internet.135 In this authorization as well, all e-mail addresses are considered 
nominative. While these decisions were clearly directed at the majority of cases where 
an e-mail address identifies an individual, they do not give direct encouragement to 
the use of anonymous or pseudonymous e-mail— anonymous and pseudonymous e-
mail messages will still be treated as nominative. 
2.1.3. Germany 
In the age of the Internet, new kinds ofinformation are generated and issues 
therefore arise as to which of these new data will be considered as "personal" data in 
the sense of German data protection law. The concept of "personal information" has 
traditionally been critical for deciding the applicability of data protection statutes, and 
German law follows this approach. Thus, the Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) 
seeks "to protect the individual against interference with his personality rights 
resulting from the handling of his personal data (personenbezogen Daten)."136 The 
Information and Communication Services Act (Informations- und 
Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz, or "IuKDG") states that it is to "apply to the 
protection of personal data used in teleservices."137 While the IuKDG incorporates 
the BDSG's definition of "personal data," the law also reduces the significance of this 
term by providing explicit protection for information that may or may not be 
"personal" under all circumstances. Such information includes utilization data 
(Nutzungsdaten) and information about pseudonyms. Moreover, the IuKDG 
identifies the first obligation of the provider of teleservices as making anonymity in 
cyberspace possible.138 Only when anonymity is not possible can personal data be 
created. 
At the same time as the IuKDG applies to "personal data," this Law itself does 
not define "personal data." Due to the relationship between the IuKDG and the 
Délibération No. 97-050 du 24 juin 1997 relative à une demande d'avis présenté 
par France Télécom concernant un traitement automatisé d'informations nominatives dénommé 
"Minitelnet." 
136 BDSG, §1(1). 
137 IuKDG, Article 2, § 1(1). 
138 IuKDG, Article 2, §4(1). 
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Federal Data Protection Act's (BDSG), this lack of definition obligates one to refer 
to the BDSG. The IuKDG explicitly indicates that the BDSG continues to apply to 
data processing unless specific language in the IuKDG speaks to the situation in 
question.139 Thus, the IuKDG Law does not abolish the BDSG, but replaces it only 
to the extent that this new law contains a specific, applicable regulation. 
In light of the IuKDG's definitional silence regarding "personal data," one is 
obligated to turn to the BDSG to determine the scope of "personal data" and whether 
IP addresses fall under this rubric. The term "personal data" is itself a critical one for 
the BDSG; as one treatise has noted, "personal data" is this law's "most important and 
most frequently utilized concept."140 In this context, BDSG, § 3 is the relevant 
section; it states, "'Personal data' means information (Angabe) concerning the personal 
or material circumstances of an identified or identifiable individual (data subject)."141 
Under German law, legal treatises have traditionally been accorded an 
important role in deciding the meaning of law. Thus, it is natural to turn to treatises 
for help in deciding the meaning of "personal data." According to the data protection 
treatise by Spiros Simitis et al., an identifiable individual exists in the sense of BDSG, 
§ 3 when the information in question "relate to this person and only to him."142 In this 
treatise, Ulrich Dammann uses encrypted personal information as an example of when 
information is identifiable and when it is not.143 Parties who receive encrypted 
information, but who do not have access to the necessary code to break the 
139 IuKDG, Art. 2, § 1(2). As one of the drafters of the IuKDG explains, "The Teleservices 
Data Protection Act concerns itself with the special conditions for the processing of data in 
Teleservices. Only in circumstances where the Teleservices Data Protection Law contains a special 
regulation does this regulation have priority over the general Federal Data Protection Law. If the 
Teleservices Data Protection Law contains no applicable statement, the Federal Data Protection Law 
is valid." Stefan Engel-Flechsig, Die datenschutzrechtlichen Vorschriften im neuen Informations- und 
Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz, Recht der Datenverarbeitung 59, 61 (2/1997) 
140 Ulrich Dammann, in Simitis et al, Kommentar zum BDSG, § 3, page 4. 
BDSG, § 3(1). 
Spiros Simitis, Ulrich Dammann et al, Kommentar zum Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, § 3, 
1-11 
11. 
143 Ulrich Dammann, in Simitis et al, Kommentar zum BDSG, §3,14. 
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encryption will not have personal information in their possession; once the code 
becomes accessible to them, however, the previously anonymous data will become 
identifiable and thus personal data. Deciding whether or not information is 
"identifiable," therefore, requires a determination of "the objective identifiability of the 
concerned party in the concrete case."144 
A different German data protection treatise speaks of "identifiability" as 
relating to the "knowledge, means and possibilities of the data processing body."145 
This work makes reference to "one's practical experience" regarding "that kind of 
possibility [of identifiability] that can be expected with a certain level of 
probability."146 Even when the use of additional information allows the individual to 
be "identifiable," the initial data in question becomes "personal data" for purposes of 
the BDSG only when the additional information are actually available and are likely 
to be used to make the information identifiable. 
This analysis is also supported by looking at a concept that is the opposite of 
identifiability— namely, anonymity. The BDSG, § 3(7) defines anonymization 
(Anonymisieren) as "the alteration of personal data in such a way that specific 
information on the personal or material circumstances of an identified or identifiable 
natural person can no longer be attributable to him or only with a disproportionately 
great expenditure of time, money, and labor."147 This definition supports the idea that 
"identifiability" depends on a likelihood that a reasonable effort can lead to personal 
data that refer to only one person. 
This analysis indicates that under German law: (1) when the use of IP 
addresses and other kinds of information (such as clickstream data) can be combined 
with other data to identify an individual, and (2) these data are likely to be used to 
make this identification, (3) initial information will be "identifiable" and, therefore, 
"personal data" under the IuKDG. The IuKDG supports this interpretation by 
explicitly providing specific protection for utilization data (Nutzungsdaten), 
144 Id. at 14 (emphasis removed). 
145 Peter Gola, Rudolf Schomerus, Hans-Joachim Ordemann, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz § 3 
(2.8, pg. 90) (6th ed. 1997). 
146 Id. 
147 BDSG, § 3(7). 
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accounting data (Abrechnungsdaten), contractual data (Bestandsdaten), and even 
pseudonyms. For example, utilization data, which are defined as information that 
enable the user to utilize teleservices,148 are to be erased as soon as possible and are 
not to be transmitted to other providers or third parties.149 It must also be stressed 
that, as will be discussed below, the IuKDG requires the provider of teleservices to 
make anonymous or pseudonymous use of its services possible. Thus, the first 
obligation for a provider under German data protection law is, "to the extent 
technically feasible and reasonable," to prevent personal information from ever being 
generated.150 
The IuKDG also indicates that IP addresses and clickstream data might 
sometimes be regarded as personal data by moving away from the BDSG's 
requirements regarding "data files."151 Under the Federal Data Protection Law, 
certain requirements apply only to information in data files. In contrast, the IuKDG 
states, "Unless otherwise provided in this Act, the relevant provisions concerning the 
protection of personal data shall be applicable even if the data are not processed or 
used in data files."152 This provision indicates that the IuKDG's data protection 
requirements will not hinge upon whether collections of personal information fulfill 
the BDSG's notion of "data files." 
Turning from the issue of IP addresses as personal data in Germany, this study 
will now consider anonymization and pseudonyms. The IuKDG contains strong and 
explicit provisions to make anonymity possible in the on-line world. The Law 
requires service providers "to offer the user anonymous use and payment of 
teleservices or use and payment under a pseudonym to the extent technically feasible 
148 Id. at Article 2, §6(1 )(1). 
149 Id. at Article 2, §6(2) & (3). 
150 Id., at Article 2, §4(1). See Article 2, §3(4)("The design and selection of technical 
devices to be used for teleservices shall be oriented toward the goal of collecting, processing and 
using either no personal data at all or as few data as possible."). 
151 See BDSG, § 3(2), § 14(1), § 20(2), § 27(1). 
152 IuKDG, Article 2, §1(2). 
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and reasonable."153 It also explicitly requires providers to inform users of these 
options.154 Moreover, a user has a right of access not only to the provider's stored 
data regarding his person but also to stored data about his pseudonym.155 
Pseudonyms also play an important role in the Law's regulation of profiling. 
The IuKDG generally restricts user profiles to circumstances under which 
pseudonyms are used. Such anonymous profiles are not to be linked to identifiable 
data.156 As the Law states, "Profiles retrievable under pseudonyms shall not be 
combined with data related to the bearer of the pseudonym."157 The issue of profiling 
will be explored in more detail below. 
It is important to note one important limitation on a certain kind of use of 
pseudonyms. As the section on cryptography discusses below, German law permits 
publicly certified digital signatures to be utilized on a pseudonymous basis,158 but 
requires the certification authority to know the individual's identity. Under certain 
circumstances, the certification authority must share that information with law 
enforcement authorities. 
Anonymity also plays an important role in limiting the use that providers may 
make of utilization and accounting data. The initial service provider may not transmit 
to other providers whose on-line services have been used any data other than 
accounting data and "anonymised utilization data for the purposes of their market 
research."159 In addition to these provisions regarding anonymization and 
pseudonyms, the IuKDG requires the provider to take technical and organizational 
precautions to ensure that "the user is protected against third parties obtaining 
153 IuKDG, Article 2, § 4. 
154 Id. 
155 IuKDG, Article 2, § 7. 
156 IuKDG, Article 2, § 4(4). 
Id. 
See section 2.5.3. 
IuKDG, Article 2, § 6(3). 
157 
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knowledge of his use of teleservices."160 These are extremely high standards that 
appear to prohibit the sharing of such data as "http" information about web sites 
visited with outside parties. 
One German on-line service provider is already following the requirements of 
the IuKDG. T-Online is the on-line service of Deutsche Telekom, which is the newly 
privatized former German state telecommunications service. Deutsche Telekom 
generally assigns e-mail addresses that consist only of numbers. It then allows each 
T-Online member to choose his own email name and terms the resulting email 
address, the "email Alias."161 By first starting out with an email address that is 
numerical and terming any transformation of this number into letters the "email Alias," 
T-Online emphasizes the customer's freedom to choose a pseudonym. 
2.1.4 United Kingdom 
The British data protection regime has no statutory provision specific 
to the Internet. No law speaks explicitly to the scope of information constituting 
"personal data" in connection with on-line services. The general data protection law, 
the Data Protection Act of 1984, defines "personal data" as "data consisting of 
information which relates to a living individual who can be identified from the 
information (or from that and other information in the possession of the data 
user)...."162 This definition clearly suggests that an IP address will be viewed as 
identifiable data when additional information allow it to be used identify the data user, 
but not when such additional information is unavailable. The Data Protection 
Registrar and the Home Office have both advocated such an interpretation of the law. 
The Registrar specifically addressed the issue of whether an email address is 
personal data in an official paper, "Data Protection and the Internet." In this 
document, the Registrar states: 
The answer [whether an ΓΡ address is personal data] will depend on a number 
of facts: whether the address is issued to a particular individual; what is the 
160 IuKDG, Article 2, § 4(2)(3). 
161 T-Online: Macht alles fuer jeden so einfach 22 (5/97). 
162 Data Protection Act 1984, 1(3). 
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context in which it is held; whether it itself identifies an individual; etc. If the 
address can be related to an identifiable individual either from itself or from 
itself and other information in the possession of the data user, it is personal 
data.163 
In this view, an e-mail address is personal data under British data protection law only 
when it can be related to an identifiable person. 
The Home Office has taken a similar approach in its paper regarding the 
Government's proposals for implementing the European Directive.164 In this paper, 
which was issued in July 1997, the Home Office states that it interprets the term 
'"personal data' as excluding anonymous information to which identifiers are unlikely 
to be capable of being attached."165 The Home Office provides the following example, 
"[W]here a person holds data which are to him anonymous and does not hold 
complementary information which might help to identify the people concerned, the 
mere existence of such information elsewhere should not make the data personal 
within the meaning of the Directive. There must be a reasonable likelihood of the two 
pieces ofinformation being brought together."166 
This analysis is analogous to established British data protection law regarding 
telephone numbers.167 Generally, telephone numbers are viewed as personal 
information in the United Kingdom when they refer to an individual subscriber. As 
for work telephone numbers, these can become personal information depending on 
the circumstances. For example, when a telephone number is assigned to a specific 
person, or when telephone calls are logged and attributed to a specific person, an 
extension number will become a personal number. 
163 http://www.open.gov.ulc/dpr/internet.htm 
164 Data Protection: The Government's Proposals (July 1997). 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ 
datapl.htm> 
165 Id. at 2.3. 
,66 I d 
167 This analysis is based on a personal communication from a member of the staff of the 
Data Protection Registrar. 
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The Data Protection Act does not itself explicitly include anonymity as one of 
its core seven data protection principles. Anonymity does clearly relate, however, 
to several of these principles; perhaps the two most relevant principles are "fairness" 
and to collect only personal information that is "adequate, relevant and not 
excessive."168 
The Data Protection Registrar has emphasized the importance of anonymity 
in the on-line world. One of the most important such references to anonymity came 
in the Data Protection Registrar's response to "government.direct," which is an 
important British initiative for the on-line delivery of government services. The 
"government.direct" Green Paper pointed to strategies for the electronic delivery of 
such services as "providing information, collecting taxes, granting licenses, 
administering regulation, paying grants and benefits, collecting and analysing 
statistics, and procuring goods and services."169 "government.direct" seeks to utilize 
information technology to bring government closer to the individual, make public 
services more accessible, and give citizens and businesses more control over their 
dealing with the government.170 
In response to this initiative, the Data Protection Registrar stressed the 
importance of anonymity. The Registrar observed, "Where services are to be 
delivered electronically, service or benefit providers do not necessarily need to know 
at all times the precise identify of an individual."171 Technology is to be made 
available that will provide individuals with a secure method of authorizing and 
authenticating transactions electronically while also "minimising the need for actual 
identification whenever possible."172 This minimalization of identification of data 
users will be made possible through the incorporation of privacy enhancing 
technologies. 
It is likely that anonymity and the use of pseudonyms will play an increasing 
168 Data Protection Act 1984, Schedule 1, Part I. 
169 <http://www.open.gov.uk/citu/gdirect/greenpaper/chapl .htm> 
170 <http://www.open.gov.uk/citu/gdirect/greenpaper/foreword.htm> 
171 Response to Government.Direct Including a Paper on Privacy Enhancing Technology, 
Appendix 11,13 Activities Report, 103. 
172 Id. 
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important role in British data protection. The most likely trend in an on-line 
environment is for anonymity and the use of pseudonyms to be interpreted as key 
elements of the core data protection principles. 
2.2 Jurisdiction: Registration and Supervision by Data Protection 
Authorities 
The international nature of on-line services raises a second set of jurisdictional 
issues regarding the territorial applications of substantive data protection rules. The 
European Directive instructs each member state to apply its national provisions when: 
(a) the processing is carried out by a data controller in the member state, including 
situations in which a controller may be processing personal data in several member 
states, (b) the national law applies by virture of international public law even though 
the controller may not be established in that member state, or (c) the controller is 
outside the Community, but makes use of equipment within the Community for 
purposes of processing the information.173 In effect, multiple national laws may apply 
to on-line services. 
Registration requirements with data protection authorities and supervision by 
these officials offer a good glimpse of the scope of data protection regulation for on-
line services and a practical set of conflicting issues that might arise. The European 
Directive requires notification to Member State data protection authorities prior to 
the processing of personal data.174 Existing laws in European nations already require 
that a data user who holds personal information register all nonexempt data with the 
national oversight authority. For example, the United Kingdom's Data Protection 
Registrar has summarized its national requirements in this fashion, "every data user 
who holds personal data must be registered, unless all the data are exempt."175 
With the Internet, however, any information that is on-line may be transferred 
to any Internet user anywhere in the world. On-line services and web browsing often 
involve the collection of information by a server located in a country other than the 
user's state. For example, a French Internet user may fill in a form found while 
173 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 4. See also id., at Recitals 18-20. 
174 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 18. 
Data Protection Registrar, The Guidelines, p.6 (Third Series, Nov. 1994). 
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searching the World Wide Web to request product information. The form may reside 
on a server in Montreal, but the server may send the collected personal data for 
processing in Frankfurt/Main. As a result, the various sites and foreign data users 
may have an obligation to register with one or more given European data protection 
authorities. Examination of the obligation to register is a shorthand way of assessing 
the applicability of the full set of data protections to remote, global activities. 
On-line services challenge the effectiveness of data protection officials' 
supervision of data processing practices. Article 28 of the European Directive 
requires the creation of such independent authorities who will be "responsible for 
monitoring the application within its territory of the provisions adopted by the 
Member States." The European Directive also requires each national data protection 
authority to pay attention to data processing outside national boundaries through its 
provisions regarding international data transfers. Such extraterritorial oversight will 
be far from easy to carry out. As a further element of difficulty, in Germany, where 
federal and state data protection commissioners have different kinds of oversight 
authority, the question of who has responsibility for oversight of international on-line 
services will arise. This sub-section will seek to analyze how the Member States 
interpret the applicability of their national laws to global activities on the Internet. 
2.2.1 Belgium 
Belgium requires the filing of a declaration to the CPVP prior to the 
commencement of any processing of personal information.176 While no special rules 
apply to online services, the general data protection law will require the declaration 
of processing for such services. The law seeks to assure the disclosure of data 
processing activities. The declaration must indicate: (a) the date of application or the 
date of the law, decree, ordinance, or regulatory action that authorized the processing; 
(b) the name and address of the person responsible for processing the information; (c) 
the name and address of the person managing the processing; (d) the purpose for the 
processing; (e) the types ofinformation being processed, specifically identifying any 
forms of sensitive information; (f) the persons authorized to obtain the personal 
information; (g) the guarantees for medical data; (h) the means by which individuals 
are given notice of the processing, the office where the right of access may be 
Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 17, § 1er. 
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exercised, and the measures taken to facilitate such right; (i) the maximum duration 
of storage, use and dissemination.177 For public sector data processing, a statute or 
Royal Decree must authorize the processing of personal information prior to the filing 
of the declaration. Like many of its counterparts in other countries, the CPVP has an 
important advisory role in the preparation of such statutes and decrees.178 
As a reflection of the extremely broad territorial scope of the Belgian data 
protection law, this declaration requirement applies to "any automatic treatment even 
ifall or part of the processing takes place abroad in the event that such processing is 
directly accessible in Belgium by means that are specific to the processing."179 In 
effect, this creates a substantive choice of law rule that makes Belgian standards the 
applicable law for the treatment of personal information.180 When no human 
intervention is needed and the processing abroad is accessible in Belgium, then 
Belgian law will apply. This principle establishes that if a user of personal information 
is in Belgium, the location of actual processing is irrelevant for the application of 
Belgian law to the user of the personal information and the processing must be 
declared to the CPVP.181 The converse may also apply: if the user of personal 
information is located outside of Belgium, but obtains access to information in 
Belgium, then the Belgian rules might apply to the use of the personal information. 
The law, however, is ambiguous in this situation.182 According to the CPVP, the law 
does not apply to processing not "directly accessible" outside of Belgium.183 The 
official examples used for accessibility examine the inbound flow ofinformation (i.e. 
177 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 17, £ 3. 
178 CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1992-1993, p. 11-12(1997). 
179 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 3,§ 1er. 
M-Η. Boulanger, C. De Terwangne et Th. Léonard, La protection de la vie privée à 
l'égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel— La Loi du 8 décembre 1992, Journal des 
Tribunaux, 15 mai 1993, p. 375. 
181 CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1994-1995, p. 17-18 (1997) (explaining the 
Commission's interpretation of the territorial reach of the Belgian law.) 
Id. 
Id. 
46 
data held outside of Belgium for use within Belgium under the control of someone 
within Belgium). But, the statute expressly applies the notice requirements to the 
collection of information occurring within Belgium for processing outside of 
Belgium,184 and the law forbids the collection within Belgium for processing abroad 
of sensitive data that would otherwise be restricted under the law.185 If the Belgian 
law applied fully to situations in which obtaining data within Belgium sufficed to apply 
Belgian law to the processing, this special export provision would not be necessary 
for sensitive data. 
In either case, the broad territorial reach is likely to have significant impact for 
on-line services. Anytime personal information residing on servers outside of Belgium 
is used within Belgium, multiple laws will apply to the on-line activity; the law of the 
place where the server is located as well as the law of Belgium. Similarly, if 
information originates in Belgium, foreign services may still find themselves subject 
to Belgian law. If they do not, then the difference in territorial application provides 
a disincentive to locate electronic services in Belgium. In particular, the location of 
a server outside of Belgium with data being input world-wide, such as through the 
completion of an on-line subscription form, might avoid the strictures of the Belgian 
law. The processing would not be "accessed" within Belgium— rather the data would 
be obtained within Belgium. 
When Belgian law applies, the user or "controller" of the database (the 
"maître du fichier") must have a presence in Belgium, either through an existing legal 
domicile, through the election of a Belgian domicile, or, for foreign parties, through 
the designation of a Belgian agent.186 The status of "controller," however, is a vague 
concept in the Belgian law. Article 6 of the data protection law defines the 
"controller" as the person or entity "competent to decide the purposes of processing 
or the type of information to be included."187 According to the CPVP, the 
184 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 4. The CPVP takes the position that this obligation 
only attaches if the information will be "accessible" in Belgium. CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1994-
1995, p. 18(1997) 
185 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 3, j> 2. 
186 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 1 § 6. 
187 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 1 I 6. 
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"controller" will be the person ultimately responsible for the information.188 
Belgium has faced some difficulty assessing an appropriate fee for the 
declaration of processing. At present, the fees are progressive according to the 
significance of the data processing as measured by the number of individuals to whom 
the processing relates and whether the declaration is made on paper or in electronic 
form.189 
Under the Belgian law, a Royal Decree can exempt categories of processing 
from the obligation to declaration requirement if the information and the processing 
obviously do not threaten privacy.190 This provision was inspired by the French law 
authorizing the national data protection authority to allow simplified registration for 
certain types of data processing.191 In Belgium, a wide range of common data 
processing activities have been exempted from declaration, particularly those 
involving: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Salary administration 
Personnel management (excluding health information or 
sensitive information) 
Accounting 
Partner and shareholder administration 
Client and supplier management 
Member and donor administration 
Communications data 
Visitors' logs 
Student records 
Communal registries 
188 CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1994-1995, pp. 15-16(1997). 
189 Arrêté royal no. \2bis du 16 mars 1996 modifiant l'arrêté royal no. 12 du 7 mars 
relatif à la contribution à verser lors de la déclaration des traitements de données à caractère personnel 
à la Commission de la protection de la vie privée, M.B., 15 mars 1996, p. 5801 et seq. 
190 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 17 § 8. 
191 Rappor au Roi sur l'Arrêté Royal (No. 13) du 12 mars 1996, M.B., 15 mars 1996, 
p. 5802 (noting the Belgian transplantation from French law). For a discussion of France, see j> 2.2.2, 
infra. 
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11. Public registers 
12. Social security 
13. Processing pursuant to specific rules.192 
The treatment of personal information will only qualify for the exemption from 
declaration, however, if a set of specific conditions exist for the processing: (1) a 
predetermined finality limits the type ofinformation being processed; (2) restrictions 
on the source of storage are imposed; (3) restrictions on data use are imposed; (4) the 
communication to third parties of the information is prohibited; and (5) a limitation 
on the duration of data storage exists.193 If these conditions are not met, then the 
Royal Decree does not grant an exemption from the law's declaration requirement; 
the processing is permissible subject to satisfaction of the declaration obligation as 
well as the other data protection principles contained in the law. 
Various aspects or functions of online activities may, thus, qualify for the 
exemption from declaration. However, these exemptions are reasonably specific by 
comparison to many Internet activities. The exemption for "visitors' logs" would 
probably not apply, for example, to the log files maintained by many web sites to track 
usage. The exemption only covers controlled entry logs of visitors to work sites and 
may only include specific information: name, professional address, identification of the 
employer, identification of the person's car used for site access, the area and identity 
of the person being visited and the date and time of the visit.194 While many parallels 
exist between these physical site logs and virtual site logs, only the processing strictly 
conforming to the Royal Decree can be exempt from declaration. 
For on-line services, a significant gap appears to exist between the legal 
requirements and actual practices. For example, despite the declaration requirement, 
none of the major operators of on-line services in Belgium has declared the treatment 
192 Arrêté Royal (No. 13) du 12 mars 1996 portant exemption conditionelle de 
l'obligation de déclaration pour certaines catégories de traitements automisés de données à caractère 
personnel qui ne présentent manifestement pas de risque d'atteinte à la vie privée, M.B., 15 mars 
1996, p. 5816; CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1996, pp.48-49 (1997). 
193 Id. 
194 Arrêté Royal (No. 13) du 12 mars 1996, art. 9. 
49 
of personal information to the CPVP.195 While account management and 
communications data for switching purposes are exempt from declaration, subscriber 
profiling and the transmission of subscriber data to third parties such as the 
transmission of IP addresses and information concerning subscriber's browsers196 
would not be covered by the exemption. 
In terms of supervision, the Belgian data protection law disbanded the 
Commission consultative de la protection de la vie privée and created a new, semi-
independent supervisory authority— the CPVP, Commission de protection de la vie 
privée191 In addition, specific laws may establish a sectoral advisory committee such 
as the Oversight Committee of the Banque-carrefour de la sécurité sociale.198 While 
the members of the CPVP are appointed to serve as independent watchdogs, the 
CPVP itself depends upon the Ministry of Justice for both its staff and budget.199 This 
dependance vitiates complete independent oversight of data protection. The 
transposition of the European Directive should affect this structure,200 but the revised 
draft of the proposed Belgian legislation does not offer any modification to the 
institutional arrangements.201 
195 A search of the Commission's register for Microsoft Network (MSN), Skynet, 
CompuServe, Datapak, and Interpac on August 5, 1997 revealed no entries. 
196 This is generally part of the <http> protocol information that is transmitted to 
remote web sites. 
197 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 23. 
See Loi du 15 janvier 1990 relative à l'institution et à l'organisation d'une Banque-
carrefour de la sécurité sociale, chapitre VI, M.B., 22 février 1990, pp. 3295 et. seq. 
199 Id.; CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1996, p. 58 (1997). 
200 C?VP, Rapport d'activité 1996, p. 58 (1997) citing Avis No. 30/96 du 13 
novembre 1996 concerant Γ Avant-Projet de loi adaptant la loi du 8 décembre 1992 à la Directive 
européenne. 
See Projet de loi adaptant la loi du 8 décembre 1992 relative à la protection de la 
vie privée à l'égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel à la Directive 95/46/CE du 24 
octobre 1995 du Parlement européen et du Conseil relative à la protection des personnes physiques à 
l'égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données 
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2.2.2 France 
France requires the public disclosure of all data processing of nominative 
information and assigns the role of supervision to the CNIL. Public sector data 
processing may not take place without specific statutory authority or a regulation 
promulgated after approval by the CNIL.202 If the CNIL refuses to approve the 
proposed regulation, then the processing may only take place following approval by 
the Council of State and adoption of a decree.203 For the private sector, France 
requires that a declaration be made to the CNIL of any processing of nominative 
information prior to the commencement of processing.204 The CNIL must accept any 
declaration formally complying with the required elements of disclosure.205 France 
does not have any particular statutory provision enumerating specific registration 
requirements for on-line services or for Internet activities. The general obligations 
apply to on-line services and, for these services, the territorial reach of the law 
appears to extend beyond French borders. 
In terms of supervision, authority rests with the CNIL and with individuals. 
The CNIL is charged with monitoring respect for the data protection law206 and may 
submit cases of illegality to the public prosecutor for enforcement actions.207 The 
CNIL has an indirect enforcement power, however, through its investigatory missions, 
site visits, and notification process.208 As a 'public order' statute, the data protection 
law includes criminal sanctions for violations of the requirements including 
registration. However, under the generally applicable principles of the French 
202 LoiNo. 78-18 du 6 janvier 1978,art. 15. 
203 I d 
204 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 Janvier 1978, art. 16. 
See Arrêt du Conseil d'État du 6 janvier 1997 (voiding the implicit rejection by the 
CNIL of a declaration of processing) reprinted in CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activitéé, p. 414 (1997) 
206 
207 
208 
LoiNo. 78-17 du6Janvier 1978, art. 6. 
Id., art. 11. 
Loi No. 78-17 du 6 Janvier 1978, art. 21. 
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criminal code, sanctions may only be imposed if the violation takes place on French 
territory or if one of the acts contributing to the violation takes place on French 
territory.209 This principle will, thus, limit these supervision powers over multinational 
on-line services to those activities taking place within France. For example, the 
CNIL's powers to compeli a party to comply with investigatory requests will not have 
force if the party is outside of France. Otherwise, individuals may also "supervise" 
data processing to the extent that the law gives individuals a right of access to their 
data and a right of correction.210 French law does not distinguish between residents 
and non-residents for these rights of access and correction. 
Ordinarily, the provisions of French national law apply only to processing 
activities in France. This territorial limitation is seen in the CNIL's authority to 
restrict transborder data flows if foreign processing will contravene French data 
protection principles.211 A law designed for extra-territorial application would not 
have a policy need to block foreign data transfers because it would presumably 
regulate this processing directly. 
In addition, the data protection law's registration requirement itself suggests 
that information partially obtained in France for purposes of processing abroad, such 
as the clickstream data generated in France from on-line services for use outside of 
France, is a data export.212 But, several recent decisions suggest that France will 
apply the French standards to anyone accessing data that is located within France.213 
209 Nouveau Code Pénal, Art. 113-2 ("La loi pénale française est applicable aux 
infractions commises sur le territoire de la République. L'infraction est réputée commise sur le 
territoire de la République dès lors qu'un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire.") 
210 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 34, 36. 
211 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 24 ("la transmission entre le territoire 
français et l'étranger, sous quelque forme que ce soit, d'informations nominatives faisant l'objet de 
traitements automatisés régis par l'article 16 ci-dessus[obligation de déclaration] peut être soumise à 
autorisation préalable ... en vue d'assurer le respect des principes posés par la présente loi."). 
212 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 19 ("la déclaration doit préciser: .... si le 
traitement est destiné à l'expédition d'informations nominatives entre le territoire français et 
l'étranger, sous quelque forme que ce soit, y compris lorsqu'il est l'objet d'opérations partiellement 
effectuées sur le territoire français à partir d'opérations antérieurement réalisées hor de France.") 
213 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité 1996, p. 106 
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In discussing the arrangements for airline reservation systems, the CNIL established 
that companies using international airline reservation systems must follow the legal 
standards of the place where the information was collected.214 Under this doctrine, 
any web site collecting nominative information from users located within France will 
be subject to the registration requirement of French law prior to collecting such 
information. Specifically, if a French user responded to a form on a foreign site that 
was used to collect nominative information, the foreign site would be required to 
register with the CNIL prior to accepting the information from the French user. In 
essence, access to information localized in France will be assimilated to processing 
such information in France; registration obligations will attach to the site of collection 
or to the point of data entry as well as the site of use. Thus, whether different actors 
must register under French data protection law may depend upon the nature of the 
contacts with the French forum and not just the situs of the actor. 
For data processing subject to the registration obligation, French law requires 
the designation of a person within France who controls the processing or, in the 
absence of a controller in France, the designation of a legal representative in France.215 
This requirement would oblige anyone accessing information on-line that is stored 
on a server located in France to designate an agent within France. The airline 
reservation systems decision also made an important point regarding the responsibility 
of parties in a decentralized network. Under the decision, equipment providers and 
service providers might be liable for data processing in each country where 
established.216 This position has important implications for browsers, search engines 
and similar technology. To the extent that these technologies create nominative 
information or search for nominative information on French web sites, they might be 
subject to French registration requirements and the obligations of the data protection 
statute. For example, the movement toward a definition of an Open Profiling 
Standard and the incorporation of such a standard in browser software would result 
in the retention by browser software of detailed, nominative information. Users 
would be asked to provide demographic information to the browser for future 
214 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité 1996, p. 106 
215 This requirement derives from the information that is required to be included in the 
registration declaration. Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 19. 
216 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité 1996, p. 106. 
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automatic collection by web sites. The retention and subsequent disclosure by 
browser software may make the manufacturer of the software responsible for some 
of the information processing activities.217 For example, the manner in which the 
browser software incorporates the Open Profile Standard is significant. A 
manufacture who requires that all data fields be completed prior to the installation of 
the browser software on a user's personal computer would be in likely contravention 
of the notice, opposition and relevancy requirements of the French data protection 
law. 
In essence, French law may result in multiple registrations for any single on-
line commerce activity. This result arises from clickstream data passing through many 
entities on the Internet and the likely broad interpretation of the definition of 
nominative information to include clickstream information collected by any recipient. 
For example, an on-line subscription to an electronic journal such as Le Monde will 
require the registration of the subscription and browsing processing by Le Monde, the 
browsing processing by the Internet Service Provider, the payment processing by the 
financial intermediary, and any profiling by third parties such as DoubleClick. 
The CNIL is just beginning to focus on registration issues and compliance by 
Internet Service Providers. In 1995, the CNIL announced an investigation of various 
on-line service providers including MSN, AOL and Club-Internet.218 However, to 
date the investigations have not been concluded and predictions regarding their impact 
would be premature. Nevertheless, the CNIL may be heading toward the eventual 
elaboration of a simplified registration process for Internet sites.219 This might 
alleviate the otherwise required lengthy application process for every Internet site 
collecting such minimal information as log files or IP addresses. 
French data protection law already allows the CNIL to accept "simplified 
Although the data would still be entered into the browser by the user and the data 
would be tagged by the user for different levels of disclosure, the manufacturer controls the data 
fields, formats and processing by the software (including security) that would each be subject to the 
protections of the data protection law. 
218 See CNIL, 16e Rapport d'activité, p. 86. 
Already, the CNIL has taken this approach for some limited public sector Internet 
sites. See Délibération No. 97-032 du 6 mai 1997 relative à la demande d'avis présenté par le 
premier ministre concernant un modèle-type de traitements d'informations nominative opérés dans le 
cadre d'un site Internet ministériel. 
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declarations" for routine processing that does not threaten privacy or freedom.220 For 
public sector sites, the CNIL has already granted permission for a proposed 
government regulation that would authorize agencies to establish Internet sites 
conforming to a specific model containing approved types ofinformation, finality and 
notice.221 At the moment, however, no simplified registration process for on-line 
services in the private sector. A number of existing simplified registration categories 
are relevant for on-line services and electronic commerce, such as account and billing 
data,222 client management processing,223 payment records held by financial 
institutions,224 or mailing list processing if used to send information other than 
commercial soliciations.225 However, these simplified declarations are unlikely to 
apply to many on-line services. To qualify for a simplified declaration, the processing 
must conform strictly to the requirements established by the CNIL including finality 
and types ofinformation collected. Yet, on-line services will generally collect types 
ofinformation, such as an e-mail addresses, encryption codes and log file information, 
that is not included in the authorization for simplified registration. 
France has also taken a special interest in the supervision of processing of data 
held in the public sector. A series of decisions concerning the use of on-line 
220 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 17. The CNIL has approved 40 simplified 
registration declaration forms. CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, at p. 13. 
221 Délibération No. 97-032 du 6 mai 1997 relative à la demande d'avis présenté par 
le premier ministre concernant un modèle-type de traitements d'informations nominative opérés dans 
le cadre d'un site Internet ministériel. 
222 Norme Simplifiée No. 14, Délibération No. 80-33 du 21 octobre 1980 concernant 
les traitements automatisés d'informations nominatives relatifs à la gestion des fichiers de 
fournisseurs comportant des personnes physiques. 
223 Norme Simplifiée No. 11, Délibération No. 80-21 du 24 juin 1980 concernant les 
traitements automatisés d'informations nominatives relatifs à la gestion des fichiers de clients. 
224 Norme Simplifiée No. 12, Délibération No. 80-22 du 8 juillet 1980 concernant les 
traitements automatisés d'informations nominatives relatifs à la tenue des comptes de la clientèle et le 
traitement des informations s'y rattachant par les établissements bancaires et assimilés. 
225 Norme Simplifiée No. 15, Délibération No. 80-32 du 21 octobre 1980 concernant 
les traitements automatisés d'informations nominatives relatifs aux listes d'adresses ayant pour objet 
l'envoi d'informations 
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directories demonstrates particular concern for the territorial application of French 
law. The CNIL has required public agencies to warn Internet users that directory 
services supplied by the agency on their sites are subject to the protections of the 
French law. In one case, the CNIL noted that the site operators planned to put the 
notice in French as well as English along with the text of the French law in both 
languages.226 The fact that the CNIL endorsed an English language notice for the 
French web site is in itself extraordinary, given the national emphasis on the French 
language. France seems to be using the host site within France as a pressure point for 
assuring local standards in the international environment. 
2.2.3 Germany 
On-line services can pose difficult challenges to a requirement of registration 
with a data protection authority and raise complicated issues regarding the ability of 
these officials to supervise and oversee data processing. This Study's analysis of these 
issues in Germany begins with a discussion of German law's traditional decentralized 
approach to data protection supervision. Data protection oversight agencies have 
been created at both the federal and state levels in Germany. 
The federal data protection law (BDSG) assigns an oversight role for the 
federal public sector to the Federal Data Protection Commissioner.227 State data 
protection laws assign to state data protection commissioners a similar oversight role 
over state public organizations. As for the private sector, the BDSG assigns 
governmental oversight over private organizations to the so-called "Supervisory 
Authority."228 Some states have assigned this oversight role to existing state data 
protection commissioners; other states have granted these duties to a different 
governmental authority. Finally, the BDSG requires companies in the private sector 
to appoint an internal data protection officer if they have at least five employees 
226 See CNIL, 16e Rapport d'activité 84-85 (1996). 
227 BDSG, §§ 22-26 . 
228 BDSG, § 38. 
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involved with processing personal data.229 These officers are to monitor the proper 
use of projects involving the processing of personal data.230 
German data protection commissioners in the public sector and the 
Supervisory Authorities in the private sector primarily have an advisory role. 
Although binding legal decisions concerning data processing generally rest elsewhere 
(exceptions will be discussed below), these data protection authorities cam investigate 
certain data processors. The federal and state data protection coranwssioneirs can 
submit formal complaints to the responsible ministers at the level of tibe federal 
government and Lander. Moreover, BDSG, § 38(4) allows the Snpemsmy 
Authority "to enter the property and office premises of the body during business hows 
and to conduct examinations and inspections there."2311 The data protection 
authorities can also issue appeals to the media and to the legislature. Moreover, data 
protection authorities have a special obligation to help anyone who believes that the 
processing of her personal data has caused a hardship to her privacy rights.. 
Germany does not grant its data protection authorities the power to Bcenise 
collections of personal data. In addition, except in a limited range of ckcaainsltances, 
data protection authorities cannot order governmental or private bodies that process 
information to take certain actions or desist from other behavior. Thus, the BDSG 
requires the Federal Data Protection Commissioner to lodge complaints with other 
authorities should he "discover any violation of the provisions of this Act or of other 
provisions on data protection or some other irregularities in the processing or use of 
personal data."232 State data protection commissioners also have a sàniar power 
(Beanstandungsrecht)233 As for the Supervisory Authorities, who are appointed in 
easch state to monitor private organizations, they can direct measures to be taken only 
"to eliminate technical or organizational shortcomings."234 
229 BDSG, §§ 36-37. 
230 BDSG, § 37. 
231 BDSG, § 38(4). 
232 BDSG, § 25. 
233 See, e.g., Hessisches Datenschutzrecht, § 27. 
234 BDSG, § 38(5). 
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German law does require, however, that data processing bodies maintain 
registers of certain data banks. For example, BDSG, § 18 requires public bodies to 
"maintain a register of the data-processing systems used."235 This register is shared 
with the Federal Data Protection Commissioner and may be inspected by anyone. As 
David Flaherty has noted, "the register allows reflection on the bureaucratic 
development of public administration by identifying the reasons for the existence and 
use of certain data bases."236 
In the private sector, the Supervisory Authority is also required to keep a 
register of certain data banks. The BDSG requires "[bjodies which store personal 
data as business" to notify the relevant supervisory authorities.237 Electronic 
registration does not yet appear to be taking place in Germany. As Stefan Walz, the 
data protection commissioner of Bremen, has noted, the register is the "foundation 
and the essential orientation for my inspection activities."238 As noted above, these 
inspection activities take place under the authority granted in BDSG, §38(4). 
The IuKDG remains within the traditional German approach to oversight. 
First, it requires no additional registration requirement. The IuKDG states, "Within 
the scope of the law, teleservices shall not be subject to licensing or registration."239 
This section means that the BDSG's registration requirement will control. To the 
extent that on-line services "store personal data as business,"240 they will be required 
to register with the Supervisory Authority. 
As for monitoring, the IuKDG also takes a traditional approach by granting 
power to the states' Supervisory Authority. The IuKDG gives the Supervisory 
Authorities monitoring power through a cross-reference to BDSG, § 38, which is the 
section that sets out this institution's power. The IuKDG extends this power; it does 
235 BDSG, §18. 
236 David Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies 60 (1989). 
237 BDSG, § 32. 
238 Landesbeauftragter für den Datenschutz, 19. Jahresbericht 47 (1997) [hereinafter cited 
as Bremen Data Protection Commissioner, 19th Report]. 
239 IuKDG, Article I, §4. 
240 See BDSG, § 32. 
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so by stating, "an examination may be carried out [by the Supervisory Authority] even 
if there are not grounds to suppose that data protection provisions have been 
violated."241 This statement makes clear the Supervisory Authority's ability to monitor 
private sector data protection exists irrespective of investigations based on a suspicion 
of violations.242 
As for the Federal Data Protection Commissioner, the IuKDG also assigns 
oversight authority to this figure. The Federal Data Protection Commissioner is to 
"observe the development of data protection as applied to the provision and utilization 
of teleservices and ... make relevant activities in the activity report he has to submit" 
to the German Bundestag U3 
The IuKDG does not require any registration requirement beyond that of the 
BDSG. This approach means that the IuKDG itself will have no impact on the 
registration obligations for data processing related to on-line services. The process 
of registration could be greatly simplified, however, were electronic on-line 
registration possible in Germany. This possibility does not yet seem to be under 
discussion. 
As for monitoring, both the state Supervisory Authorities and the Federal Data 
Protection Commissioners will play important roles in this area. In addition, the 
IuKDG strengthens the ability of the state Supervisory Authorities by making clear 
its ability to visit the premises of on-line service providers and demand information 
from them. 
Early drafts of the IuKDG also discussed the concept of a data protection 
audit (Datenschutz-Audit). A data protection audit would be carried out by 
independent experts hired by on-line service providers. It would support the role of 
the internal data protection official and make possible the use of a "data protection 
seal of approval" for on-line services that met the approved standards. Unfortunately, 
the IuKDG as enacted fails to contain provisions for the data protection audit.244 
241 IuKDG, Article 2, § 8(2). 
242 BDSG, § 38. 
243 IuKDG, Article 2, § 8(2). 
244 The Federal Data Protection Commissioner has objected to this absence of 
provisions for a data protection audit. In his most recent report of activities, Dr. Jacob notes, 
The lack of a 'seal of quality,' which the audit would have made possible, prevents or makes 
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Although the IuKDG does not set up rules for a data protection audit, such a process 
can still be carried out on a voluntary basis.245 In contrast to the IuKDG's failure to 
enact provisions for a data protection audit, the Media Services Interstate Agreement 
contains an explicit statutory provision that permits data protection audits to be 
carried out.246 
2.2.4. United Kingdom 
As this Study has noted above, the Data Protection Registrar has critical 
powers through the registration process.247 The Data Protection Act requires 
registration of a data user who holds personal data unless all the data are exempt. A 
register entry must include a description of the personal data held and the purposes 
for which the data are held or used, the sources from whom the data user may obtain 
the information constituting the data, and the overseas country to which the data user 
may transfer the data.248 
Over the past two years, considerable discussion has taken place regarding 
potential simplification of the registration process. In response, the registration 
more difficult the orientation that is necessary for a wide acceptance and that will above all 
make possible the widescale entry into the information society. The Federal Republic of 
Germany is thereby renouncing an important future advantage for itself in global 
competition— namely its advantage in data protection, which it has won through experience. 
Federal Data Protection Commissioner, 16th Activity Report, 143. 
245 For a discussion, see Stefan Engel-Flechsig, Die datenschutzrechtlichen Vorschriften in 
neuen Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz, Recht der Datenverarbeitung 59,66-67 
(Heft 2/1997). 
246 Media Services Interstate Agreement, § 17. 
247 Through the registration process, the Data Protection Registrar can serve an Enforcement 
Notice that directs a registered person to take specific steps to comply with the Data Privacy Law and 
in particular to the data protection principles. The Registrar can also issue a De-registration Notice 
that cancels from the Register the whole or part of any registration entry and a Transfer Prohibition 
Notice that prevents the transfer of personal data overseas. If the Registrar takes such enforcement 
action, the data user may appeal this action to the independent Data Protection Tribunal. See Data 
Protection Act 1984, Part II.4-20. 
248 See id at 6-9. 
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process has been revised and streamlined. Registration is now possible on-line with 
the use of templated registration forms, based on the nature of businesses. In 
addition, access to the public register is now available on-line.249 Approximately 500 
applications to register are currently made each week.250 Additional changes are also 
planned regarding registration. The Home Secretary and the Data Registrar both seek 
to replace the current registration model with a new "notification" scheme. The 
process for notification is intended to further simplify the required process and to 
minimize the details that the controller has to provide.251 
The United Kingdom does not have a particular statutory provision 
enumerating specific registration/notification requirements for on-line services or for 
Internet activities. The Data Registrar has issued a paper, however, regarding "Data 
Protection and the Internet" that examines registration issues.252 In this document, the 
Registrar states her view that most businesses who are planning to use the Internet for 
activities currently carried out by other means are likely to be already registered. For 
these data users, use of the Internet will require review of the register entry and 
decisions as to the extent that circumstances of data use may have changed.253 
One important area in which the Internet changes the circumstances of 
publication is when biographical details of an organization's staffare published on the 
World Wide Web. As the Registrar states: 
There are some cases ... where the use of the Internet as the medium, for 
example, to publish information greatly increases the potential for access to 
the information.... Such information may have been made available to 
enquirers anyway, but publication over the Web is quite different to 
249 http://www.open.gov.uk/dpr/register.htm 
250 Data Protection Registrar, Thirteenth Annual Report 5 (1997). 
251 Home Office, Data Protection: The Government's Proposals at 5.3; Paper 4, Data 
Protection Registrar, Questions to Answer: Data Protection and the EU Directive 33-46 (1996). 
252 Data Protection and the Internet: Guidance on Registration, 
<http://www.open.gov.uk/dpr/ 
internet.htm>. 
253 Id. 
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publication by more traditional means. 254 
The Registrar recommends that in such cases where extensive use is made of the 
Internet, the data user describe the use of the Internet in the registration in free text. 
In instances where the Internet is utilized to provide access to personal data, 
further international transfer of the data is easily possible. The Data Protection 
Registrar recommends that if a possibility exists that access to personal data "might 
be available widely over the Internet," the "worldwide" box on the registration form 
should be checked with a free text description. The Registrar suggests use of the 
following text, "Personal data held for this purpose may be transmitted over the 
Internet. Transfers of personal data may therefore take place, potentially to any 
country in the world."255 
The Registrar appears to be taking a cautious approach as to whether or not 
foreign website must register in the United Kingdom if they collect personal data in 
the United Kingdom. The Registrar has noted: 
[Mjerely accessing personal data on the Internet by a person who does not 
control the contents and use of the data does not create a liability for 
registration. However, downloading and retaining a copy of the data for 
further processing implies control over the contents and use of the copy, and, 
unless the data are exempt, is likely to require registration.256 
This statement may indicate that a foreign business will be subject to the registration 
requirement if it controls this information. This statement may be intended, however, 
only to refer to domestic data users. 
The Home Office has recently offered a comment regarding the geographical 
extent of any new Data Protection Law.257 In its proposal, a new British data 
254 Id at 2. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 4. 
257 Data Protection: The Government's Proposals, 2.23. 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk.datap4.htm>. 
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protection law is to apply to processing: (1) by a controller established only in the 
United Kingdom; (2) for the purposes of the United Kingdom branch of a controller 
established in more than one more European Union country; (3) by a controller 
established outside the United Kingdom but in a place where United Kingdom law 
applies; (4) by a controller not established in the European Union but who uses 
equipment in the United Kingdom. In the fourth case, the organization in question 
is to be obligated to designate a representative as controller in the United Kingdom.258 
This proposal raises significant questions in the context of on-line services, but 
the Home Office's proposal does not explicitly define the activities that will constitute 
the "use of equipment in the UK." This language itself follows that found in the 
European Directive.259 Two further sources can be examined regarding the 
issue on registration in the on-line world. The UK Data Protection Act states that it 
"does not apply to a data user in respect of data held... outside the United 
Kingdom."260 Here, the critical concept is that data must be treated as "held" where 
the data user exercises control over them.261 The Data Protection Act further refers 
to "control over data" as control "over the contents and use of the data comprised in 
the collection."262 Due to the international nature of the Internet, on-line processing 
activity in the Australia, Hong Kong or the United States may also involve computers 
in the United Kingdom itself. It may be that the "control" over the contents of the 
data will be exercised outside of the United Kingdom. If so, foreign websites will not 
be required to register in the United Kingdom or be subject to British data protection 
law. 
258 Id. 
259 See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, article 4(1 )(c) 
("Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this Directive to the 
processing of personal data where: the controller is not established on Community territory and, for 
purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the 
territory of the said Member State, unless such equipment is used only for purposes of transit through 
the territory of the Community."). 
260 
261 
262 
Data Protection Act 1985, § 39. 
Id at § 39(2)(a). 
Id at §l(2)(b). 
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The Consultation Paper on the Data Protection Directive offers some final 
light on the issue of registration.263 This paper states that when data is processed 
outside of the Community, the national law to apply is "the law of the Member State 
in which the equipment used for processing (eg a computer) is situated."264 The paper 
then offers the following example, "[A] controller based in, for example, the United 
States, who carried out processing operations using equipment in the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany would be subject to the national law of each of those 
Member States in respect of the particular processing operations carried out using the 
equipment in the Member State in question."265 Here, too, the question of the 
geographic extent of British law turns on the nature of "using equipment" in the 
United Kingdom. An Internet operation with its server in the United States can easily 
access personal data of an individual located in the United Kingdom— such activity 
will require "use" of equipment inside and outside the United Kingdom. 
Finally, as a general observation about registration in the United Kingdom, 
there appear to be a number of difficulties with compliance. As already noted, the 
Data Protection Registrar hopes to improve the number of registrations through on-
line registration and streamlining of requirements. Moreover, statistics indicate that 
registrations are on the increase and that knowledge of the Data Protection Act is at 
an all time high.266 Nevertheless, it is likely that the number of current registrations 
cannot begin to approach all those within the United Kingdom who process personal 
data.267 This observation can probably also fairly be made regarding other countries 
263 Consultation Paper on the EC Data Protection Directive, at 2.22. 
<http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/ 
Consult/ukdp/dataprot.htm>. 
264 Id. at 2.25. 
265 Id. at 2.25. 
266 Data Protection Registrar, 13th Activity Report at 29-34. 
267 In 1996-97, there were 200,864 registered data users in the UK. 13th Annual Report at 
21. 
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with a registration requirement.268 
As more data processing takes place on-line, the number of businesses and 
individuals subject to a registration requirement is likely to increase greatly. As the 
Registrar has noted of computing, "It is all pervasive, almost universal and employed 
not just by very large organizations in a highly structured manner, but by businesses 
of all sizes and millions of individuals."269 Despite the Registrar's ongoing efforts to 
simplify registration requirements and to increase awareness of the Data Protection 
Act, it is not clear that a high level of compliance will exist in the on-line environment. 
For example, two of the United Kingdom's leading on-line newspapers, the Times and 
the Electronic Telegraph, collect personal information from their on-line readers as 
part of a registration process that is a condition to reading the web version of their 
periodicals.270 Yet, as of December 5, 1997, neither newspaper had registered with 
the Data Protection Registrar. 
2.3 Transparency 
As noted above, transparency is one of the core principles of European data 
protection law.271 This standard requires that the processing of personal information 
be structured in a fashion that is open and understandable for the individual. 
Moreover, transparency requires that individuals have rights of access and correction 
to stored person information.272 
In the context of on-line services and the Internet, this data protection 
standard is subject to great stress. In current practice, on-line service participants do 
not generally offer information about how they handle personal data. While many 
service providers are beginning to offer notice to their subscribers,273 many web sites 
268 See, e.g., Landesbeauftragter fur den Datenschutz, Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 
19. Jahresbericht (1997) (122 registrations for the state of Bremen). 
269 Questions to Answer, at 4. 
270<http://www.the-times.co.uk/;http://www.telegraph.co.uk.> 
271 See supra j 1.2.2. 
272 Id. 
273 See, e.g., Part I, j>j> 1.4.3,1.5.2 ; Part II, case studies. 
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collecting personal information do not. Yet, such transparency is technically capable 
of being provided. Thus, as the first part of this Study has noted, one world wide web 
site even permits individuals to test in real time the information that a server can 
collect about him.274 
Similarly, access and correction rights do not generally appear to be offered 
by on-line service participants. Like transparency, these rights are technically feasible 
in the on-line environment. 
2.3.1 Belgium 
The Belgian law requires notice to individuals at the time of collection of 
personal information if such information is being collected directly from the 
individual.275 The notice must inform the individual of the identity of the person 
responsible for the processing, the finality of the data being collected, the possibility 
to find additional information from the declaration to the CPVP, and the individual's 
right to access and correct the stored personal information.276 If information is only 
collected indirectly, then the individuals must be notified contemporaneously with the 
storage of the information.277 Nevertheless, separate contemporaneous notice for 
indirect collections of personal information is not required if a contractual relationship 
exists between the individual and the person processing the information.278 Notice is 
also not required when: 
• notice has previously been provided and the purposes have not been 
modified since the delivery of the notice; 
• the treatment of the information relates exclusively to the 
identification of individuals for the purpose of public relations, social 
See, e.g., <http://www.anonymiser.com>. 
Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 4(1). 
Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 4. 
Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 9. 
Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 9. 
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or professional relations provided, however, that the person concerned 
directly communicated the information; 
• the information is uniquely incorporated as secondary information 
incidental to processing of information about another person and 
provided such incidental information is not processed independently 
and not used for any other purpose; 
• the processing consists of information made public by the person 
concerned and the exclusive purpose of processing is the pursuit of 
the purpose for which the person concerned made the information 
public; 
• the processing involves information made public by law or regulation 
and the processing conforms to the purpose of the publication.279 
When notice is required, Belgian law appears to require reasonably specific 
information about the nature of the processing and, in particular, to require finality. 
For example, a court found that a bank informing its clients that the bank "guarantees 
that personal information will be used exclusively for legal purposes, namely the 
preparation and execution of contracts in the framework of providing financial 
services and optimizing the relationship between the bank and the client" is not 
sufficient as a notice for use of the information in connection with insurance 
solicitations.280 The Belgian court viewed the notice as fairly referring only to pure 
banking services such as means of payment, account address, savings plans, 
investments, loans and the like. The court also justified its finding by noting that the 
insurance activities were a recent addition to the bank's services.281 This approach 
reflects a strict interpretation of finality and is significant for the consequences of 
notice statements made by online service participants to their clients. Since on-line 
services are inherently dynamic, the adaptation of information uses is likely to fall 
outside the scope of finality originally notified to individuals. Consequently, on-line 
services may frequently be required to update their notices to individuals. 
279 Arrêté royal (no. 15) du 15 mars 1996 modifiant l'arrête royal no. 9 du 7 février 
1995, M.B., 15 mars 1996, p. 5830. 
280 Trib. Comm. Anvers, 7 juillet 1994, reprinted in 1994/4 D.I.T., pp. 52-53. 
281 Id. 
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The transparency principle in Belgium also includes a right of access to 
personal information held by the controller282 as well as a right of correction of 
inaccurate data.283 The controller may require that an individual pay a fee of 100BF 
(2.5 ECU) to cover the administrative expenses of responding to the access request,284 
though in the case of an access demand for consumer credit information, the 
consultion must typically be free of charge.285 Yet, these rights may be complicated 
for an individual to exercise in the context of on-line services. For any particular 
transaction, the organization qualifying as a "controller" may shift in accordance to 
the flows of clickstream data. Hence, an individual may have to approach several 
"controllers" to obtain a clear picture of the information circulating about him. 
2.3.2. France 
French law requires that individuals receive notice of automatic processing of 
nominative information.286 This obligation attaches only to those collecting 
information directly from individuals.287 This limitation on the obligation to provide 
notice is significant in the network environment; many providers of on-line services 
may not collect personal information directly from the individuals concerned. When 
notice is required, it must inform the individual: (a) whether the information must be 
given or is voluntary, (b) what consequences will follow in the absence of a response, 
(c) who will receive the information, and (d) that the individual has a right of access 
282 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 10. 
283 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 12. 
Arrêté Royal No. 4 du 7 septembre fixant le montant, les conditions et les 
modalités du paiement de la redevance préalable au maître du fichier lors de l'exercice du droit de 
communication des données à caractère personnel fondé sur l'article 10 de la loi du 8 décembre 1992. 
See Y. Poullet & A. Lefebvre, Vie privé et crédit à la consommation, protéger le 
consommateur ou sa vie privée: un choix difficile, in LE CRÉDIT À LA CONSOMMATION, p. 121 
(G.-A. Dahl, ed., 1997)(citing Article 70(2) of the Law on Consumer Credit and Article 10 of the 
Royal Decree of November 20, 1992.) 
286 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 Janvier 1978, art. 27. 
287 See, e.g., CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertés, p. 16 (1988) 
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and correction to the information.288 Individuals have the right to oppose processing 
of nominative data for legitimate reasons (other than processing performed in 
conformance with a regulatory mandate.)289 In the case of sensitive data, individuals 
must consent explicitly in writing to the processing of such information.290 
Individuals also have a right of access to any nominative information held pursuant 
to a declaration291 and have a right to require the correction of any erroneous, 
incomplete, equivocal, stale or improperly used information.292 
The CNIL has been extremely vigilant in assuring notice and consent for the 
treatment of personal information and, in particular, for on-line services. At the tenth 
year anniversary of the French law, a CNIL study reported that the agency gives a 
broad interpretation to the meaning of'collection of personal information,' including 
situations where information is generated automatically in the course of business.293 
The purpose for this broad interpretation is to avoid circumvention of the individual's 
right to know about the processing of personal information. More recently, the CNIL 
has focussed on the notice given to individuals in the context of directory information 
on the Internet294 and has carefully scrutinized the processing of medical information 
on the Internet to assure that patients receive an explicit consent form at the time of 
data collection.295 
288 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 27. 
289 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 26. 
290 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 31. While the law does not mention any 
formalities for the consent, the CNIL, as confirmed by the Conseil d'Etat, understands this provision 
to require a written consent. CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertés, p. 23. 
291 Id., art. 34. 
292 Id., art. 36. 
293 CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et des libertés, pp. 17-18. 
294 CNIL, 16e Rapport d'activité, pp. 84-86 (1996); CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, 
69-83(1997). 
295 Délibération No. 96-062 du 9 juillet 1996; Délibération No. 96-063 du 9 juillet 
1996; CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, pp. 83-87 (1997). 
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In terms of the content for an adequate notice, the CNIL has insisted in its 
Internet decisions that the notice must include the "logic of processing"296 and must 
inform users of the purpose for the information and that Internet transmissions are less 
secure that other forms.297 In addition, the CNIL's strong position on directory 
information is that the individual must be informed specifically that such information 
will be placed on the Internet and must be told of the special risks associated with the 
accessibility of personal data on the Internet.298 
With respect to "opposition" which is the right of individuals to object to 
processing, the CNIL distinguishes the distribution of personal information on the 
Internet from other disseminations.299 Consequently, the CNIL has sought to assure 
that distribution by one channel such as a telephone book does not preclude 
opposition to Internet dissemination.300 The notices generally must indicate that 
individuals have a right of opposition to the treatment of personal information. 
Because the obligation to provide notice is restricted to collections of personal 
information directly from the concerned individuals, many providers of on-line 
services may escape the requirement and not be required to give notice to individuals. 
Personal information may also be collected indirectly from individuals on the Internet, 
such as is the case of data for log files acquired by a host site from the individual's 
296 CNIL, Voix, image et protection des données personelles, 55(1996). While the 
CNIL does not elaborate on the meaning of "logic of processing," the term refers to the type of 
analysis performed to make inferences about individuals. 
297 See, e.g., Délibération No. 97-051 du 30 juin 1997 concernant une demande d'avis 
présenté par la Mairie de Paris relative à un traitement d'informations nominatives mis en oeuvre 
dans le cadre du site Internet de la Ville de Paris; Délibération No. 97-032 du 6 mai 1997 relative à la 
demande d'avis présenté par le premier ministre concernant un modèle-type de traitements 
d'informations nominative opérés dans le cadre d'un site Internet ministériel. 
The CNIL approved, for example, a model for the treatment of personal 
information by Internet sites operated by government ministries and emphasized the terms of notice to 
be provided. See Délibération No. 97-032 du 6 mai 1997 relative à la demande d'avis présenté par le 
premier ministre concernant un modèle-type de traitements d'informations nominative opérés dan le 
cadre d'un site Internet ministériel. 
299 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, pp.72-73 (1997). 
300 I d 
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Internet service provider. In these situations, the Internet service provider would 
have the obligation to notify individuals of the transfer of nominative information to 
third parties, but the recipient would not. The CNIL has also suggested that Internet 
service providers should bear responsibility for notification of the information 
practices of intelligent agents where those agents make use of profiles of nominative 
information.301 Nevertheless, in cases of a recipient's indirect acquisition of personal 
information, if the recipient then collected information directly from the individual, 
such as through the use of "cookies" or a questionnaire at the site, notice complying 
with the legal standards would be required. Yet, the mere fact of a "cookies" alert 
appearing on screen through an Internet browser or the implicit awareness of data 
collection when a user completes a questionnaire would be unlikely to satisfy the 
content standards for notice; these mechanisms do not, for example, usually indicate 
the compulsory nature of responses, the logic of processing, the finality, or the 
heighten risks from an open network environment. 
The transposition of the European Directive will necessitate an increase in the 
French notice requirements because the European Directive requires notification for 
indirect collections of personal information.302 In the on-line world, technical means 
can readily be developed to achieve these notifications. For example, just as a small 
icon appears on some browsers to indicate the use of encryption protocols,303 a small 
icon could appear to indicate the transfer of personal information. The CNIL has 
taken tentative steps in this direction by noting, for example, that a screen with a 
notice of opposition rights along with a clickable link to register opposition was an 
appropriate mechanism to provide notice of collection of personal information and the 
required opt-out.304 
Finally, French law will have to include a broader range of exclusions from the 
301 CNIL, Voix, image et protection des données, p. 56-57 ( 1996). 
302 See Directive 95/46/EC, art. 11 ; CNIL, Voix, Image et Protection des données 
personnelles, p. 54 (1996). 
303 Netscape Navigator uses a small key in the bottom left comer of the user's screen 
to indicate the current use of secure transmission capabilities. 
304 Délibération No. 97-050 du 24 juin 1997 relative à une demande d'avis présenté 
par France Télcom concernant un traitement automatisé d'informations nominatives dénommé 
"Minitelnet." 
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notice requirement than exist presently in order to comply with the European 
Directive.305 The European Directive provides a variety of derogations not found in 
French law (e.g. national security, defense, public security, breaches of ethics for 
regulated professions, an important economic or financial interest of a member state 
or of the European Union)306 These derogations are likely to prove significant for on-
line services due to omnipresent security issues that will be endemic in an open 
network environment. 
2.3.3 Germany 
The IuKDG builds on the existing BDSG provisions regarding for 
transparency and, in particular, notice.307 The IuKDG emphasizes the importance of 
notice at several places. In its Article 2, § 3(5), it states, "The user shall be informed 
about the type, scope, place and purposes of collection, processing and use of his 
personal data." This fundamental rule about notice is strengthened by specific rules 
about automated procedures, such as cookies, under which personal data are 
collected. 
The IuKDG's rules about cookies requires both notice and a chance to waive 
notice. The Law states, "In case of automated processing, which permits subsequent 
identification of the user and which prepares the collection, processing or use of 
personal data, the user shall be informed prior to the beginning of the procedure."308 
This obligation is placed on "providers" who are defined as "natural or legal persons 
or associations of persons who make available teleservices or who provide access to 
the use of teleservices."309 The obligation extends, however, only to circumstances 
French law only provides an exception for the collection ofinformation necessary 
to establish a violation. Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 27 alinéa 2. 
306 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 13(1). 
307 See BDSG, § 19: "The data subject shall, upon request, be provided with information on 
1. stored personal data concerning him, including their origin and recipients, and 2. the purpose of 
storage." 
308 IuKDG, Article 2, §3(6). 
309 IuKDG, Article 2, §2(1). 
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when cookies permit "subsequent identification of the user."310 The IuKDG also 
indicates that the responsibility for notification about cookies will belong to the party 
who places the cookie, whether Internet Service Provider (ISP) or web site. The web 
site falls into the category of those "who make available teleservices"; the ISP, those 
"who provide access to the use of teleservices."311 
Information about this "automated processing" is to be accessible to the user 
at any time.312 Moreover, the "user may waive such information."313 This waiver of 
receiving information about automated processing, such as cookies, is not, however, 
considered to be consent for purposes of permitting the performance of teleservices 
or for further use of data collected for performing teleservices.314 
The IuKDG also requires providers to inform users "of any reforwarding to 
another provider."315 As this Study has pointed out above, the IuKDG also requires 
the user to be informed about the option of "anonymous use and payment of 
teleservices or use and payment under a pseudonym."316 In addition, the user is to be 
told of any information that is stored under his pseudonym.317 The IuKDG requires 
that a user have access, free of charge, to "stored data concerning his person or his 
pseudonym."318 
As for consent, the IuKDG places this at the center of its principles for data 
protection and carefully polices the conditions under which consent is to be granted. 
310 Id. 
311 IuKDG, Article 1,§ 3. 
312 IuKDG, Article 2, § 3(5). 
313 Id. 
314 Id. 
315 IuKDG, § 4(3). 
316 IuKDG, Article 2, § 4. 
317 IuKDG, Article 2, § 7. 
318 IuKDG, Article 2, § 7. The BDSG's general rule is also that "[i]nformation shall be 
disclosed free of charge." BDSG, § 34. 
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The Law also provides for consent to be provided in an electronic fashion. The 
IuKDG's consent provisions point to a way to bring data protection into the next 
century. Permitting the electronic gathering of consent lowers the cost of obtaining 
agreement for on-line service providers. At the same time, the IuKDG establishes 
strict limits on the conditions under which consent may be obtained. These limits seek 
to insure that consent is both: (1) truly informed, and (2) truly voluntary. 
Under the IuKDG, data may only be collected and processed if the law permits 
such action or if the user has given his permission.319 In addition, the IuKDG requires 
individual consent to be sought for certain kinds of additional processing of 
"contractual data," which are those data required for concluding a contract on the use 
of teleservices.320 The IuKDG states, "Processing and use of contractual data for the 
purpose of advising, advertising, market research or for the demand-oriented design 
of the teleservices is only permissible if the user has given his explicit consent."321 
This provision places strict limits on further use of basic information which service 
providers must collect about each of their customers. 
Consent as a principle of data protection can easily be abused. Past reliance 
on consent to data processing in the United States, for example, has shown that two 
particular difficulties can arise.322 First, data subjects may have no real alternative 
except to consent when their permission is sought before data processing. Second, 
data subjects may be unable to make an informed choice due to inadequate 
information about planned processing. The IuKDG attempts to prevent these two 
kinds of abuse of its consent provisions. 
As to the lack of a real choice, the IuKDG requires that access to on-line 
services be provided irregardless of permission being granted to further processing of 
personal data. The statute states, "The provider shall not make the rendering of 
teleservices conditional upon the consent of the user to the effect that his data may 
be processed or used for other purposes if other access to these teleservices is not or 
)11 IuKDG, Article 2, §3(1). 
320 IuKDG, Article 2, § 5(2). 
321 Id. 
322 These problems are particularly acute in the context of the processing of health care 
information. See Paul M. Schwartz & Joel R. Reidenberg, DATA PRIVACY LAW, 167-71 (1996). 
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not reasonably provided to the user."323 In addition, the user is to be informed "about 
his right to withdraw his consent at any time with effect for the future."324 This 
statutory language guarantees reasonable access to teleservices even if a user does not 
consent to additional use of his personal data. 
As for the danger of uninformed consent, the IuKDG requires specific kinds 
ofinformation to be shared with the data subject as part of the consent process. The 
Law states, "The user shall be informed about the type, scope, place and purposes of 
collection, processing and use of his personal data."325 These detailed provisions 
safeguard the consent process by requiring that users receive the kinds ofinformation 
that are likely to be necessary for well-informed decisionmaking by teleservices 
consumers. 
In another advance for data protection law, the IuKDG explicitly permits 
consent to be declared electronically. In Article 2, § 3(7), the Law provides that 
consent can be declared electronically if certain conditions are met. According to the 
IuKDG's legislative history, this statute develops these procedural protection because 
of the special risks of electronic consents. These risks are due to the lack of both 
"embodiment (no writing form)" and "biometricai marks (no signature in one's own 
hand)."326 
Consent therefore is valid under the IuKDG only if the provider ensures that 
electronic consent is given through a process that is tailored to the digital world. As 
the Law states: 
Consent can also be declared electronically if the provider ensures that 
1. such consent can be given only through an unambiguous and deliberate act 
by the user, 
2. consent cannot be modified without detection, 
323 IuKDG, Article 2, § 3(3). 
324 IuKDG, Article 2, § 3(6). 
325 IuKDG, Article 2, § 3(3). 
326 Deutscher Bundestag, 13. Wahlperiode, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 
Drucksache 13/7385, Seite 23 (09. April 1997). 
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3. the creator can be identified 
4. the consent is recorded and 
5. the text of the consent can be obtained by the user on request at any time.327 
One of the most important of these requirements for electronic consent is that the 
consent only be made "through an unambiguous and deliberate act by the user." Here, 
the legislative history states, "In this sense, a consent is authorized, for example, 
through a confirmed repetition of the command to transfer that is simultaneously 
accompanied on the viewing screen by a declaration of consent at least in extracts."328 
As to the requirement that consent cannot be modified without detection, the federal 
government stated, in introducing the draft IuKDG, that "suitable technical processes" 
must be made available to prove the authenticity and authorship of the consent.329 
German law protects not only consent, but also rights of access and 
correction. The IuKDG provides the user the right "at any time to inspect, free of 
charge, stored data concerning his person or his pseudonym at the provider's."330 It 
also states, "The information shall be given electronically if so requested by the 
user."331 
The IuKDG itself does not provide rights to correct personal data. In this 
gap, the Federal Data Protection Law's requirements will control. The BDSG 
provides, "Personal data shall be corrected if they are inaccurate."332 
These rights of access and correction are of enormous importance in the on-
line world. Data subjects will be able to find out the information that providers have 
stored on them. They will also be able to correct this information when incorrect. 
Finally, some comments about current practices in Germany are possible. The 
IuKDG's rights regarding transparency are impressive. Actual practices may not yet 
327 IuKDG, Article 2, § 3(7). 
328 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 13/7385, Seite 23. 
329 Id. 
330 IuKDG, Article 2, §7. 
331 Id. 
332 BDSG, §35(1). 
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be responding, however, to these legal requirements. Examination of web sites that 
fall under the Law's definition of "teleservices" finds some noteworthy failures to 
follow the statutory requirements that this section has discussed. 
A few examples will suffice. Within the IuKDG's definition of "teleservices" 
are "goods and services offered and listed in electronically accessible data bases with 
interactive access and the possibility for direct order."333 Thus, web sites that offer 
products for sale clearly fall under the statute's requirements for transparency. 
Nevertheless, a survey of German web sites reveals that the IuKDG's requirements 
are not yet uniformly followed. This phenomena can be at least partially explained by 
the statute's entering into force only a few months ago. 
As an initial example, Der Spiegel, a leading German magazine, offers a 
popular web site that contains news articles and offers extensive goods and services 
for sale.334 This site sells audio CDs, CD-Roms, videos, books as well as tickets for 
events and shows taking place all over Germany. These products can all be ordered 
on-line at the Spiegel website. Yet, the Der Spiegel website furnishes no indication 
of the planned use of personal data that are collected as part of its selling of goods. 
Another web site that offers goods and services for sale is that of the Kaufhof, a 
leading German department store.335 Here too, the web site provides no information 
about its fair information practices (if any). 
As a final example, KaDeWe, the upscale Berlin department store, offers its 
products for sale on line through the "my-world" web site.336 This site does provide 
on-line information about its security practices. Specifically, the my-world web site 
uses SSL, the Secure Socket Layer, which is a encryption process.337 The "my-world" 
site uses SSL to "offer you the security that your personal data— such as your address 
333 IuKDG, Article 1,§ 2(5). 
334 <http://www.spiegel.de/shop/right.html> 
33i <http://www.kaufhof.de/hilfe.html>. Among the many products for sale on its web site 
are official souvenirs for the Federal Garden Show, including wooden animals and wooden flowers 
that one can exhibit in one's own garden. < 
http://www.kkaufhof.de/cgi/ktest/html/online/bundesgarten>. 
336 <http://www.my-world.de> 
337 <http://www.my-world.de/bestellen/tips/SSL.html> 
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or your credit card number- will not fall into the wrong hands. "338 Nevertheless, this 
web site does not supply information about any other fair information practices. 
2.3.4 United Kingdom 
As one of its core data protection principles, British law requires that an 
individual is entitled "at reasonable intervals and without undue delay or expense ... 
to be informed by any data user whether he holds personal data of which that 
individual is the subject."339 Notice also forms part of the "fairness" principle of data 
protection. In determining whether or not personal information has been obtained 
fairly, one factor, according to the Act, is "whether any person from whom it was 
obtained was deceived or misled as to the purpose or purposes for which it is to be 
held, used or disclosed."340 The right of notification has been further developed by 
decisions of the Data Protection Tribunal. In particular, three decisions of this body 
are worthy of note. 
First, in the Linguaphone decision of 1996,341 the Data Protection Tribunal 
criticized one data user's notification to individuals as insufficient. This notification 
was not of a proper size and prominence to provide effective information to the 
individual.342 Second, in a judgment regarding the use by utility companies of 
personal information in their supply data bases for non-supply purposes, the Data 
Protection Tribunal found that "individuals should be informed of any non-obvious 
purpose for which their data may be used or disclosed at the time that they enter into 
a relationship with a data user."343 Thus, notice, if it is to promote fairness in data 
use, must be provided when the data collection relationship first begins. 
338 Id. 
339 Data Protection Act of 1984, at Schedule 1, Part 1.1 (7)(a). 
340 Id. at Part ILL 
341 The decision is set out at Data Protection Registrar, The Twelfth Annual Report 82 
(1996). 
342 See Data Protection Registrar, The Twelfth Annual Report 82 (1996). 
343 13th Annual Report, pg 27. 
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As a final example, the Data Protection Tribunal in Innovations (Mail Order) 
Ltd v. The Data Protection Registrar, stressed the importance.of notice being given 
at the correct time.344 In some cases, Innovations had informed its customers of its 
rental of mailing lists only when it acknowledged receipt of their orders. The 
Registrar objected to this timing of notice, and the Tribunal stated, "We have reached 
a conclusion that the words 'fairly obtained' in the First Data Protection Principle 
direct attention to the time of obtaining not to a later time."345 Timing of notification 
is thus a key element to providing adequate notice in British data protection law. 
These decisions emphasize that notice must be of proper size and prominence, 
and that it must be provided when data is first provided to the data user. Application 
of this approach in the on-line world will require certain behavior of both Internet 
Service Providers and web sites. Following the Tribunal's interpretation of 
notification in these decisions, Internet Service Providers would be required to 
provide adequate notification of planned data use at the time that a contract is initially 
concluded with the individual. As for web sites that collect and process personal 
information, they would have to supply prominent notification when they collect 
personal information from the person who is visiting their site. Finally, this notice 
must be sufficiently detailed because of the flexibility of processing and open access 
afforded to data on the Internet. 
In the United Kingdom, consent is viewed as an essential element of the 
"fairness" principle. The Data Protection Act of 1984 provides that personal 
information must be obtained and processed "fairly and lawfully."346 In the United 
Kingdom, formal consent is usually not required of individuals. Rather, information 
is to be provided to the individual, who, in his affirmative choice to use the services 
of the data user will be presumed to have consented to the planned data processing. 
This general rule regarding consent is subject to some limitations. First, in 
cases where individuals have no realistic choice other than to give their information 
to a particular data user, the Registrar has argued that "the data user should provide 
the individual with the opportunity to opt out of additional uses or disclosures of 
344 For a discussion, see Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection Guidance for Direct 
Marketers 21 (1995). 
345 Id. 
346 Data Protection Act 1984, Schedule 1, Part 1.1. 
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information which go beyond the primary purposes for which the information was 
supplied."347 One example where no real choice exists is when a monopoly suppler 
provides an essential service.348 The Data Protection Registrar has also extended this 
analysis to quasi-monopoly suppliers and those with "a very dominant market 
position."349 In these cases, the companies in question were public utilities,350 but the 
analysis can be extended to telecommunication companies. The Registrar has argued 
that individual customers should be viewed as having restricted the use of their 
personal data to supply and billing purposes in the absence of a positive consent for 
any additional purposes.351 
Second, consent should be sought in some instances for third party marketing. 
One of the most important of these circumstances is when "data users have chosen not 
to inform the sources of their information of their intention to use personal data for 
host mailing or list rental when first obtaining a data subject's details, even though that 
was their intention."352 A mere letter to customers informing them of list rental 
practices is not enough to assume that consent has been obtained from all those who 
have not objected.353 This approach to consent creates an opt-in requirement when 
data users choose not to inform the individual of their plan to engage in mailing with 
the personal information that they gather. 
Finally, the Data Protection Registrar has taken the position that the nature 
of the consent, express or implied, depends on a contextual analysis. Consent relates 
to the notion of "fair obtaining" ofinformation, after all, and "[w]hat is fair in a 
particular case can only be determined in the light of industry practices and consumer 
(1995). 
347 Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection Guidance for Direct Marketers § 63, 22 
348 Data Protection Registrar, Thirteenth Annual Report, 27 (1997). 
349 I d 
350 Id. at 26. 
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352 Id. at § 65, 22-23. 
353 Id at 23. 
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expectations."354 As these practices and expectations change, the standard for 
compliance with the Data Protection Act's fair obtaining requirement will continue to 
evolve. 
In addition to this established approach to consent, the UK Data Protection 
Registrar has made specific comments regarding the on-line world. The Registrar has 
spoken to the need for users of the Information Superhighway "to control the use of 
their personal data and have real choice."355 In particular, the Registrar has pointed 
to privacy enhancing technologies as a promising way to respond in this area. 
One important proposal of the UK Data Protection Registrar regarding 
consent in the on-line world concerns "suppression markers in Internet addresses."356 
Through use of this device, individuals could indicate their objection "to have data 
about them collected or to receive unsolicited, promotional e-mails as a result of 
visiting particular sites or taking part in particular groups."357 A suppression marker 
would allow individuals to block contact with those who might use the Internet to 
collect data or send them unsolicited junk mail (spamming). 
The idea of an email suppression marker builds on existing British privacy law. 
In the United Kingdom, privacy preference services exist for postal direct marketing 
and for telephone direct marketing.358 These services allow consumers to register 
their preference not to receive unsolicited direct marketing communications. In 
addition, a fax preference service is under development. An email suppression 
marker, as proposed by the Data Protection Registrar, would allow individuals to 
indicate and communicate their wishes directly via their email address. As the 
Registrar states regarding an individual's desire not to receive unsolicited email, 
"There seems to be no reason on the Internet to divorce that message from the 
354 
355 
Id. at § 63, at 22. 
13th Annual Report, at page 53. 
356 Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Suppression Markers in Internet Addresses, Appendix 
14 in UK Data Protection Registrar, Thirteenth Annual Report (1997). 
357 Id. 
358 Data Protection Guidance for Direct Marketers 23-24 (1995). 
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address itself"359 
One difficulty with this proposal is that it cannot work without an appropriate 
not-yet-existing infrastructure. Another shortcoming is that the expression of privacy 
preferences can itself raise privacy issues. For example, unless other informational 
safeguards are in place, marketers might use information in the privacy preference 
address to develop individual profiles. Yet, the Registrar's proposal by its own 
confession "deals only with suppression not with obtaining information in the first 
place."360 Thus, a kind of meta-privacy preference might also be needed regarding 
the fair use of privacy markers in settings outside the Internet. 
How then is United Kindom data protection law likely to respond to the issue 
of consent in an on-line environment? First, British law's contextual approach to 
consent is likely to emphasize the need for a positive consent requirement should no 
real choice as to the underlying service be available and where inadequate information 
has been provided to the individual at the time of collection. One example of such an 
area might be concerning the transmission of clickstream data. Thus, positive consent 
to data use might be required should a limited number of Internet Service Providers 
be available in a geographic area. Moreover, web sites that initially fail to provide 
adequate information about planned future data use might be required to seek 
affirmative consent for such secondary use as sharing information with third parties. 
Finally, British data protection law is likely to seek the use of privacy enhancing 
technologies that will permit consent to be indicated in a rapid, low cost fashion. 
British data protection law contains no explicit provision concerning access 
and correction in the on-line context. Yet, the Data Protection Act of 1984 does 
allow an individual to access personal data held by a data user and "where 
appropriate, to have such data corrected or erased."361 Under British data protection 
law, data subjects have a right to see any data concerning themselves, subject only to 
359 A "privacy marker" might indicate these following privacy preferences: (1) no messages 
are to be sent to the individual, or (2) communication from the website visited would be accepted, but 
from no other parties. These markers would also allow "the freedom to make different choices about 
different contacts." Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Appendix 14, in UK Data Protection Registrar, 
Thirteenth Annual Report. For example, an individual might express a certain privacy preference for 
one site but use a different marker for a different site. 
360 I d 
361 Data Protection Act 1984, at Schedule 1, Part 1.7. 
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certain limited exceptions.362 Access requests are, moreover, to be answered 
promptly by the data user.363 British data protection law allows a fee up to £10 (15 
ECU) to be charged for an exercise of subject access rights. In its paper regarding 
implementation of the European Directive, the Government has indicated that it does 
not intend to change this fee requirement.364 
As yet, little guidance exists as to how these rights will be applied in the on-
line world. The Data Protection Registrar has stressed, however, that a data user 
must make efforts to find personal data that it has stored in different systems to fulfill 
its obligation to satisfy the access right. The Registrar has observed: 
Difficulties may occasionally arise where the data in question are stored in 
different systems. For instance, a marketer who has become a data user in 
respect of mailing lists which have been rented in or leased, in addition to an 
existing customer data base, must ensure that both sets of data are searched.365 
Websites that collect personal data and then share this information with affiliated 
websites may have an obligation to provide access and correction rights beyond their 
own data system. 
Another possible development regarding access/correction rights in the on-line 
world concerns the form in which access will be provided. The Government has 
stated that any new data protection law should take advantage of the flexibility 
provided by the Directive, which allows communication of information "in an 
intelligible form."366 Specifically, the Government has pointed to the possible for 
362 See Data Protection Act 1984, Part III.21 : "[A]n individual shall be entitled - (a) to be 
informed by any data user whether the data held by him include personal data of which that individual 
is the data subject; and (b) to be supplied by any data user with a copy of the information constituting 
any such personal data held by him." 
363 Data Protection Registrar, Homeworking and Computer Information 24 (June 1997). 
364 www.homeoffice.gov.uk.datap5.htm. 
365 Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection Guidance for Direct Marketers, 37. 
366 <http:// www.homeoffice.gov.uk.datap5.htm> 
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"electronic communication and possibly other means."367 The choice as to means 
should be left to the data subject, who "will still be able to request a hard copy of the 
information, which will have to be granted except in limited cases where this is 
unreasonable or involves disproportionate effort."368 
This statement points to a data protection regime that will permit subject 
access to take place on-line. The British data protection law might encourage 
websites and Internet Service Providers to develop technical means that will allow 
data subjects on-line access to the information that is stored about them. This 
approach would allow low cost means of obtaining access to information about 
oneself. Such a development would be consistent with the Data Protection Registrar's 
interest in privacy enhancing technologies.369 It is as yet unclear how the data user's 
right to charge for access will be interpreted in an age where such access can be 
provided at low cost— indeed, without human interface. 
British law contains no explicit provision concerning access/correction in an 
on-line environment. Yet, its existing data protection statute provides these rights. 
The meaning of these rights in an on-line environment is only beginning to be 
explored. One important issue to be resolved is the circumstances under which 
subject access fees will be charged. 
2.4 Profiling and Sensitive Data 
On-line services often rely on profiling individuals for the development of 
customized services and for marketing activities. Profiling raises many issues 
associated with the finality of data use as required by the European Directive.370 For 
example, search engines enable on-line directories, on-line public data bases and 
message board postings to be used for multiple purposes. The commonplace 
matching of one set of data generated from on-line transactions with other 
complementary information also raises an issue concerning finality. Furthermore, the 
367 Id. 
Id. 
See, e.g., Data Protection Registrar, 13th Annual Report, at 115-17. 
370 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 6(l)(b). 
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recording and use of behavioral patterns implicates additional issues of consent, data 
storage, and purging that are also the subject of mandates in the European 
Directive.371 
The manner in which Member States treat these issues will have a fundamental 
impact on the structure of on-line services. Similarly, the characterization of 
individuals according to their behavior implicates another fundamental tenet of data 
protection: the special consideration to be afforded to sensitive data. Data profiles 
may frequently approach the categories of sensitive data that are subject to processing 
prohibitions under the European Directive.372 Although isolated pieces of personal 
information acquired during the course of on-line service activities may not be 
"sensitive data," the context of such information, especially in light of profiling 
practices, may bring the personal information within the meaning of the definition of 
"sensitive data." The responses of the Member States to on-line concerns for 
sensitive data will be highly instructive for the analysis of the substantive 
harmonization of the national laws. 
2.4.1 Belgium 
The bedrock of Belgian data protection law is the statutory provision that 
personal information may only be processed for a legitimate and specified purpose and 
can not be used in a manner incompatible with that purpose.373 Belgium interprets 
finality in a strict manner. For example, in a significant, but unreported court case, 
Mercedes lost a suit for a breach of finality by using motor vehicle registration 
information for a marketing purpose, namely to solicit Mercedes owners to have their 
cars serviced in Mercedes garages.374 Mercedes had acquired the information from the 
Ministry of Communications and Infrastructure through F.E.B.I.A.C. (the trade 
371 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 6(1 )(c), 7, 
372 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 8. 
373 C. de Terwagne et Y. Poullet, Les annuaires téléphoniques au carrefour des 
droits, Journal des Tribunaux, 1er juin 1996, p. 425, 432. 
374 Chambre actions cass. Bruxelles, 20 mars 1995. See also J.P. Buyle, L. Lanoye, Y. 
Poullet & V. Willems, Chronique de la jurisprudence: L'informatique (¡987-1994), Journal des 
tribunaux, 23 mars 1996, pp.235-236 (commenting on the trial court decision). 
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association for car and motorcycle manufacturers.) The court noted that the law 
authorizing the release of state-held motor vehicle registrations prohibited the use of 
administrative documents for commercial purposes and given that the state could not 
delegate its public service mission to the private sector, Mercedes' claim that the 
communications to car owners promoted public safety was unavailing.375 According 
to commentators on this case, the court found that the use of the state's motor vehicle 
registration information by an automobile manufacturer for commercial solicitation 
purposes was illegitimate.376 
A sectoral law also affects the purposes for treatment of personal information 
associated with on-line payments. The consumer credit law would prohibit many 
profiling activities.377 This sectoral law limits the treatment of personal information 
to the exclusive purpose of "evaluating the financial situation and the credit 
worthiness of the consumer."378 This finality restriction applies to all contracts for 
credit involving consumers;379 credit information may only be used for the granting 
and management of credit.380 The law further limits the type ofinformation that may 
be processed in connection with credit transactions.381 Similarly, under the general 
Chambre actions cass. Bruxelles, 20 mars 1995 (citing Loi du 11 avril 1994 
relative à la publicité de l'administration, art. 10.) 
Id. 
An interesting issue arises as to which law controls, the later general data 
protection law or the earlier sectoral consumer credit law. Commentators have argued that general 
issues are governed by the Loi du 8 décembre 1992 and specific issues for the credit sector are 
covered by the the Loi du 12 juin 1991. See Y. Poullet & A. Lefebvre, Vie privée et crédit à la 
consommation, protéger le consommateur ou sa vie privée: un choix difficile, in LE CREDIT A LA 
CONSOMMATION, 103, 105 (G.-A. Dahl, ed., 1997) 
Loi du 12 juin 1991 relative au crédit à la consommation, art. 69. 
Id., at art. 2. 
Id., at art. 69; see also, CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1992-1993, pp. 68-72. 380 
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information related to an individual's nationality. CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1992-1993, p. 77 
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data protection law, payment transaction data may not be used for purposes other 
than executing payment. This has been confirmed by several court cases in which 
banks were found in violation of finality by using payment records to profile 
customers and solicit them for commercial purposes.382 To the extent that electronic 
commerce transactions involve consumer credit, this sectoral law imposes important 
finality rules, excluding profiling for non-payment purposes, on any collections of 
transaction data. 
The scope of finality will be an important constraint on the treatment of 
personal information generated by on-line services. With a strict interpretation of 
finality, the complexity and fluidity of data processing for on-line activities will 
necessarily result in fragmented decisions for finality and in an attempt to impose 
narrow uses for personal information. 
In any event, Belgian data protection law does permit secondary use with the 
individual's consent. For consent, the trend in Belgium is to require differentiated 
levels of assent. In some instances, consent may be required on an opt-in basis. For 
example, the publication of directories for public officials may only contain work 
addresses unless express consent is granted to include home information.383 Similarly, 
the CPVP has required express consent to include an individual's name and address 
on an advertising list384 and to profile the prescription practices of physicians.385 In 
its consideration of the applicability of the data protection law to telephone directory 
credit transactions. Arrêté royal du 20 novembre 1992 relatif au traitement des données à caractère 
personnel en matière de crédit à la consommation. 
382 Trib. comm. Bruxelles, 15 sept. 1994, reprinted in 1994/4 D.I.T., 45-50; Trib. 
Comm. Anvers, 7 juillet 1994, reprinted in 1994/4 D.I.T., 51-55. See also J.P. Buyle, L. Lanoye, Y. 
Poullet, & V. Willems, Chronique de jurisprudence: L'informatique (1987-1994), Journal des 
tribunaux, 23 mars 1996, p. 232. 
383 c p v P ; A v i s n o 23/94 du 13 juillet 1994; CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1994-1995, p. 
27(1997). 
384 Recommandation no. 1/95 du 18 juillet 1995; CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1994-
1995, pp. 29-30(1997). 
385 Recommandation No. 01/96 du 23 septembre 1996 à propos de l'analyse de la 
consommation de médicaments en Belgique basée sur des informations issues des prescriptions 
médicales, pp. 6-7. 
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information, the CPVP recommended that Belgacom, the national telephone 
company, implement several levels of opt-outs: (i) consent to all uses; (ii) objection 
to commercial uses of personal information ("liste orange"); (iii) objection to any 
dissemination of personal information ("liste rouge".)386 The CPVP noted that 
Belgacom had to inform its subscribers of these possibilities and their rights under the 
data protection law.387 Similarly, the courts have noted that a company may make 
internal use of personal information outside the scope of the original purpose for 
collection if the individuals have notice and the ability to opt-out.388 
In the context of on-line services, consent can be readily obtained on an opt-in 
basis by technical means. The various technical protocols such as "cookies" alerts or 
the P3P labelling and filtering initiative at W3C389 enable users to make affirmative 
choices. However, appropriate notice is still necessary for the consent to be 
meaningful. 
Nevertheless, for the treatment of sensitive data, the Belgian law generally 
requires advance consent.390 The Royal Decree implementing protections for sensitive 
data tries to track the European Directive. Under the Royal Decree, the processing 
of sensitive data treats consent as valid only if it shows that the agreement was 
"expressly voluntary, freely given, specific and informed."391 This decree amended a 
prior rule for sensitive data that did not match the standards of the European 
Directive. However, in the new decree, an important degree of ambiguity exists with 
386 Recommandation no. 02/93 du 7 septembre 1993; CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1994-
1995, p. 28(1997). 
387 Id. 
388 See, e.g., Trib. comm. Bruxelles, 15 sept. 1994, reprinted in 1994/4 D.I.T., 45-50; 
Trib. Comm. Anvers, 7 juillet 1994, reprinted in 1994/4 D.I.T., 51-55. 
See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Use of Technology to Assure Internet Privacy: 
Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection, Lex Electronica 111:2, <www.lex-electronica.org> 
(November, 1997)(discussing the P3P and W3C initiatives). For a further discussion, see infra § 3.3 
390 Arrêté royal (No. 14) du 22 mai 1996, M.B., 30 mai 1996, p. 14515 (superceding 
Arrêté royal (no. 7) du 15 février 1995); CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1996, p.38 (1997). 
391 Arrêté royal (No. 14) du 22 mai 1996, art. 1(e), M.B., 30 mai 1996, p. 14515, 
14532; See also Rapport au Roi, M.B., 30 mai 1996, p. 14515, 14520. 
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respect to the form of the consent. Court decisions prior to the change of the new 
Royal Decree required written consent.392 The new Royal Decree, however, is silent 
as to the form. For on-line services, this ambiguity presents a clear obstacle to 
electronic consent to the collection and processing of sensitive information. 
As an important corollary to finality for profiling practices, Belgium requires 
that those collecting personal information minimize the amount of data processed. 
Article 5 of the statute mandates that the information not be "excessive with respect 
to the finality" of processing.393 The Belgian law also stipulates that only information 
relevant for the purposes of processing may be used.394 
Finally, the CPVP is also quite concerned about the duration of storage of 
personal information. The Belgian law interdicts storage of non-relevant information 
and consequently prohibits storage beyond the duration required by finality.395 In a 
recent advisory opinion, the CPVP criticized a draft Royal Decree for credit 
information because of an inadequate restriction on the duration of storage for 
positive credit information.396 This attention to storage is likely to create a legal 
obligation for the rapid deletion of stored on-line services data. 
2.4.2. France 
Under French law, the use of personal information is strictly limited to the 
392 Arrêté royal (No. 14) du 22 mai 1996, M.B., 30 mai 1996, p. 14515 (superceding 
Arrêté royal (no. 7) du 15 février 1995); CPVP, Rapport d'activité 1996, p.38 (1997). 
393 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 5 (data "must be adequate, relevant and non-
excessive with respect to the finality.") 
394 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 5 (data "must be adequate, relevant and non-
excessive with respect to the finality.") 
395 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 16(1 )(4). Article 17(3)(2) requires that the duration 
of storage be indicated on the declaration of processing. 
396 cpyp^ A v i s n o j Q/97 du 9 avril 1997. 
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purposes declared at the time of collection.397 This finality obligation is considered 
"omnipresent in the text of the law"398 The principle derives particular strength from 
the criminal sanctions that may attach to secondary uses of personal information. The 
law further states that "the evaluation of human behavior cannot be based on the 
automatic processing ofinformation resulting in the definition of a profile or of the 
personality of the person concerned."399 This provision, in effect, prohibits data 
profiling as the sole basis for decision-making.400 Profiles may, however, be 
considered along with other factors to be evaluated by a live person in connection 
with decisions about individuals.401 
In the context of on-line services, the profiling of transaction information may 
also lead to the creation of sensitive information. The law generally prohibits the 
computerized storage of any information that directly or indirectly reveals: racial 
origins, political opinions, philosophical opinions, religious beliefs, or union 
membership.402 If the individual consents explicitly in a writing independent of the 
data collection, then the sensitive information may be processed.403 This consent 
Loi No. 78-17 du 6 Janvier 1978, art. 19 (requiring the declaration of finality) & 
art. 44 (providing criminal sanctions for use of personal information that is inconsistent with the 
declared purpose). 
398 CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et de libertés, pp. 36-37 ( 1988). 
399 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 2. 
400 See CNIL, 14e Rapport d'activité, pp. 59-64 (1994); Délibération No. 93-032 du 
6 avril 1993 relative au contrôle effectué le 2 octobre 1992 à la Caisse regionale de crédit agricole de 
Dordogne. 
401 CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertés, pp. 47-48 (1988). 
Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 30. Religious organizations along with 
philosophical, political or union groups are exempted from this interdiction to the extent of 
maintaining a membership list in computerized form. Id. In addition, for reasons of "public interest," 
essentially state security, government decrees may exempt certain processing from this restriction, but 
only after approval by the CNIL. 
See CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertés, pp. 44 (1988)(refering to Arrêt du 
Conseil d'État du 5 juin 1987); CNIL, 14e Rapport d'activité, pp. 40-42 (1994)(noting that express 
consent means written consent for the storage of the particular data that is considered sensitive.) 
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requirement imposes a significant constraint for on­line services because they will be 
obliged to obtain consent off­line in advance of any processing that results in the 
treatment of sensitive data. 
Under the French law, individuals have a fundamental right to object to the 
processing of personal information.404 Individuals for "legitimate reasons" may 
require the suppression or purging of personal information held by others. However, 
the "public interest" may defeat the legitimacy of an individual's reasons.405 
The duration of data storage is also subject to careful limits under French law. 
The law prohibits the storage of personal information any longer than necessary to 
accomplish the purposes for collection of the information.406 The CNIL has 
historically been quite vigilant in its monitoring of the length of data storage.407 
The Telecommunications Law of 1996408 may also have an impact on the 
treatment of personal information for profiling purposes. According to the new law, 
telecommunications operators must respect the secrecy of correspondence.409 This 
provision may mean that an Internet service provider such as Wanadoo, operated by 
France Telecom, will not be allowed to provide identifiable information on users' on­
line activities to third parties. In addition, the provision may even forbid the use of 
transaction information for profiling purposes. 
As the CNIL examines on­line services, it pays particular attention to the 
respect of the finality principle. For Internet discussion groups, the CNIL has 
indicated that finality precludes using information gleaned from the discussion group 
for purposes other than those proposed by the discussion group itself; the accessibility 
of the information does not mean that it can be used to "enrich databases intended for 
■109 
II alinéa 5. 
Loi No. 78­17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 26. 
CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, pp. 116­117 (1997). 
Loi No. 78­17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 28. 
CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertés, 31­32 (1988). 
Loi No. 96­659 du 26 juillet de réglementation des télécommunications. 
Loi No. 96­659 du 26 juillet de réglementation des télécommunications, art. L. 32­
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example to be used for commercial purposes."410 This suggests that the use of search 
engines external to the discussion group, such as <www.dejanews.com>, that offer 
profiling capabilities of message posters could violate the principle of finality. The 
significance for on-line service offerings is that French discussion groups might need 
to mask their existence from search engines. Or alternatively, search engines might 
need to suppress research on French discussion groups to avoid contravening the 
finality principle of the postings to those discussion groups. At the present ttime, no 
indication exists that such infrastructure arrangements are either being implemented 
or contemplated. 
For electronic commerce, behavior profiling of customers is emerging as a key 
component in corporate strategy. The CNIL has addressed behavior profiling in the 
financial services sector and indicated that client profiling is legitimate only in 
connection with the development of business strategy and that the profiling can only 
be used for that purpose.411 In connection with the endorsement of the Kieline 
electronic payment system for the Internet, the CNIL noted that the payment 
transaction records would be particularly valuable and that users were to be informed 
of their right to oppose any sale of personal information by Kieline.412 The CNIL also 
seems to have used its series of decisions regarding the dissemination of professional 
directories on the Internet as a vehicle to address the possibility of profiling being 
performed on the traces left in electronic transactions. The CNIL requires that a web 
server post a conspicuous notice that the information in the directory is subject to the 
rights and obligations of French law and that collection of directory information to 
enhance databases for secondary uses, especially marketing purposes, is illegal.413 At 
410 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, 92 (1997)(discussing the discussion group of the 
Caisse nationale de prévoyance.) 
411 CNIL, 14e Rapport d'activité, p. 61 (1994). 
412 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, p. 93. 
Délibération No. 95-131 du 7 novembre, 1995 portant sur la demande d'avis 
présenté par le Centre national de calcul parallèle des sciences de la terre concernant un traitement 
automatisé d'informations nominatives pour la publication d'un annuaire sur un réseau international 
ouvert; Délibération No. 96-065 du 6 juillet 1996 portant avis sur le projet de décision présenté pour 
le Centre national de la recherche scientifique concernant un modèle type de traitement automatisé 
d'informations nominatives pour la publication d'annuaires des unités propres ou mixtes sur un 
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the same time, the CNIL recognizes that the enforceability of finality on the Internet 
is far from settled; the CNIL requires that notice be provided to the individuals 
identified in the directories warning those individuals of the enhanced risks of Internet 
dissemination.414 
In reviewing directories on the Internet, the CNIL has argued that data 
accessible to the general public does not lose its protection as "nominative" 
information.415 Specifically, the CNIL noted that consent for disclosure of directory 
information in a paper format should not preclude opposition to disclosure of the 
same information on-line or on CD-ROM.416 The rationale for this distinction lies in 
the CNIL's concern for the risks to finality that arise with the availability of directory 
information on-line. The CNIL requires the web site to display a screen preceding the 
release of any information that identifies the data's finality.417 In contrast, the CNIL 
has, in effect, created an opt-out regime for secondary use of certain public data in 
connection with the creation of government Internet sites. The decisions authorize 
distribution over the Internet ofinformation regarding public officials and the exercise 
of public functions by those officials only after the officials have been advised of 
unlimited uses that may occur on the Internet and their right to object to Internet 
dissemination. 
Another difficult area for on-line services will likely be the relationship 
between the French interdiction of the storage of sensitive information418 and profiling 
techniques. In particular, to the extent that profile information reveals an individuals 
réseau international ouvert; Délibération No. 95-131 du 7 novembre 1995; CNIL, 17e Rapport 
d'activité, p. 70 (1997); CNIL, 16e Rapport d'activité, pp. 84-85 (1996). 
414 See supra. 
415 See CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, 73 (1997) 
416 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, 73 (1997). 
417 Délibération No. 96-065 du 6 juillet 1996 portant avis sur le projet de décision 
présenté pour le Centre national de la recherche scientifique concernant un modèle type de traitement 
automatisé d'informations nominatives pour la publication d'annuaires des unités propres ou mixtes 
sur un réseau international ouvert; Délibération No. 95-131 du7novembre 1995; CNIL, 17eRapport 
d'activité, p. 70 (1997); CNIL, 16e Rapport d'activité, pp. 84-85 (1996). 
418 LoiNo. 78-17 du6janvier 1978, art. 31. 
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"morals," as illustrated by the individual's surfing patterns or viewing habits, such 
profiling comes within the ban on the collection of sensitive information. The CNIL 
appears to allow an exception to this interdiction when the individual grants express 
consent in writing independently of the collection of sensitive information.419 Given 
the seriousness with which the CNIL regards the processing of sensitive information, 
an on-line consent to processing may not be sufficient. To the extent that a search 
engine, for example, generates a profile revealing "sensitive" information, its use 
would be illegal. 
The necessary restraints on profiling and sensitive information pose a number 
of issues for the intelligent agents that are increasingly useful in electronic commerce. 
For example, collaborative filtering and relational agents necessarily develop user 
profiles and may match them against third party profiles to make a decision or choice 
automatically. Information delivery services such as PointCast may, for example, 
customize a subscriber's on-line news in relation to profiles of like-minded 
subscribers. Only news that would appeal to like-minded subscribers will be delivered 
to the particular subscriber. To an extent, these agents may conflict with the 
fundamental provision in French law that no automatic decision be made on the basis 
of a behavioral profile. Similarly, such functions appear to contradict the policy 
positions on behavioral profiling. Finally, to the extent that these profiles elicit 
"sensitive" information, they may be prohibited. 
Yet, the regulatory difficulties for intelligent agents are also compounded by 
their technical features. Not all agents will automatically make decisions. An agent 
may, for example, search for the best CD-ROM for a client, but not actually execute 
an order on behalf of the client. If the CD-ROM turns out to be the best Christian 
music of the 1990s, the agent will be processing sensitive information and confront 
the special restrictions requiring written consent in advance. 
In a similar fashion, the emerging infrastructure for Internet advertising 
challenges the French principles. The decisional mechanisms for placing banner 
advertisements on a web surfer's screen, such as DoubleClick, depend on the 
development of a user profile based on log file information and "cookies." Since both 
of these types ofinformation appear to be treated as "nominative" data by the CNIL, 
the profiling that results in an automatic decision regarding which advertisement to 
show the user triggers a potential problem; the French law bars any "private decision 
CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertés, p. 44 (1988). 
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involving an appraisal of human conduct... based solely on any automatic processing 
of data which describes the profile... of the person concerned."420 This is especially 
problematic if the advertisements are selected on the basis of preferences that reveal 
sensitive information. 
Finally, the CNIL has also insisted that the right of opposition permit the 
subscriber of an e-mail account to refuse the sale of name, address and phone 
number.421 The CNEL also expresses particular concern over the secondary use of e-
mail addresses by third parties acquiring those addresses from Internet 
communications.422 Outside the context of e-mail, the CNIL continues to insist that 
individuals have an effective right to the suppression from processing of their personal 
information. Consistently throughout the decisions on professional directories 
disseminated over the Internet423 and the review of an on-line payment mechanism,424 
the CNIL has stressed that the concerned individuals be informed of and have a means 
to suppress the processing of their personal information. In addition, the CNIL is 
likely to seek affirmative consent, rather than implicit "opt-out" consent, for the 
commercial distribution of profile information. For example, in its recent 
endorsement of a financial services discussion group, the CNIL noted that 
membership on a mailing list of relevant materials was through an opt-in link on the 
company's site.425 
Data storage also seems to be a high level concern for the CNIL. The approval 
by the CNIL of an insurance company's Internet discussion group noted that 
420 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 2. 
421 Délibération No. 97-050 du 4 juin 1997 relative à une demande d'avis présenté 
par France Télcom concernant un traitement automatisé d'informations nominatives dénommé 
"Minitelnet. 
422 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, p. 93 (1997). 
423 See supra. 
424 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, pp. 92-93 (1997)(discussing Kieline). 
425 CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, p. 91 (discussing the mailing list for the CNP.) 
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messages would not be stored longer than three months.426 Similarly, the advice given 
by the CNIL for government web sites insisted on the deletion of log files within 
fifteen days.427 The short duration of storage is likely to confront the tendency to 
amass electronic transaction data for future use. 
2.4.3 Germany 
The BDSG contains no section that explicitly regulates profiling. In 
contrast, the IuKDG places strict and explicit limits on data profiling. It permits the 
creation of user profiles only "under the condition that pseudonyms are used."428 
Moreover, once profiles are created that are retrievable under pseudonyms, these data 
are explicitly forbidden from being combined with data related to the bearer of the 
pseudonym.429 
The BDSG also contains no section that explicitly provides higher protection 
for sensitive data. Nevertheless, its standards for permitting the storage and 
communication of personal data inherently provide greater protection for such 
information. Thus, one ground for preventing storage and communication is when 
the data subject has "legitimate interests" that override "justified interests of the 
controller of the data."430 This balancing approach will offer greater protection to 
sensitive personal data.431 Like the BDSG, the IuKDG offers no explicit protection 
for sensitive information. To the extent, however, that it guarantees anonymity in 
cyberspace and places strict limits on the creation of user profiles, this statute has 
addressed some of the most critical concerns regarding sensitive personal information. 
The IuKDG provides finality by restricting further use of data. It states, "The 
1997). 
Id. 
427 See supra. 
428 IuKDG, Article 2, § 4(4). 
429 IuKDG, at Article 2, § 4(4). 
430 See BDSG, §28(1 )(2). 
431 Peter Gola & Rudolf Schomerus, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz § 28, 7.1, Seite 383 (6th ed. 
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provider may use the data collected for performing teleservices for other purposes 
only if permitted by this Act or some other regulation or if the user has given his 
consent."432 As this Study has noted above, the Law also seeks to restrict the 
potential for abuse of this consent provision. The IuKDG contains safeguards to 
ensure that consent is (1) truly informed, and (2) truly voluntary. Another finality 
provision of the IuKDG requires the separate processing "of personal data relating to 
the use of several teleservices by one user."433 Combination of such data are 
permitting only when "necessary for accounting purposes."434 
One of the most important ideas of the IuKDG is to require a minimization of 
the personal data that are collected as part of the provision and utilization of on-line 
services. The Law's central principle regarding the minimization of data is to require 
this idea to be reflected in the design of technology. The IuKDG states, "The design 
and selection of technical devices to be used for teleservices shall be oriented to the 
goal of collecting, processing and using either no personal data at all or as few data 
as possible."435 
Another way that minimization is to be ensured is by requiring personal data 
to be erased at stated intervals. Thus, utilization data are to be erased "as soon as 
possible, at the latest immediately after the end of each utilization, except those that 
are at the same time accounting data."436 As for accounting data, the Law requires 
that they be erased "as soon as they are no longer required for accounting 
purposes."437 
A final way that the IuKDG seeks to guarantee a minimization of personal 
data is by limiting the information that is revealed on invoices for on-line services. 
432 IuKDG, at Article 2, § 3(2). 
433 IuKDG, at Article 2, § 2(4). 
434 Id. For a discussion, see Stefan Engel-Flechsig, Die datenschutzrechtlichen Vorschriften 
im neuen Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz, Recht der Datenverarbeitung 62 (Heft 
2/1997). 
435 IuKDG, Article 2, § 3(3). 
436 IuKDG, Article 2, §6(2)(1). 
437 IuKDG, Article 2, §6(2)(1). 
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The Law states, "The invoice concerning the use of teleservices must not reveal the 
provider, time, duration, type, content and frequency of use of any particular 
teleservices used unless the user requests such detailed records."438 
2.4.4 United Kingdom 
British data protection law requires finality in data processing and places limits 
on data storage. As for finality, a number of the data protection principles stress the 
importance of this fair information practice. The second principle states, "Personal 
data shall be held only for one or more specified and lawful purpose."439 The third 
principle also protects finality by providing, "Personal data held for any purpose or 
purposes shall not be used or disclosed in any manner incompatible with that purpose 
or those purposes."440 Much of the Registrar's interpretation of the idea of finality 
concerns the registration notice itself. Thus, the Registrar has stated, "use of personal 
data for any purpose is permitted, without breach of the [incompatibility] Principle, 
so long as the use of those personal data for that purpose is described in the data 
user's register entry."441 The fairness principle does require, however, that data users 
know of these additional uses and disclosures before they are required to supply 
information.442 
British data protection law also requires limits on data storage. One of the 
data protection principles requires that personal data "shall not be kept for longer than 
is necessary."443 It also requires data to be erased "where appropriate."444 According 
to the Registrar, this principle implies that "data users should establish procedures for 
438 IuKDG, Article 2, § 6(5). 
439 Id at 1.2. 
440 Id. at Part 1(3). 
441 Data Protection Guidelines, at 60. 
442 Id. at 54. 
443 Data Protection Act 1984, Part 1(6). 
444 Id. at 7(b). 
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the erasure of data which are no longer used."445 One suggestion of the Registrar is 
that data users who hold more than "a very small amount of personal data ... adopt 
a systematic policy of deleting data."446 Such data purges would take place at the end 
of a standard life cycle for records of a particular category.447 
British data protection law contains no special provisions concerning profiling, 
but responds to it as part of its data protection principles. Of particular relevance is 
the principle of fairness in processing. The Data Protection Registrar has stressed that 
the duty to obtain information fairly requires steps to be taken to make the individual 
"aware of the additional purposes for which the information will be held and the 
additional uses and disclosures before he or she is required to supply the 
information."448 This language essentially approaches profiling through a notice 
requirement. This approach is echoed by the Code of Practice of the Internet Service 
Provider's Association (ISP A).449 The ISPA speaks of the requirement of its members 
to use "reasonable endeavors to ensure that services which involve the collection of 
personal information ... must make it clear to the relevant party the purpose for which 
the information is required."450 No particular provision in this Code addresses 
profiling. 
It is increasingly difficult for individuals to know the kind of profiling that is 
occurring in the on-line world. The application of the fairness principle to profiling 
by Internet Service Providers or websites is as yet unsettled. 
The Data Protection Act permits the Secretary of State to supplement the data 
protection principles to provide additional safeguards for four categories of sensitive 
data. These categories pertain to information as to the data subject's (1) racial origin; 
(2) political opinions or religious or other beliefs; (3) physical or mental health or his 
sexual life; or 
445 Data Protection Guidance for Direct Mailers, at 36. 
446 Data Protection Registrar, The Guidelines 64-65 (Third Series November 1994). 
447 J d 
448 Data Protection Registrar, The Guidelines 54 (Third Series November 1994). 
449 <http://www.ispa.org.uk> 
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(4) criminal convictions.451 These powers have not yet been exercised; the Secretary 
of State has not issued such a statutory instrument. 
As part of the process of compliance with the European Directive, explicit 
protection for sensitive information is likely to be added to the UK Data Protection 
Act.452 One proposal, which was made by the Data Protection Registrar in its 
response to the official Consultative Paper on the Directive, calls for the Secretary of 
State to implement a Sensitive Data Decree.453 As a model for potential British 
efforts, the Registrar pointed to the Netherlands' Sensitive Data Decree.454 The 
Registrar has also advocated a new category for sensitive data in registration.455 
Although no specific British statute explicitly addresses the minimalization of 
personal data on the Internet, the principle of minimalization is well established in 
British data protection law. In particular, the UK Data Protection Registrar's 
advocacy of privacy enhancing technologies has stressed the importance of 
minimalization of data. As the Registrar stated in its response to a governmental 
prospectus for the electronic delivery of government services, "The key principle 
underlying the privacy enhancing design approach is that the quantity of personal 
information in any transaction should be the minimum required for that transaction. "456 
This governmental proposal, entitled "government.direct," offers, according to the 
Registrar, an ideal opportunity for a commitment to technology design that will 
451 Data Protection Act 1984, 2(3). 
452 See Consultation Paper on the EC Data Protection Directive, 4.1 (1996) ("Article 8 [of 
the Directive] sets special rules for the processing of data which are regarded as being particularly 
sensitive. Such special rules are effectively new to United Kingdom law.") 
<http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/Consult/ukdp/ 
dataprot.htm>. 
453 Data Protection Registrar, Consultation Paper on the EC Data Protection Directive, Our 
Answers 5.3. <http://www.open.gov.uk/dpr/answer/ans4-5.htm>. 
454 See id. at Appendix II. 
455 Data Protection Registrar, The Future of Registration, www.open.gov.uk/dpr/chap5-
8.htm#standard. 
456 Response to Government.Direct Including a Paper of Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 
in UK Data Protection Registrar, The Thirteenth Activity Report 102 (1997). 
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collect the least amount of personal data possible. 
The relationship between privacy enhancing technologies and data 
minimalization requires the right questions to be asked when technology is being 
designed. Among these questions, the Registrar views the following as an essential 
part of technology design, "Do I need to collect any personal data at all?"457 The Data 
Protection Registrar is currently searching for pilot schemes in which to promote the 
privacy enhancing philosophy and technique. 
2.5 Security 
One of the most controversial areas, at present, for the Internet and online 
services is the balance between cryptography and law enforcement concerns. On one 
hand, commercial services and individuals need and seek to improve the security of 
communications by using different kinds of cryptography for on-line transmissions of 
personal data, especially in the context of electronic payments.458 The European 
Directive requires the implementation of "appropriate technical and organizational 
measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or 
accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access."459 The European 
Directive further requires that "such measures shall ensure a level of security 
appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the nature of the data to be 
protected" with due consideration of the state of the art and the cost of 
implementation.460 On the other hand, some law enforcement agencies in Europe 
argue that cryptography must be limited so police will be able to gain the access to 
online data necessary to fight organized crime. A debate that began in the United 
States concerning key escrow proposals and limits on the exportation of cryptography 
has been taken up throughout Europe. For example, the German Interior Minister has 
457 
458 
■159 
460 
Id. 
See Part I, § II. 1.3 
Directive 95/46/EC, 
Id. 
art. 17. 
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recently announced his own key escrow proposal.461 Some German data protection 
commissioners are currently contesting this proposal's likely effectiveness. The 
European Commission has also taken a strong position in favor of the freedom of 
private parties to encrypt information.462 
2.5.1 Belgium 
The Belgian data protection law both directly and indirectly requires the 
"controller" of personal information to use appropriate security for the processing of 
the data. "Controllers" must assure the protection of personal information against 
access by anyone whose functions do not require such access and against 
"modifications, additions, erasure, disclosures, or combinations and interconnections 
that are unforseen, unauthorized or forbidden" by anyone with access.463 Controllers 
must further "take the technical and organizational measures required to protect files 
against accidental or unauthorized destruction, accidental loss, as well as against the 
modification, access or any other unauthorized processing of personal information."464 
These technical measures must guarantee an adequate level of protection considering 
the state of the art, the cost of the security measures and the nature of the risks 
associated with the particular personal information.465 Royal Decrees may also 
mandate specific security standards for any processing or type of processing.466 
461 For a further discussion, see § 2.5.3 below. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Ensuring Security and Trust in 
Electronic Communications: Towards A European Framework for Digital Signatures And Encryption 
COM (97) 503 (October 7, 1997). 
463 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 16( 1 )(4). 
464 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 16(3). 
465 I d 
466 I d 
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These security requirements imposed by the data protection law have a 
significant impact for online services. Electronic commerce functions must take 
measures to assure transmission integrity. While no specific decisions appear yet to 
exist, a reasonable inference is that Belgian data protection rules will require the use 
of cryptography and some forms of digital signature for online transactions. Similarly, 
the requirement imposed upon "controllers" may have implications for the function 
of search engines. A "controller" for personal information maintained on a web site 
might have to take measures to block access by search engines if the processing by 
the person launching the search is unauthorized, such as the situation in which the 
person launching the search seeks to exceed the finality permitting the storage of the 
personal information. 
In contrast to the data protection law's mandate for security, the wiretapping 
law467 undercuts any absolute security measures. Belgian law imposes an obligation 
on network operators to insure that the technical infrastructure allows law 
enforcement access to the contents of communications.468 
Because of the CPVP's predisposition for strong security, the CPVP has been 
critical of regulation limiting cryptography. In an advisory opinion on proposed 
changes to the wiretapping and pen register law, the CPVP reported that the 
imposition of key escrow was an "excessive and disproportionate measure with 
respect to security needs."469 The CPVP prefered the approach advocated by various 
international bodies, notably at the OECD and at the European Union.470 The CPVP, 
in particular, objected to the delegation of regulatory authority through Royal 
467 Loi du 30 juin 1994 relative à la protection de la vie privée contre les écoutes, la 
prise de connaissance et l'enregistrement de communications et de télécommunications privées. 
468 Loi du 21 mars 1991 portant réforme de certaines entreprise publiques 
économiques, art. 70bis. 
469 c pyp ; A v i s n 0 0 9 / 9 7 d u 20 mars 1997, p.7 
470 I d 
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Decrees.471 Prominent industry leaders in Belgium are also opposed to key escrow.472 
For the moment, the Belgian government has accepted the relaxation of 
cryptography regulation. In a draft bill, dated May 1997, the Ministry of 
Communications and Infrastructure has accepted to allow cryptography to be 
"unregulated"473 rather than have it subject to key escrow. However, the explanatory 
report from the Ministry says that this liberalization "does not signify that the 
legislature has completely abandoned all hope of having the ability to access clear text 
messages in the future .... this issue will be reviewed at a later date in light of 
technological evolutions or abusive use of cryptography."474 
This tension between the Belgian government efforts to seek regulation of 
data security and the CPVP's objections will create a degree of instability for on-line 
services. 
2.5.2. France 
France has two significant and potentially contradictory legal requirements for 
the security of nominative information. The data protection law obligates anyone 
processing personal information "to take all useful precautions in order to protect the 
security of information and particularly to prevent that such information becomes 
corrupted, damaged or communicated to unauthorized third parties."475 The security 
obligation requires the reliability of hardware and software mechanisms and the ability 
Id. 
See, e.g., BELINFOSEC, Rapport soumis à l'approbation sur les aspects 
juridiques de la sécurité informatique— La cryptographie en droit belge (Juillet, 1996). 
Ministère des Communications et de l'Infrastructure, Avant-Projet de loi modifiant 
la loi du 21 mars 1991 portant réforme de certaines entreprises publiques économiques afin d'adapter 
le cadre réglementaire aux obligations en matière de libre concurrence et d'harmonisation sur le 
marché des télécommunications découlant des décisions de l'Union européenne, art. 76 (27 mai 
1997)("L'emploi de la cryptographie est libre.") 
474 Id., Exposé des motifs, at 51. 
475 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 29. 
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of these mechanisms to resist tampering.476 
At the same time, the 1996 Telecommunications Law477 creates a new 
framework for the use of encryption. Prior to the new law, all encryption for 
information security was subject to government licensing. The new 
telecommunications law provides for freedom to use cryptographic means to 
authenticate or to assure the integrity of messages.478 Encryption may be used to 
secure the contents of message transmission if the encryption keys are deposited with 
a trusted third party.479 The trusted third party must be licensed by the state.480 
However, the terms of licensing have not yet been specified by ministerial decree and 
there is no indication if foreign escrow agents will be permitted. Any other 
cryptography must be specifically licensed by the Prime Minister.481 This reform 
package is intended to strike a balance between the needs of users to engage in secure 
transactions and the interests of national defense and public security to gain access to 
encrypted communications. The new law grants law enforcement access to the 
encryption keys deposited with licensed trusted third parties. In effect, the purported 
liberalization of encryption remains far from an encouragement to secure treatment 
of personal information as contemplated in the data protection law. 
The CNIL has repeatedly emphasized security measures to assure the finality 
of personal information. A series of decisions in the context of health information and 
patient records emphasize the crucial security elements.482 For ministerial Internet 
sites, the CNIL has pointedly noted the essential need for security mechanisms to 
CNIL, Dix ans d'informatique et libertés, pp. 49-50 (1988). 
Loi No. 96-659 du 26 juillet 1996. 
Loi No. 96-659 du 26 juillet 1996, art. 17. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id., at 108-123. 
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assure the integrity and finality of data processing.483 The CNIL has also noted that 
even directory information placed on public web servers must have sufficient security 
to assure no other public access to personal information.484 In addition, the CNIL has 
focused on the use of security to assure the integrity of personal information. For 
example, Kieline, the electronic payment service for the Internet, received a favorable 
review by the CNIL due in part because of Kieline's emphasis on security 
mechanisms.485 The CNIL noted that consultations with national security officials was 
a necessary part of the examination of the data processing arrangements to ascertain 
that satisfactory, legal security mechanisms were deployed.486 
Yet, security issues have had varying meaning over the last few years. In 
1993, for example, the CNIL favored the use of pre-paid chip cards because they 
provided security for anonymous payment transactions and accepted the introduction 
of chip cards for medical services due, in part, to the security measures that would 
assure limited access to stored personal information.487 By contrast, the intelligence 
service of the Ministry of Interior viewed the 1997 introduction of the Mobicarte, a 
payment card for mobile telephones, as a fundamental challenge and required that 
France Telecom build in the capacity for tracking and identifying callers.488 In this 
case, security was a means to identify and track individuals rather than create 
anonymity. 
See Délibération No. 97-032 du 6 mai 1997 relative à la demande d'avis présenté 
par le premier ministre concernant un modèle-type de traitements d'informations nominative opérés 
dabs ke cadre d'un site Internet ministériel. 
Délibération No. 96-065 du 6 juillet 1996 portant avis sur le projet de décision 
présenté pour le Centre national de la recherche scientifique concernant un modèle type de traitement 
automatisé d'informations nominatives pour la publication d'annuaires des unités propres ou mixtes 
sur un réseau international ouvert; Délibération No. 95-131 du 7 novembre 1995; CNIL, 17e Rapport 
d'activité, p. 70 (1997); CNIL, 16e Rapport d'activité, pp. 84-85 (1996). 
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CNIL, 17e Rapport d'activité, pp. 92-93 (1997). 
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The access by law enforcement to personal information is likely to become an 
area of increasing friction. The French law's declaration requirements are inapplicable 
to cases involving national security, defense or public safety.489 Similarly, public 
sector data processing involving national security, defense or public safety need not 
be disclosed through publication of the authorizing regulations. Special procedural 
rules apply to the exercise of the individual's right of access to personal information 
if the processing implicates national security, defense or public safety.490 
2.5.3 Germany 
For on-line services, the IuKDG places an obligation to provide security on 
the provider. It requires that the user be protected against third parties obtaining 
knowledge of her use of teleservices and that personal data generated in connection 
with accessing teleservices generally be immediately erased.491 The IuKDG also 
creates a scheme for the voluntary use of digital signatures,492 which will be discussed 
below. 
As part of its provisions for on-line security, Germany currently places no 
restrictions on the use of cryptography within Germany, or on the import or export 
of cryptography software. This situation may change, however, as a vigorous debate 
is now underway concerning the need for a so-called "Crypto-Law" (Kryptogesetz) 
that would limit cryptography. The German Minister of the Interior, the German 
Intelligence Community, and some elements of the CDU have taken a position in 
favor of limits on cryptography. Other German ministers, state data protection 
commissioners, and German industry have taken a vigorous position against any 
restrictions on cryptography.493 
489 LoiNo. 78-17 du6janvier 1978, art. 19. 
490 Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 39. 
491 IuKDG, Article 2, §2(2) & (3). 
492 IuKDG, Article 3. 
493 See generally Tobias Stroemer, Bonner Streit um Kryptogesetz (1997) 
<http://www.netlaw.de/ 
newstick/krpto-2.htm>; Lorenz Lorenz-Meyer, Das Kreuz mit der Kryptographie, Spiegel Online 
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The parties who seek limits on cryptography have argued that such measures 
are needed to protect the activities of law enforcement authorities. As a CDU 
argument in favor of the regulation of cryptography states, "The introduction of 
widespread encryption can have the result of making seriously more difficult the work 
of the authorities responsible for prosecution of crimes by causing legally monitored 
communication to become 'unreadable.' This result would disadvantage law abiding 
citizens."494 Such potential harm to law enforcement's ability to monitor 
communications is the most frequently cited policy reason in favor of regulation in this 
495 
area. In one internal articulation of the government's favored approach, which Der 
Spiegel revealed, an inter-ministerial group of experts advocated the establishment of 
a three-step approach to the control of cryptography.496 First, those who offer 
encryption products and services would be obliged to offer data in clear text to 
government authorities. This demand has already been met as far as 
telecommunication providers are concerned. While German law places no current 
restrictions on end-to-end encryption, the Telecommunications Act requires 
telecommunications providers to make technical provisions to allow their networks 
Archiv-Dokument 3/1997 <http://www.spiegel.de/special.hefi2/krypto.html>. 
494 CDU, Argumente gegen eine Kryptoregelung und Erwiderungen. 
<http ://www. cdu. de/bpt/ 
archiv97/krypto.html>. 
More specifically, some government agencies have pointed to the use of encryption 
by criminals and by extremist groups. In the latest report of the Bureau for the Protection of the 
Constitution (Amt für Verfassungschutz), for example, this agency noted that the use of new 
electronic communication media was increasingly important for extremist groups. Amt für 
Verfassungschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 1996, Linksextremistische Bestrebungen L, 2.3. 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/inland/ministerien/bmi/vsber96/links_i.html. 
These extremist groups were also found to be using encryptions algorithms, in particular 
"Pretty Good Privacy," to encode their communications. Id. Among the strongest advocates for 
limitations on encryption software are the Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution, the Federal 
Information Agency (Bundesnachrichtdienst), and the Minister of the Interior, Manfred Kanther. 
496 Lorenz Lorenz-Meyer, Das Kreuz mit der Kryptographie, Spiegel Online Archiv-
Dokument 3/1997 <http://www.spiegel.de/special.hefi2/krypto.html>. 
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to be open to surveillance by the appropriate authorities.497 Second, the utilization of 
encryption systems would require authorization by government. This utilization 
would be tied to the possibility that reconstruction of encrypted data could be made 
in a fashion that was "current and subject to reasonable expenditures." Finally, the 
use of non-authorized encryption processes would be forbidden.498 
The acceptance of this proposal is far from certain. Numerous voices in 
Germany have been raised against any proposal to regulate cryptography.499 Some 
of these voices are within the federal government. Thus, the Federal Justice Minister 
Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, the Technology Minister Jürgen Rüttgers, and the Commerce 
Mnister Günter Rexrodt, have expressed skepticism regarding limits on encryption. 
On May 2, 1997, for example, Dr. Rexrodt issued a press release that claimed the 
Federal Ministry of Commerce has taken an active role during the last years to block 
the federal government from introducing any measure restricting encryption.500 
State data protection commissioners have also taken a highly active role in this 
debate. The Schleswig-Holstein Commissioner has found, for example, that 
encryption tools are no less than a "gift from heaven. " In his most recent report of 
activities, Dr. Bäumler advocates the use of encryption without restrictions as a way 
to protect communications and financial transactions in open nets. This report states: 
It remains to hope that policymakers grasp that encryption represents a 
unique chance to protect the private sphere in a problematic, technical 
environment. Moreover, the experts are fairly unanimous that a forbidding 
or a limitation of cryptography would be ineffective. It would be easy to 
circumvent these restrictions precisely by those against whom they were 
497 Telekommunikationsgesetz vom 25 Juli 1996, § 88. 
498 Lorenz Lorenz Meyer, Das Kreuz mit der Kryptographie, Spiegel Online Archiv-
Dokument 3/1997 <http://www.spiegel.de/special.heft2/krypto.html>. 
499 See generally Tobias H. Stroemer, Bonner Streit um Krypto-Gesetz (1997) 
<http://www.netlaw.de/newstick/krypto-2.htm>. 
500 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Rexrodt weiter strikt gegen Kryptographieverbot 
(May 2, 1997). http://www.bmwi.de/presse/1997/0502prm.html. 
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raised— namely members of sophisticated organized crime organizations 501 
While encryption offers a powerful step forward for data protection, any attempts to 
limit it are said to be doomed to failure. 
The Data Protection Commissioner of Hesse has followed up on the idea that 
encryption will be impossible to limit. In the 25th Annual Activity Report of this 
Commissioner, Dr. Rainer Hamm argues in favor of government renouncing its 
regulation of encryption technology because of the technical difficulties of enforcing 
effective limits on cryptography. Dr. Ham found that "Every governmental 
regimentation of the introduction of encryption processes by the transfer and storage 
of data will be for naught."502 This result follows from such factors as the ease in 
which this regulation can be circumvented, that oversight of encryption is hardly 
possible, and that it opposes other governmental and economic interests in the 
security of data.503 Dr. Hamm also objected to key escrow proposals, which he felt 
raised additional risks to the security of keys.504 Other data protection commissioners 
have also raised strong objections to limits on encryption based on these notions.505 
Another objection to encryption views legal restrictions on this technology as 
unconstitutional. One data protection expert has pointed to a potential violation by 
encryption controls on the Basic Law's Article 10, which protects the privacy of 
communications.506 A law that limits encryption is likely to infringe on this 
constitutional right without any positive effect on any other constitutional interest. 
As such, limits on encryption are said to be unconstitutional due to their 
501 19.Tätigkeitsbericht, 2.3 (1996)(emphasis in original). 
502 Der Hessische Datenschutzbeauftragte, 25. Tätigkeitsbericht 161 (1996). 
503 Id. at 155-161. 
504 I d 
505 See, e.g., Berliner Datenschutzbeauftragter Jahresbericht 1996, § 3.4 ( 1997), 
<http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/jahresbe/96/teil3.htm>. 
506 Johann Bizer, Rechtliche Bedeutung der Kryptographie, 21 Datenschutz und 
Datensicherung 203 (1997). 
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ineffectiveness and unsuitability.507 
Finally, German industry has played an active role in supporting unrestricted 
use of encryption. For example, the German Information Technology Manufacturer's 
Association (Fachverband Lnformationstechnik) has stated that any regulation of 
cryptography would "create only unnecessary administrative and cost expenditures 
in considerable amounts and reduce the export chances for German security 
products."508 The Telesec, a division of the Deutsche Telekom, the newly privatized 
German telecommunications provider, has also objected to restrictions on 
encryption.509 This opposition has also been accompanied by resistance among 
experts and among the population in the general.510 
As for digital signatures, the German lawmaker has provided for their use in 
the IuKDG. While this provision provides for anonymous use of digital signatures, 
the IuKDG's Digital Signature Law also permits law enforcement authorities to find 
out the names of those who use such digital keys under a pseudonym. Finally, the 
Digital Signature Law contains provisions concerning data protection vis-a-vis the 
certification authorities' own collection of data. 
The IuKDG's Article 3 regulates the use of digital signatures. This section of 
the Law, which is termed the Digital Signature Act (Signaturgesetz), establishes the 
"conditions under which digital signatures are deemed secure and forgeries of digital 
signatures or manipulation of signed data can be readily ascertained."511 The German 
lawmaker enacted legislation in this area as an essential step to encourage commercial 
507 Id. See also Norbert F. Poetzl, Kuverts fuer E-mail, Spiegel On-Line. 
<http://www.spiegel.de/special/hefi2/ss03100.html>. 
508 Fachverband lnformationstechnik, Position zur Einfuehrung des "Gesetzes zur digitalen 
Signatur" und zur Regulierung von Verschluessungsverfahren. http://www.telesec.de/fvit.htm. 
509 Telesec, Krvptokon tro verse. <http://www.telesec.de/recht3.htm>. 
510 Two elaborate web sites that reflect this more general opposition the encryption are 
<http://www.crypto.de and www.thur.de/ulf/krypto/verbot.html>. 
511 IuKDG, Article 3, § 1(1). 
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activities on the Internet.512 
The IuKDG's Digital Signature Act sets up a licensing procedure that involves 
two critical actors: the "competent authority" and the "certification authority." Under 
the Law's approach, the competent authority, a governmental body, gives licenses to 
assign public signature keys to certification authorities. The competent authority is 
a specific government agency, which the Law also identifies; according to the Digital 
Signature Act, the competent authority is the "Regulatory Authority of the 
Telecommunication and Postal Services" (Regulierungsbehörde).il3 This body is 
located within the Commerce Ministry (Ministerium für Wirtschaft)51,1 
In its role granting licenses to distribute digital signatures, the Regulatory 
Authority (called the "competent authority" in the IuKDG) makes the digital 
certificates which it has issued available for verification and retrieval at all times over 
publicly available telecommunication links.515 The Regulatory Authority also has an 
important role in monitoring the behavior of the certification authorities, who are the 
bodies responsible for distributing the digital signatures. The Regulatory Authority 
can forbid the use of unsuitable technical components and oversee the activities of a 
certification authority by visiting its sites.516 This provision has no territorial limit on 
it, which would suggest that a body outside of Germany that sought licensing by the 
5,2 As the federal government (Bundesregierung) stated in introducing the IuKDG, "The 
development of information and communication technology opens new possibilities for data transfers 
and for economic activities." Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Deutscher Bundestag, 
13.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 13/7385 (09. April 1997) at 25. 
In place of the omnibus standards of the BDSG and any uncertainty regarding their 
application, a sector law would create legal certainty for these new data transfers and economic 
activities. In addition, with increasing electronic transfers of personal information, including sensitive 
data in the medical sector, the German government pointed to a "urgent need" for a digital solution to 
protect data from unnoticed alteration. 
Id. 
513 IuKDG, Article 3, § 3. This section references the Telecommunications Act, § 66. 
514 Telecommunications Act, § 66. 
515 IuKDG, Article 3, § 4. 
516 IuKDG, Article 3, §§ 4-5. 
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German Regulatory Authority would also be subject to it. On the other hand, the 
Digital Signatures Law contains provisions regarding certificates issued by other 
countries, which may indicate that only German entities can certify keys as a 
certification authority.517 Finally, the Regulatory Authority can also revoke licenses 
"in the event of non-fulfillment of obligations" arising under the Digital Signature 
Law.518 
As to the role of the certification authorities, these bodies are responsible for 
the issuing of key certificates to the parties who wish to affix a digital signature to a 
document.519 According to the Digital Signatures Law, digital certificates are to 
contain information regarding: (1) the name of the owner of a signature key or the 
distinctive pseudonym assigned to the key's owner; (2) the public signature key that 
is assigned; (3) the names of the algorithms with which the public key of the owner 
of the signature key and the public key of the certification authority can be used; and 
(4) an indication as to whether use of the signature key is restricted in type or scope 
to specific applications.520 
The Digital Signature Law permits the certification authority to collect 
personal data only under limited circumstances. These data must be collected only 
(1) when this information is required for the purposes of a certification, and (2) 
directly from the party concerned.521 Any collection of data from third parties may 
be permitted only with the consent of the party concerned.522 
According to the Digital Signatures Law, certificates issued by other countries 
for a digital signature are deemed equivalent to digital signatures issued under this 
Law when the foreign digital signature is as secure as a German one.523 Finally, 
517 IuKDG, Article 3, § 15. 
518 IuKDG, at Article 3, § 13(3). 
519 IuKDG, at Article 3, §4. 
520 Id. at Article 3, §5-7. 
521 IuKDG, Article 3(12). 
522 Id. 
523 Id. at Article 3, § 15(1). 
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certification authorities are explicitly forbidden from the storage of private signature 
keys— although such devices themselves are not forbidden by German law.524 
As the requirements for digital certificates indicate, digital signatures may be 
issued to individuals who wish to use them under a pseudonym. Making digital 
signatures available for use with a pseudonym allows a person to enter into cyber-life 
and maintain anonymity, which provides an important measure of data protection. As 
the Federal Data Protection Commissioner observed in his 16th Report of Activities: 
Through the [establishment of a pseudonym] the amount of personal data that 
is automatically created about a person in the context of business transactions 
over telecommunication connections can be seriously reduced. The 
availability of user profiles, the surveillance of consumer behavior as well as 
direct advertising by companies will thereby be almost entirely precluded.525 
The handing out of publicly certified digital signatures on a pseudonymous basis is 
subject, however, to access to information about one's true identity by law 
enforcement agencies. 
The Digital Signature Law contains standards that permit a range of 
governmental bodies to gain data pertaining to a person's actual identify when this 
information has been masked behind a publicly certified digital signature. This Law 
permits the de-anonymization of pseudonym provided for digital signatures for a 
defined set of law enforcement purposes: 
the prosecution of criminal or administrative offences, for averting danger to 
public safety or order or for the discharge of statutory duties by the Federal 
and State authorities for the protection of the Constitution, the Federal 
Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst), the Military Counter-
intelligence Service (MilitaerischerAbschirmdienst) or the Customs 
Criminological Office (Zollkriminalamt)526 
524 Id. at Article 3, § 5(4). 
525 147. 
<> IuKDG, Article 3, § 12(2). 
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All requests for information are to be documented and are generally to be share with 
the owner of the signature key at a later date.527 
The IuKDG contains another section regarding law enforcement access to 
personal data. In its Article 2, §6, it carves out a law enforcement exception to its 
protection for utilization and accounting data. This section first forbids the 
transmission of these data "to other providers or third parties," and then declares, 
"This shall not affect the powers of criminal prosecution agencies."528 The Federal 
Data Protection Commissioner has criticized this aspect of the law as giving a 
disproportionate power to law enforcement authorities.529 More details regarding 
the use of the digital signatures are to be provided by the Digital Signature Regulation 
(Verordnungzur digitalen Signatur). The German government released a draft of 
this bill on October 8, 1997.530 
2.5.4 United Kingdom 
Data security is an important element of data protection in the United 
Kingdom. The eighth and final data protection principle requires data security. It 
states, "Appropriate security measures shall be taken against unauthorised access to, 
or alteration, disclosure or destruction of, personal data and against accidental loss 
or destruction of personal data."531 According to the Registrar, "The prime 
responsibility for creating and putting into practice a security policy must rest with the 
computer user."532 This policy must take all reasonable steps to insure security. The 
reasonableness of security will be measured according to the "risk of harm to 
527 Id. 
528 Id. at Article 2, § 6. 
529 Federal Data Protection Authority, 16th Activity Report, 144. 
530 Verordnung zur digitalen Signatur in der Fassung des Beschlusses der Bundesregierung 
vom 8.Oktober 1997 <http://www.iid.de/rahment/sigv.html>. 
531 Data Protection Act 1984, Part I, Schedule 1(8). 
532 Data Protection Registrar, The Guidelines 66 (Third Series 1994). 
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individuals from a breach of security."533 
Risks to data security are likely to increase in the on-line world, and the Data 
Protection Registrar has begun to address this issue in its guidance on "Homeworking 
and Computer Information."534 This guidance examines both e-mail in particular and 
the Internet in general. 
Concerning e-mail, the Registrar states that e-mail is generally likely to be at 
some risk. These risks are due to the nature of the Internet and e-mail systems: 
As a form of network the Internet is particularly insecure and cannot 
be relied on to provide protection for personal data. In addition it is probable 
that the service provider will have access to the mailbox as well as the person 
to whom the mailbox is assigned. 
However, in reality, the risks associated with the use of e-mail for 
routine nonsensitive messages are not great. While it may be possible for the 
mailbox to be accessed by unauthorised people, they are unlikely to attack the 
computers remotely accessing the mailbox. The time spent accessing the 
mailbox is short and does not allow much of an interval for interference.535 
According to the Registrar, use of the Internet without encrypting messages may be 
generally consistent with the requirement for appropriate security. Where sensitive 
personal information is contained in messages, however, use of the Internet may be 
appropriate only if an "appropriate form of encryption" is utilized.536 
As for the Internet in general, the Registrar discussed the need for 
organizations to take general security measures to assure the integrity ofinformation. 
These include the installation of "firewalls," taking care as to the personal data that 
are included on a website, and seeking informed consent of anyone whose data will 
533 Id. at 68-69. 
534 Data Protection Registrar, Homeworking and Computer Information 25 (June 1997). 
535 Id. at 28 
536 Id. 
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be used on a website.537 The Registrar also warned of the possibility of credit card 
theft on the Internet and suggested the use of "appropriate security measures, such 
as encryption."538 
As in other countries, a vigorous debate is underway in the United Kingdom 
regarding the regulation of cryptography. The Department of Trade and Industry is 
playing a key role in this debate; much of the discussion is being shaped by its 
consultation paper, "Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of 
Encryption Services."539 This governmental paper argues in favor of official licensing 
of Trusted Third Parties (TTP) who will provide encryption services. 
Under the proposed scheme, the government is to provide licenses to TTPs, 
"which will provide encryption services to a wide range of bodies across all 
sectors."540 Of this voluntary licensing scheme, the Department of Trade and Industry 
states: 
The licensing regime will seek to ensure that organisations who wish to 
establish themselves as TTPs will be fit for the purpose. It will aim to protect 
consumers as well as to preserve the ability of the intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies to fight serious crime and terrorism by establishing 
procedures for disclosure to them of the encryption keys, under safeguards 
similar to those which already exist for warranted interception under the 
Interception of Communications Act 1985.541 
As this statement makes clear, the Department of Trade and Industry plans both 
licensing and a key escrow approach. 
Of licensing in general, the Department's plan is to ensure that TTPs can be 
trusted by the entities that they serve. Licensing will protect consumers, allow 
537 Id. 
538 Id. 
539 Department of Trade and Industry, Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision 
of Encryption Services: Public Consultation Paper (March 1997) <http://dtiinfol.dti.gov.uk/pubs>. 
540 Id. at § 40. 
541 Id. at § 17. 
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interoperability of secure services, and allow UK business to take advantage of secure 
electronic trading.542 Moreover, use of a licensed TTP will be entirely voluntary. As 
the paper states, "The market will decide if it wants to use TTP services and not 
Government. The Government believes that the benefits of this scheme will far 
outweigh any others."543 
Although use of a TTP is voluntary, the TTP itself is to have no choice 
regarding its participation in a key escrow scheme. Issuance of a warrant to law 
enforcement officials would require a TTP to disclose in a timely manner the 
cryptographic key material to a central repository, which would act on behalf of an 
governmental agency. The Department of Trade and Industry has set out the role of 
the central repository in language worth quoting in some detail: 
For purpose of legal access, a central repository might be nominated or 
established by the UK authorities. The purpose of this central repository will 
be to act as a single point of contact for interfacing between a licensed TTP 
and the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies who have obtained 
a warrant requiring access to a client's private encryption keys. The central 
repository would, therefore, be responsible for serving the warrant (whether 
by physical or electronic means) on the TTP and distributing the encryption 
key to the appropriate agency.544 
The entire process of obtaining keys, from the time the central repository serves the 
warrant to the delivery of the keys, is intended to take no more than one hour.545 
The Department of Trade and Industry also foresees a process by which 
foreign TTPs will share keys with competent authorities in the United Kingdom. The 
government plan will allow foreign TTPs to be chosen by UK clients. Yet, the 
Department states, "It will therefore be necessary (for law enforcement purposes) to 
543 Id. at § 42 
544 Id. at § 77. 
MS Id at § 78. 
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establish arrangements with other countries for the exchange of keys."546 These 
arrangements are to be on the basis of "dual legality," which means that a demand for 
access must meet criteria in both countries. The Department observes, "The keys held 
by UK licensed TTPs will not, under this legislation, be permitted to be disclosed to 
the authorities of other countries unless such requests satisfy UK law and are 
authorised by the competent UK authority."547 Finally, the Department of Trade and 
Industry states that no recovery of keys will be allowed regarding an "integrity 
function."548 By this term, the Department refers to the use of encryption for reasons 
other than encoding information, such as verifying digital signatures. 
This official proposal has met with various levels of criticism. To begin with 
the Data Protection Registrar's response, her comments are divided into responses to 
two principle issues: (1) the regulation of encryption and encryption services; and (2) 
the circumstance under which law enforcement agencies should have access to 
encrypted data.549 Concerning the regulation of encryption, the Registrar "welcomes 
the proposals to license Trusted Third Parties to the general public ... and particularly 
welcomes the fact that the use of the licensed services is to be on a voluntary basis."550 
In particular, the Registrar found merit in establishing a regulatory regime for those 
who provide encryption services for others to assure standards for these services.551 
As for lawful access to encrypted data, the Data Protection Registrar accepts 
that circumstances exist under which relevant authorities should be able to obtain 
access to information. Here, the Registrar cites the European Human Rights 
Convention, which spoke of limits on privacy being acceptable "in the interests of 
546 Id. at § 55. 
547 Id. Annex Β to the report contains further details regarding international aspects of the 
government's proposal. 
548 Id. at § 46. 
549 Response of the Data Protection Registrar, Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the 
Provision of Encryption Services (March 1997) <http://www.open.gov.uk/dpr/ttpfinal.htm>. 
550 Id. at § 3.5(d). 
551 Id. at § 2.2.2 ("There is merit in establishing a regulatory regime for those who are 
providing encryption services to others: to set and assure the standard of those services."). 
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national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others."552 This limitation on privacy is 
potentially broad, of course, and the Data Protection Registrar stresses that lawful 
access to encryption codes should be made through judicial process.553 In addition, 
lawful access should take place as a part of a general regime of transparency regarding 
the implications of lawful access.554 As the Registrar states: 
Users of licensed TTPs should be aware that the potential for lawful access 
to their keys without their knowledge means that they cannot assume that 
encrypted data is ever fully secure. They should also be aware that lawful 
access may be granted to others based outside the UK.555 
The Data Protection Registrar finds that even with key escrow the level of risk for the 
majority of individuals and businesses will be acceptable.556 Finally, the Registrar 
stresses that the ability of authorities to encrypt data should not put them in a position 
of being able to impersonate anyone.557 The use of encryption for authentication 
should not be put into question by a regime of access to encryption codes. 
Both industry and the civil liberty community in the United Kingdom have 
raised vigorous objections to encryption. For example, British Telecommunications' 
(BT) objection to the Department of Trade and Industry's paper is that it places too 
little emphasis "on the mechanisms of trust" as opposed to "ensuring that government 
European Human Rights Convention, Article 8. 
553 Response of the Data Protection Registrar, Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the 
Provision of Encryption Services, at § 3.7 <http://www.open.gov/uk/dpr/ttpfinal.htm>. 
554 Id. at §3.6. 
555 Id. at § 3.6. 
556 Id. at §3.6. 
557 Id. at § 3.8. 
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is able to intercept encrypted communications."558 BT also expresses concern 
regarding plans for international warrants to obtain disclosures of keys. The fear is 
that such a provision will encourage international industrial espionage. In BT's words, 
"There is a need for caution here in so far as this may allow for some countries to 
make use of law enforcement and security agencies to obtain information to enable 
their own 'flagship' businesses to obtain competitive advantage."559 Finally, BT 
stresses that encryption keys used for authentication and protection of data integrity 
should not be made available to law enforcement without the legal owner's 
permission.560 The law must differentiate between processes for access to keys which 
are used to protect confidentiality and keys that are used for authentication and 
checks of data integrity.561 Other UK industry spokespersons have contested the 
government's plan for regulating encryption technology.562 
Civil liberty organizations have also objected to the Department of Trade and 
Industry's proposal for encryption. The Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties (UK) 
group has protested key escrow as creating "an unprecedented technical capability for 
mass surveillance."563 This group also felt that centralized storage for keys would 
558 BT's Comments on the Public Consultation Paper "Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for 
the Provision of Encryption Services" (May 1997). <http://www.bt.com/regulate/otherresp/hmgothers 
/encryption/doc. htm> 
559 Id. at 61. <http://www.bt.com/regulate/omeiresp/limgothers.encryption/response.htm> 
560 Id. at Appendix. 
<http://www.bt.com/regnlate/omerresp/hmgothers/encryption/annexa.htm>. 
561 Id. 
562 See, e.g., Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd response to the UK Government Consultation 
Paper, <http://www.cs.ucl.ac.Uk/staff/I.Brown/dti/intel.htm>; for an interesting comment on the UK 
proposal from a committee of the American Bar Association, see ABA Science & Technology 
Information Security Committee, Response to the Department of Trade and Industry's "Licensing of 
Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of Encryption Services" (1997) 
<http://dev.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/ukkeyrl.html>. 
563 Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK), First Report on UK Encryption Policy 12 (May 
30, 1997) 
<http://www.leeds.ac/uk/law/pgs/yaman/ukdtirep.htm> 
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present an irresistible target for theft by intruders 564 
564 Id. at 19. 
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3. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
This section will analyze the uniformity of existing and likely regulatory 
responses in the four Member States to the identified issues of data protection for on-
line services. Initially, the section will address divergences among the national laws 
of the Member States that are significant for on-line services. This analysis will also 
refer to the potential impact of the transposition of the European Directive on these 
divergences as well as the transposition of the sectoral ISDN Directive.565 The 
section will then turn to an examination of the obstacles to the internal market that 
remaining divergences may pose. This assessment will identify the type of regulatory 
obstacles that on-line services will face and will offer specific examples of on-line 
services confronting regulatory obstacles. 
Finally, this section will examine policy options for data protection drawn 
from infrastructure technologies. The discussion addresses technical solutions for a 
number of the data protection issues. This section concludes by analyzing options for 
effective regulatory policy protecting personal information in an on-line environment. 
The conclusion treats technical infrastructure design as a form of regulatory decision, 
presents a set of policy instruments that data protection officials might use to 
participate in crucial technical decision-making, and offers a jurisdictional basis under 
the European Directive's provision on codes of conduct that might be used to 
advance such data protection through technical standards. 
3.1 Divergences in Member State Law and Transposition of the 
European Directive and the ISDN Directive 
In each of the five threshold areas discussed above, the Study shows that some 
similarities exist in the doctrine that is evolving within the Member States for the 
treatment of personal information in the on-line environment. But, nevertheless, 
divergences among these Member States exist in the interpretation and application of 
the basic data protection principles. These divergences have potential significance for 
the structure and development of on-line services. 
Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 
1997 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
telecommunictions sector, O.J. L24 (30 Jan. 1998).[Hereinafter ISDN Directive]. 
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3.1.1 Jurisdictional Scope of "Personal Information" 
While each of the Member States offer protections for personal information, 
whether directly or indirectly nominative, the interpretation of when information 
relates to an "identifiable" person is not uniform. These differences create important 
ambiguities in the application of data protection laws to critical on-line information 
such as IP addresses. For example, the United Kingdom looks at a contextual analysis 
that emphasizes whether the identity of the individual can be established "from [the 
data] itself and other information in the possession of the data user."566 French law 
appears to take a broader approach to the notion of an "identifiable individual" and 
will examine whether it is at all possible to trace the information back to an individual 
in order to assure protection in the event that linkages are made.567 Belgian law even 
goes in an opposite direction, in some instances, and excludes a number of types of 
otherwise qualifying "personal information" from protection, such as data made public 
by the person concerned.568 In contrast, Germany has explicit rules set out in the new 
Information and Communications Services Act, the IuKDG, that spell out a 
requirement for anonymous and pseudonymous interactions.569 The specific German 
rules also apply certain data protection rights, such as access to stored data, to 
pseudonymous information.570 
These ambiguities across the Member States' national laws raise an important 
issue for the structure of data flows. The complexity and flexibility of data flows for 
on-line activities can present an overwhelming array of concerns and problems for 
data protection. These data protection concerns might become more manageable if 
information were segmented into "identifiable" and "unidentifiable" data. The 
Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection and the Internet, 
<http://www.open.gov.uk/dpr/internet.htm> (1997) (emphasis added). 
567 See 2.1.2 
See 2.1.1. The data is only excluded from the protection of the statute if the 
purpose for the public disclosure is respected. If the purpose for the disclosure is respected, the 
law's protections, such as notice of use, rights of access and error correction, will not apply. 
569 See 2.1.3. 
570 See 2.1.3. 
124 
emphasis in the Member States on anonymous and pseudonymous interactions reflects 
this conceptual approach.571 In practical terms, the case studies also show that the 
commercial arrangements for the collection of data and the types of data that are 
collected in on-line contexts have significant variation and may be structured to avoid 
the provision of identifying information to many of the intermediary participants.572 
Yet, few interactions will truly be considered anonymous if the technical capacity to 
trace information back to an individual results in the legal classification of all such 
information as relating to an "identifiable" person. To such an extent, data protection 
principles will apply and will need to be developed in extensive detail no matter how 
networks configure the data flows. 
The transposition of the European Directive will encourage greater 
convergence for the jurisdictional scope of the data protection principles. The 
European Directive contains an explanatory recital that interprets "whether a person 
is identifiable, account must be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used 
either by the controller or by any other person to identify said person."573 The recital 
also stipulates that the principles of data protection should not apply to anonymous 
data.574 Nevertheless, the European Directive's context-based appreciation leaves 
room for both narrow and broad understandings as to the difficulty of actually 
identifying the person about whom information may only relate indirectly. The 
consequences for data processing are significant if one Member State views the data 
as "personal information" and another does not; data protection law will apply in one, 
but not in the other Member State.575 
The transposition of the ISDN Directive is not likely to resolve this remaining 
divergence. While the ISDN Directive is intended to apply throughout the 
telecommunications sector,576 the provisions are drafted with a specificity that 
See 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4. 
See Part II. 
Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 26. 
Id. 
See 3.2.2 
Directive 97/66/EC, Art. 1(1). 
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emphasizes data protection for telephone and fax communications. The ISDN 
Directive is silent on the definition of personal information and, thus, defers to the 
general framework directive for the scope of "identifiable" information.577 The ISDN 
Directive does, however, contain special restrictions on "traffic data relating to 
subscribers and users"578 and calling-line identification information.579 Yet, both of 
these provisions seem to contemplate telephone calls rather than on-line 
communications. For example, "traffic data" refers to the information processed "to 
establish calls"580 rather than to establish "connections" or "communications" which 
would be more meaningful for the on-line environment. Moreover, if the traffic data 
relates to a subscriber or a user, then at the conclusion of the call, the data must be 
erased or rendered anonymous.581 The ISDN Directive does not offer any guidance 
to determine whether information would "relate" to a subscriber or user. In any case, 
the ISDN Directive is silent on the requirements for information to be considered 
anonymous. 
In a similar vein, the calling-line identification provision requires that a calling 
user have the possibility "to eliminate the presentation of the calling line identification 
on a per-call basis."582 This is does not make sense in the on-line environment: web 
useage is not "per-call" and a user's suppression of his IP address would entirely 
preclude communication on the Internet.583 Thus, the transposition of these 
provisions in the ISDN Directive are unlikely to clarify the divergences concerning the 
scope of "personal information." 
See Directive 97/66/EC, Art. 1 (2) [stating that "the provisions of this Directive 
particularise and complement Directive 95/46/EC."] 
578 Directive 97/66/EC, Art. 6. 
579 Id., at Art. 8. 
580 Id., at Art. 6(1). 
581 Id. 
582 Id., at Art. 8(1). 
In the on-line environment, the anonymity desired by blocking CLI may be 
achieved by the use of an anonymizer. However, an anonymizer still transmits an IP address, just not 
that of the ultimate user. 
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3.1.2 Jurisdictional Scope of Registration and Supervision 
The analysis of registration requirements illustrates a number of common 
features among the Member State laws, but also shows significant differences in the 
territorial reach of those laws. In each of the Member States, anyone processing 
personal information must generally notify a supervisory authority.584 However, 
certain activities may be either exempted from the declaration requirement, as is the 
case in Belgium, or subject to simplified procedures, as is the case in France. For 
foreign on-line service sites, the territorial scope of Member State laws are not 
identical. Under present British law, the location where data is stored will likely 
determine the applicability of the Data Protection Act.585 Foreign web sites, for 
example, appear unlikely to fall within the obligation to register in the United 
Kingdom. By contrast, France and Belgium appear poised to treat the foreign web 
sites that collect information from within their respective countries as under the 
subject matter jurisdiction of their respective national data protection law.586 In 
Germany, however, it is unclear whether foreign web sites must register with 
supervisory authorities.587 
The formalities of registration with national authorities also reveal a number 
of important differences. First, the content requirements for notification to national 
data protection authorities vary somewhat across the Member States. For example, 
France requires the declaration of the origin of any stored data,588 Belgium does not, 
584 See 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.1.3,2.2.4. 
585 Data Protection Act 1984, <j> 39 (excluding application of the Act to data held 
outside the United Kingdom). 
586 See 2.2.1, 2.2.2. 
587 See BDSG, art. 32; IuKDG, art. X. 
588 LoiNo. 78-17 du6Janvier 1978, art. 19. 
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589 and the United Kingdom asks for free text descriptions for on-line services. 590 
Second, the manner of permissible registration differs. Belgium and the United 
Kingdom, for example, accept electronic registration notices; France and Germany do 
not. And, lastly, registration fees illustrate disparities among the Member States. For 
example, in Belgium the fee varies based on the number of people about whom the 
processing relates and the manner of filing, while in the United Kingdom a unitary fee 
applies. These divergences may have an effect on how companies structure the 
architecture of their network activities. 
The European Directive seeks to harmonize the territorial application of 
Member State data protection laws.591 The choice of law rules contained in the 
European Directive stipulate that each Member State shall apply its law when: 
(a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an 
establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State...; 
(b) the controller is not established on the Member State's territory, but in a 
place where its national law applies by virtue of international public law; 
(c ) the controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes 
of processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, 
situated on the territory of said Member State, unless such equipment is used 
only for purposes of transit through the territory of the Community. 592 
For data processing within the European Union, the European Directive strives to 
create a choice of law that is exclusive in order to prevent overlapping rules and place 
limits on the territorial reach of the data protection laws of the Member States. The 
relevant recitals in the European Directive note that "the processing carried out under 
the responsibility of a controller who is established in a Member State should be 
589 Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 3. 
Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection and the Internet: Guidance on 
Registration (1997), <http://www.open.gov.uk/dpr/internet.htm>. 
The ISDN Directive contains no provisions to clarify or supplement the general 
directive's impact on territorial divergences. 
592 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 4( 1 ). 
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governed by the law ofthat State."593 However, the recitals also warn that "within 
the limits of this margin for manoeuvre and in accordance with Community law, 
disparities could arise in the implementation of the Directive."594 In the on-line 
environment, the implementation of this choice of law provision is unlikely to be 
simple.595 
At the same time, for data processing outside the European Union, the 
European Directive's choice of law provision also seems to ratify the more extensive 
reach of the French and Belgian laws. Presumably any information of European 
Union origin that is transmitted outside the Union will, by virtue of the last clause in 
the choice of law provision, be subject to the substantive law of the Member State of 
origin; the "use of equipment" within a Member State for processing the information, 
such as any hardware for transmission ofinformation, confers jurisdiction on the laws 
of that Member State for the data. An ambiguity in the official translations of the 
European Directive does introduce, however, a significant potential for divergence. 
In the French text, Member State law applies to processing in third countries if 
"means" (moyens) are used within the Member State.596 In the English text quoted 
above, the same clause refers to "use of equipment" within the Member State.597 It 
is not clear that "means" and "use of equipment" are perfectly equivalent terms. 
The transposition of the European Directive will also promote some 
convergence in terms of the content of registration statements. The European 
593 Id., at Recital No. 18. 
594 Id., at Recital No. 9, 
See infra φ 3.2.1. For example, under the European Directive's choice of law 
provision, many data controllers are likely to be "established" in more than one Member State. If a 
web site places cookies on a user's computer, the web site will most likely be treated as having an 
"establishment" at the location of each user. The Recitals note that "establishment on the territory of 
a Member State implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements." 
Directive 95/46/EC, Recital No. 19. Cookies make use of the user's computer through stable 
arrangements at the user's location and constitute effective and real activity. Thus, a web server 
located in one Member State placing and recovering cookies on a personal computer located in 
another Member State must be considered to have an "establishment" in the second Member State. 
596 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 4( 1 )(c). 
597 Id. 
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Directive stipulates a set of disclosures that constitute the minimum information that 
must be contained in notifications made to the supervisory authorities598 and provides 
for certain exemptions or simplification of notification in particular situations.599 The 
sectoral-specific rules found in the ISDN Directive do not, however, provide further 
convergence for notification of processing in the context of telecommunications 
services. The ISDN Directive is silent on registration statements.600 Yet, for on-line 
services, additional registration requirements imposed by one Member State, such as 
notification of the duration of storage and the means by which individuals are given 
notice of the processing,601 introduce a potentially significant burden when rapidly 
changing, interactive on-line services are provided throughout the European Union. 
A similar burden occurs if one Member State chooses to grant a simplification or 
exemption from notification for particular processing, but another Member State does 
not.602 In both instances, the user of personal information will be subject to differing 
administrative requirements. 
On a number of these key points of divergence, the European Directive is 
silent. For example, the European Directive contains no stipulation as to the manner 
of registration— paper versus electronic filing.603 Likewise, the ISDN Directive is also 
silent on this point.604 For on-line services operating exclusively on the Internet, the 
manner of notification to supervisory authorities, and in particular the manner of 
updating notifications, has a number of implications for internal operations that are 
598 Id., art. 19(1). 
599 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 18(2). 
600 See Directive 97/66/EC. 
These content requirements, for example, exist in Belgian law, but not in the 
European Directive. Compare Loi du 8 décembre 1992, art. 17(3) with Directive 95/46/EC, art. 
19(1). 
For example, France has established a list of simplified declarations that is similar, 
but not identical to the norms adopted by Belgium. 
603 See Directive 95/46/EC, art. 18(1). 
See Directive 97/66/EC. The ISDN Directive is entirely silent on registration for 
on-line services. 
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likely to have an impact on compliance rates for on-line services. As a practical 
matter, the national authorities seem to be moving in the direction of electronic 
registrations, which are already accepted in Belgium and in the United Kingdom. Yet, 
until all Member States permit electronic registrations, the divergence between paper 
and electronic filings will have an adverse impact on on-line services. 
Finally, on the issue of notification fees, the European Directive does not 
promote any convergence. No provision in the European Directive sets a fee 
schedule. 
3.1.3 Transparency 
The Member States have each begun to address the application of national 
rules for transparency to on-line services. In these preliminary stages, a number of 
differences in existing doctrine have emerged that appear to have particular 
significance for on-line services. 
While each Member State requires that notice be given to individuals, the 
scope of the obligation itself, the form and the content, is not uniform. With respect 
to the scope of the obligation, an important difference emerges for the responsibility 
of data collectors. In France, for example, notice is only required if information is 
collected directly from an individual.605 In Belgium, on the other hand, notice is 
required both from direct and indirect collectors of personal information.606 Germany 
does not differentiate between direct and indirect collection; the IuKDG contains 
strong notice provisions. These differences among Member States affect the 
obligations of on-line service providers profoundly because personal information in 
the on-line environment can readily be collected indirectly rather than directly. For 
example, clickstream information collected by a web site about a visitor's use of the 
site is actually obtained from the visitor's Internet service provider and not directly 
from the visitor. 
The type of notice similarly presents a number of issues. While the basic 
content of the required notice is similar across the Member States, a number of 
differences appear that are highly relevant for on-line services. For example, a 
French notice must contain among its disclosures information about the significance 
605 See 2.3.2. 
606 See 2.3.1. 
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of the collected information, namely whether the collection of particular information 
is mandatory or voluntary, and the identity of any recipient of the collected personal 
information.607 Belgium, however, asks for somewhat distinct information in the 
notice to individuals, namely that the finality be specified in the notice and that the 
existence of the public register of processing declarations be indicated.608 Germany 
also has specific obligations to notify individuals if "cookies" will be used during 
Internet sessions, to notify of any re-forwarding of personal information, and to notify 
of options for anonymous interactions.609 For the rapidly changing on-line 
environment, these particular elements of notice may require frequent revision of 
notice statements by collectors of personal information. 
With respect to an individual's consent and right of opposition to data 
processing, the United Kingdom subsumes consent under "fairness."610 There, the 
Data Protection Registrar has called for a contextual analysis and positive consent in 
some specific circumstances.611 While law in the United Kingdom has generally 
preferred opt-out, the Data Protection Registrar appears likely to expand positive 
consent requirements for on-line services.612 Germany takes this idea a step further 
and has elaborated specific rules for consent with respect to "cookies" and has 
otherwise mandated strong positive consent in the on-line environment.613 France 
has, also, approved a number of opt-out consents for Internet services (specifically, 
directory listings and message boards).614 Nevertheless, French law requires advanced 
See 2.3.2. 
See 2.3.1. 
See 2.3.3. 
See 2.3.4. 
See 2.3.4. 
See 2.3.4. 
See 2.3.3. 
See 2.3.2. 
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written consent for the processing of sensitive data.615 In contrast, Germany expressly 
permits consent through on-line means.616 These disparities may mean that different 
consent requirements may apply to a single on-line service provided across the 
Member States. 
For the exercise by data subjects of their right of access to personal 
information, both the form and scope of access have some notable differences across 
the Member States. In Germany, for example, electronic access to personal 
information by data subjects is permissible. The United Kingdom appears to moving 
in this direction. By contrast, however, Belgium does not yet appear to have 
significant taken steps to permit electronic access to personal data by data subjects. 
Similarly, the scope of the access right may develop with significant variance across 
the Member States. Finally, some ambiguity may exist in the United Kingdom with 
respect to the full extent of the controller's obligation to provide access to 
information originating from that controller's web server. Such an obligation may 
also be present even if the information no longer resides on that web server.617 
In addition, fees for access by data subjects to their personal information 
varies. In Germany, for example, the new teleservices law requires that access to on-
line information must be offered free of charge.618 In the other Member States, 
charges apply such as the 100BF (2.5ECU) fee charged in Belgium and the LIO (15 
ECU) fee charged in the United Kingdom. This difference can affect where and how 
an on-line services participant designs the system architecture. 
The transposition of the European Directive will have an incomplete effect on 
some of these divergences. The European Directive mandates that notice be provided 
to an individual when information is collected either directly or indirectly from that 
person.619 This harmonization requirement resolves one existing scope issue; 
(1995). 
See 2.3.2. 
See 2.3.3. 
See UK Data Protection Guidance for Direct Marketers, p. 37 
IuKDG, at art. 2, j 7. 
Directive 95/46/EC, art . 10-11. 
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collectors of personal information must provide notice whether the collection is 
directly or indirectly from the individual. However, the European Directive only 
stipulates the minimum content that Member States must require in notices provided 
to individuals.620 Although these minimum content elements appear to combine 
different requirements in existing national law, additional points may still be imposed 
by Member State law, such as Belgium's required disclosure of the register of public 
declarations. 
For divergences over consent and opposition, the European Directive contains 
some obligations that address these issues.621 However, the European Directive does 
not provide criteria or a mandate for distinguishing between opt-in and opt-out 
consent. The exception to this silence is the explicit right to object to direct 
marketing uses of personal information.622 In effect, this provision for direct 
marketing authorizes at least an opt-out regime. 
The European Directive is also silent on the issue of on-line consent and on-
line opposition to the processing of personal information. Although the on-line 
context increases the ease and efficiency of opt-in possibilities, the continued ability 
for the Member States to diverge on the permissibility of on-line consent and 
opposition is likely to have a real impact on the cost of on-line services and the 
management of those services. The ISDN Directive, while requiring consent for 
processing of telecommunications call traffic data623 and an opt-out for the on-line 
availability of a subscriber directory,624 is similarly silent on the means for obtaining 
the consent or exercising an opt-out. 
As the European Directive is transposed in the Member States, the new 
Member State laws may not resolve all the issues pertaining to the form and the scope 
of access rights. The European Directive merely stipulates that the Member States 
Directive 95/46/EC, art. 10-11. 
Directive 95/46/EC, art. 7 (consent) and art. 14 (objection). 
Directive 95/46/EC, art. 14(b). 
Directive 97/66/EC, art. 6(3). 
Directive 97/66/EC, art. 11(1). 
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grant a right of access to the data subject against the controller.625 The European 
Directive does not address whether on-line access should be permitted nor does the 
European Directive say anything about the potential responsibility of the original 
controller for access against subsequent controllers. The same is true of the ISDN 
Directive. The sector-specific rules are silent regarding on-line access and access 
through intermediaries for information processed by third-parties. 
Finally, the European Directive is silent on the amount of any fee that may be 
charged for the data subject's access. Although the text of the European Directive 
stipulates that "Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain 
from the controller: ... without constraint at reasonable intervals without excessive 
delay or expense,"626 there is no indication as to the fee amount that might constitute 
an "excessive expense."627 The transposition of the European Directive will, thus, not 
in itself address this issue that may affect how data flows are structured and how 
information may be storage by on-line services. Likewise, the ISDN Directive does 
not deal at all with the fees for data subject access. 
3.1.4 Profiling and Sensitive Data 
National data protection doctrines as they already exist and as they are likely 
to be applied to on-line services raise a number of issues vital to electronic commerce. 
In particular, user profiling, as shown in the case studies,628 plays a fundamental 
economic role in shaping on-line activities. Yet, data protection laws remain unsettled 
in their treatment of profiling practices for on-line services. In France and Belgium, 
profiling is an issue of finality. On-line services must provide clear notice of any 
profiling activities. In the United Kingdom, profiling is an issue of fairness, and the 
Data Protection Registrar has not yet settled the application of the fairness principle 
625 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 12. 
626 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 12. 
See Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 41. While a literal interpretation of this clause 
might suggest that the European Directive requires the Member States to ban any charge for access to 
personal information, the recital provides no support for such an interpretation. 
628 See Part II. 
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to service providers and web sites. By contrast, in Germany, profiling is subject to 
specific rules that permit profiling only under the condition that pseudonyms are used. 
These requirements in existing Member State law raise serious questions with regard 
to the permissibility of using search engines and intelligent agents.629 For example, a 
search request to find web sites and message board postings will often create a profile 
of particular individuals through the indirect collection of personal information. The 
user of the search engine acts as the data controller and would be required to comply 
with all applicable data protection laws provisions on notice and consent, though the 
user may not learn the identity of the profiled individual until the profile comes into 
existence. 
In addition, the Member States, while each requiring that only relevant data 
be collected for the contemplated uses, arrive at a requirement of data minimization 
somewhat differently. France achieves minimization through purpose limitations. The 
United Kingdom has recently argued for technical design requirements to accomplish 
data minimization. And, Germany has recently adopted an express statutory provision 
that calls strictly for data minimization. With these different starting points, the 
interpretation of relevancy may differ for the same on-line service provider within all 
of the Member States; one Member State may view specific information as relevant 
for the intended purpose, while another Member State does not. 
Another important profiling issue arises in the context of anonymous 
interactions. In Germany, the IuKDG explicitly requires on-line interactions to be 
anonymous to the greatest extent possible.630 This new German statute also applies 
special data protection rules to pseudonymous information.631 The other Member 
States also appear to encourage the use of non-identifiable information. Outside of 
Germany, however, truly anonymous information is not likely to fall within the scope 
of data protection law.632 Moreover, in Belgium and France, the broad scope of the 
definition for "identifiable" information will increasingly necessitate judgmental 
629 
filtering). 
See 2.4.2 (discussion of automated decision-making restrictions and collaborative 
See 2.4.3. 
See 2.4.3. 
See 2.1. 
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decisions as to the applicability of data protection law. The United Kingdom will 
similarly face interpretive decisions for on-line data to determine if such data are 
'personally identifiable'; however, the United Kingdom appears to be making a 
narrower interpretation of this term than Belgium and France. As a result, different 
Member States are likely to have varying standards for anonymizing information. 
In the context of processing and profiling sensitive data for on-line services, 
the Member States have focused somewhat differently on the form that consent is to 
take. Germany explicitly permits electronic consent provided that specific conditions 
to protect the informed and voluntary nature of the assent are satisfied. The United 
Kingdom is considering a possible future decree on electronic consent. In contrast, 
France has a stringent doctrine favoring written consent, while Belgium does not 
appear to have addressed the particular issue. 
The transposition of the European Directive as well as the ISDN Directive will 
provide some additional certainty for the disposition of profiling and the treatment of 
sensitive data in an on-line context. The European Directive contains specific 
provisions for marketing practices,633 but does not expressly cover profiling in the 
sense that the German law explicitly establishes processing rules. Similarly, the 
European Directive does not definitively resolve the judgments that will inevitably 
need to be made concerning the scope of "identifiable" information.634 Finally, as 
noted above, the European Directive will not resolve the issues of the form of consent 
by individuals for profiling or the treatment of sensitive data.635 In contrast, the ISDN 
Directive does specifically condition the use of subscriber billing data for marketing 
purposes on the subscriber's express consent636 and requires that subscribers be able 
to indicate in directory listings that personal information may not be used for direct 
marketing purposes.637 For on-line services, the restriction on billing data will have 
a harmonizing effect, but will not cover the full range of clickstream information, and 
See, .e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, art. 14(b). 
See 3.1.1. 
See 3.1.3. 
Directive 97/66/EC, art. 6(3). 
Directive 97/66/EC, art. 11(1). 
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the directory clause of the European Directive will harmonize the creation of 
differentiated listings throughout the Member States. 
3.1.5 Security 
As illustrated previously, the success of electronic commerce initiatives 
depends on information security.638 The Member State's data protection laws and 
interpretations generally encourage the use of encryption to protection personal 
information. However, a number of opposing legal rules exist for the techniques that 
might be used to secure information on the Internet. Within the Member States, key 
escrow remains an open and sensitive issue. France, while purporting to liberalize its 
encryption rules in 1996, will require the licensing by the government of trusted third 
parties who provide encryption services.639 French authorities still have not issued the 
implementing decree setting out the criteria for licensing. Germany does not restrict 
encryption, but has established voluntary licensing for trusted third parties; these 
licensed trusted third parties will be required to release encryption keys to law 
enforcement authorities in possession of a warrant.640 Belgium and the United 
Kingdom are each considering proposals for key escrow schemes. At the same time, 
in Belgium and Germany, the laws also require telecommunications carriers to 
maintain "wiretap-ready" systems for law enforcement access.641 
The transposition of the European Directive and ISDN Directive are unlikely 
to be dispositive for the encryption debate. The European Directive, like the Member 
State laws, contains a clause requiring that the Member States provide that the 
controller "must implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to 
protect personal data ... in particular where processing involves transmission over a 
network ... [hjaving regard to the state of the art and the cost of their 
638 See Parts I & II. 
639 See 2.5.2. 
640 See 2.5.3. 
641 See 2.5.1. 
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implementation.' The ISDN Directive similarly requires: 
The provider of a publicly available telecommunications service must take 
appropriate technical and organisational measures to safeguard security of its 
services .... Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of their 
implementation, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to 
the risk presented.643 
However, both the European Directive and the ISDN Directive exempt processing of 
personal data that concerns public security and "the activities of the State in the areas 
of criminal law."644 Since the heart of the encryption debate revolves around law 
enforcement's access to encrypted information, the European Directive's security 
requirements will be limited by the legal competence of the Community to act on 
matters involving state security and law enforcement. The same limitation applies to 
the ISDN Directive. 
3.2. Obstacles to the Internal Market 
The divergences in data protection among the Member States that the 
transposition of the European Directive and the ISDN Directive are unlikely to 
resolve for the on-line environment raise a series of important obstacles to the Internal 
Market. The selection of applicable law in itself offers a number of persistent issues 
for the development of on-line services. While many of the divergences appear to be 
within the "margin of manoeuvre" for the Member States permitted by the European 
Directive, these ostensibly slight differences in protection of personal information can 
result in dramatic consequences or create strong pressures on developers of on-line 
services as well as users of those services. 
3.2.1 Applicable Law 
Directive, 95/46/EC, art. 17(1). 
Directive 97/66/EC, art. 4(1). 
Directive 95/46/EC, art. 3(2); Directive 97/66/EC, art. 1(3). 
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The significance of divergences in the treatment of personal information in the 
context of on-line services will be influenced by the choice of applicable law. If 
multiple data protection laws apply to the same on-line service activity, then any 
divergence between the laws imposes an inherent conflict in the applicable rights and 
responsibilities for data protection. Permissible activities in one jurisdiction, such as 
the processing of log files without registration, may be prohibited in another. In an 
effort to avoid these obstacles, the European Directive strives to exclude overlapping 
jurisdiction of the Member States for data protection matters. The European 
Directive provides a specific choice of law provision that selects the law of the 
Member State where the controller is established.645 The European Directive also 
provides that "Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of 
personal data between Member States for reasons connected with the protection 
afforded under paragraph 1 [the fundamental rights and freedoms of freedoms of 
natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing 
of personal data]."646 The European Court of Justice has recognized that home state 
supervision may be exclusive.647 
Nevertheless, the recitals in the Directive explicitly recognize that "Member 
States will be left a margin for manoeuvre ....[and] within the limits of this margin for 
manoeuvre and in accordance with Community law, disparities could arise in the 
implementation of this Directive, and this could have an effect on the movement of 
data within a Member State as well as within the Community."648 Under the 
European Directive's choice of law provision, a controller is subject to the law of 
each Member State where it is "established."649 As explained in the Recitals, a 
Member State's law thus applies if there is "effective and real exercise of activity 
6-15 
Mr, 
Directive 95/46/EC, art. 4. 
Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 1(2). 
See, e.g., Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. DE Agostini (Svenska) Forlag AB, 
Cases C-34 to 36/95, [1997] ECR I- (July 9, 1997). 
648 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital No. 9. 
649 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 4( 1 )(a) 
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through stable arrangements."650 This definition of "establishment" suggests that the 
systematic collection ofinformation from within any Member State using servers or 
other computing equipment within the Member State may be treated as an 
"establishment." The use of cookies, for example, creates an establishment wherever 
the user is located since interaction with the user's hard drive is a stable arrangement 
located at the site of the user that provides effective and real exercise of activity for 
the controller who places the cookie. In effect, the controllers operating in the on-line 
environment may typically be deemed to be established in several Member States for 
the same on-line activity. As a result, several data protection laws may apply to 
various aspects of an on-line service. Notification of cookies must, for example, 
comply with the notice requirements of the place where the user is located, while the 
server's processing must comply with the requirements of the law where the server 
is located. 
The uniform choice of law rule that the European Directive requires will still 
not displace all possible territorial overlaps. Under the jurisdictional doctrine of the 
European Court of Justice,651 home country supervision for data protection would not 
preclude independent regulation of the treatment of personal information for other 
goals such as consumer protection.652 For example, the crucial data protection 
provisions for on-line services in Germany arise under the Teleservices Data 
Protection Act. As such, these provisions might be applied regardless of the 
European Directive's choice of law rules. 
In addition, the European Directive does not displace any provisions of 
criminal law.653 To the extent that Member States include data protection offenses 
within their criminal law, those criminal laws may apply to acts undertaken within the 
Member State regardless of the European Directive's preferred choice of law. For 
example, France's penal code criminalizes the "act of collection of data by fraudulent, 
unfair or illegal means, or to undertake processing of nominative information 
650 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital No. 19. 
651 See Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. DE Agostini (Svenska) Forlag AB, Cases 
C-34 to 36/95, [1997] ECR I- (July 9, 1997). 
652 The recitals also make this clear. See Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 71. 
Directive 95/46/EC, art. 3(2). Criminal law is outside the scope of competence of 
Community law. 
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concerning physical persons who have opposed such processing, when such 
opposition has a legitimate basis."654 French criminal law also specifies that, in the 
absence of an individual's express consent, the storage of nominative information 
directly or indirectly revealing racial origins or political, philosophical or religious 
beliefs, union membership, or personal morals is a crime.655 
In terms of the Internal Market, the effort to provide an exclusive choice of 
law and the possibility that overlapping jurisdiction may still occur raise substantial 
incentives for developers of on-line services to try to circumvent particular data 
protection rules through infrastructure architecture. The on-line environment is 
geographically flexible. Controller's functions may be disaggregated and routed to 
take advantage of differences in the "margin of manoeuvre" among the Member 
States. For example, a French on-line service provider may allocate dynamic IP 
addresses on equipment located in the United Kingdom to try to avoid the 
applicability of French data protection law for the recipients of those IP addresses. 
Under this scenario, United Kingdom law would apply to the IP addresses allocated 
by the British server and might result in the IP addresses falling outside the scope of 
data protection for the recipients of those addresses.656 
3.2.2 Specific Examples 
The applicable law and divergences within it manifest themselves as obstacles 
to the Internal Market in three particular types of cases. First, regulatory responses 
to on-line services may result in the prohibition of certain services in some, but not all 
Member States. Second, data protection rules may impose additional difficulties on 
the provision of particular services in some, but not all Member States. And lastly, 
the differences may result in the distortion of competition in the development of on-
line services across the Member States. This section will address each of these types 
of obstacles to the Internal Market. 
3.2.2(a) Prohibition on the Provision of Services 
Code pénal, art. 226-18. 
Code pénal, art. 226-19. 
See infra <J> 1.3.4. 
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As previously reported,657 electronic transactions are growing rapidly through 
the use of web sites for both the dissemination of product information and execution 
of sales transactions.658 These sites run the significant risk of facing prohibitions on 
the collection of transaction data in some member states, but not others. For 
example, on-line bookstores will face inherent obstacles. Certain book titles along 
reveal sensitive data about those who purchase them. Moreover, on-line bookstores 
will typically use a "shopping basket" feature and place "cookies" on the buyer's hard 
drive without regard to the location of the buyer. These "cookies" enable the 
bookstore's web site to keep track of the buyer's purchases for billing. 
If a user in France were to purchase books from an on-line bookstore in the 
United Kingdom such as Catechism of the Catholic Church, Becoming Catholic: 
Even if you happen to be one and Raising Catholic Children, the titles alone would 
be sensitive data. In France, the collection of such sensitive information requires 
express written consent under both the data protection statute and the criminal law. 
The bookseller, in this case, would violate French law by processing the transaction. 
Yet, the bookseller in the United Kingdom would not become aware of the problem 
until after the transaction were processed. In the United Kingdom, however, the 
transaction is permissible as no additional requirements have yet been imposed on the 
processing of sensitive data.659 Because "cookies" are used by the bookseller from 
within France, under the European Directive's choice of law rule,660 the bookseller 
will be established for purposes of application of the French data protection law. At 
the same time, the bookseller is a "controller" subject to British law. 
A similar problem arises for the development of on-line services that rely 
heavily on advertising revenue generated by third-party advertisements placed on web 
pages through entities such as DoubleClick. In a typical arrangement, the web site 
contracts with an advertising agency who in turn collects information from the "hits" 
See Rapport No. 1 : Situation Globale; Rapport No. 2: Etudes de cas 
558 The FN AC in France and Burton's in the United Kingdom are two such prominent 
sites. 
659 See 2.4.4. 
660 See Directive 95/46/EC, art. 4(1 ). 
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to place an appropriate advertisement on the user's display. For at least one 
advertising agency, the information used to make the advertisement selections 
involves IP addresses and patterns from previous visits through "cookies." This 
collected data, however, does not include the specific identity of the user. If, in the 
case of the bookseller, a British server were used by the advertising agency, the 
service would face serious obstacles depending on the European country where the 
on-line shoppers were located. Under the British data protection law and doctrine, 
the agency might not be subject to data protection law because of the difficulty 
identifying the individual from the information that is being processed.661 However, 
under the French and Belgian doctrines, the IP address information combined with the 
"cookies" data providing the previous visit patters would likely be treated as 
"personal data."662 As a result, in those Member States, the collection ofinformation 
from users within those states by the advertising agency would be prohibited without 
the required notices to the individuals and the data protection authority.663 
Other like examples might be found in the use of search engines or information 
harvesting methods. For instance, the German Teleservices Data Protection Act, 
unlike the data protection laws of the other Member States, prohibits the creation of 
profiles unless strict limitations are respected. Generally, German law requires that 
profiles be pseudonymous.664 Since this requirement is not found in the laws of the 
three other Member States analyzed in this Study nor in the European Directive, the 
divergence threatens the legality of the use of search engines on the Internet. Search 
engines are not presently designed to create only pseudonymous profiles. 
3.2.2(b) Difficulty in provision of services 
Short of an outright restriction on the provision of particular on-line services, 
diverging data protection laws may create serious difficulties for the offering of on­
line services throughout the European Union. Such difficulties can in turn raise 
661 See 2.1.3; 2.1.4. 
662 See 2.1.1; 2.1.2. 
663 See 2.2.1; 2.2.2; 2.3.1; 2.3.2. 
664 IuKDG, art. 2, Ί 4(4). 
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obstacles to the Internal Market. Several examples illustrate these basic difficulties 
for critical features of on-line services. In Germany, on-line service providers must 
offer users various kinds of anonymous or pseudonymous options.665 Other Member 
States have not set similar requirements. Hence, an Internet service provider must 
either offer the German options throughout the European Union or differentiate 
services for subscribers within Germany. 
For robust electronic commerce to develop across Europe, digital signatures 
and certification of those signatures are widely viewed as essential. The evolution of 
these services in the Member States also face data protection difficulties. The German 
teleservices law contains special provisions for digital signatures and the collection of 
personal information related to signature certification, notably that data may only be 
collected directly from the individual concerned unless consent has been granted for 
collection from third-parties.666 Other Member States have not developed 
comparable requirements. Thus, the use of digital signature certificates in Germany 
will be subject to special data protection provisions that are not found elsewhere in 
the Member States. 
3.2.2(c) Distortion of the provision of services 
Even if divergences in data protection among the Member States do not result 
in an outright prohibition or major difficulty with respect to the provision of on-line 
services, the divergences may still present obstacles to the Internal Market. In 
particular, the divergences may lead to distortions in the structural arrangements for 
on-line services. Network technology is extremely flexible and allows service 
providers to locate their information processing activities in various jurisdictions as 
well as to disaggregate components of their services for distinct processing activity. 
The application of Member State data protection laws to particular types of services 
may, thus, provide incentives for service providers to locate or re-locate their 
activities depending on how they wish to manage data protection. 
A few examples can readily illustrate this distorting effect. The more 
restrictive interpretation of information relating to an "identifiable" person found in 
See 2.3.3. 
See 2.5.3. 
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the United Kingdom and Germany667 suggests that ISPs will have an incentive to 
locate their address servers within those Member States. To the extent that those 
Member States would not treat dynamic IP addresses as "personal information" for 
web recipients, the ISP minimizes the applicability of data protection law, though in 
Germany the Teleservices Data Protection Act would apply. Similarly, the harvesting 
of e-mail addresses, which is desired by marketing firms, has the best chance of 
avoiding the requirements of data protection law in Member States such as the United 
Kingdom where such information will only be treated as nominative information if the 
recipient can reasonably make the identifying link.668 
From the perspective of the user, these distortions are particularly troubling. 
The infrastructure arrangements in an on-line environment will often be unknown to 
the user, yet these arrangements may have a critical impact on the degree of data 
protection for the user's personal information. This is especially true for users from 
Member States such as France or Belgium that treat data protection more expansively 
than others. These users legitimately expect a certain degree of protection when 
engaging in information exchanges from their home countries, yet may be surprised 
to discover that the infrastructure situates the processing in a Member State with 
narrower protections. For example, a German user who expects that any clickstream 
profiling by the ISP will be done on an anonymous basis may be surprised to discover 
that the ISP has located clickstream profiling on a British server in an attempt to 
avoid the application of the German rule. 
3.3 Technical Solutions and Regulatory Policy 
The divergences in Member State law and the obstacles to the Internal Market 
reflect the complexities and difficulties of applying data protection to on-line services. 
These challenges to the protection of privacy raise two sets of options for regulatory 
policy. One set of options depends upon technological rules to establish data 
protection. This technological approach offers both advantages as well as drawbacks. 
The second set of options looks to an effective regulatory policy that would combine 
a range of traditional legal policy objectives with non-traditional regulatory 
instruments to achieve data protection. 
667 See 2.1.3; 2.1.4 
668 See 2.1.3; 2.1.4 
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3.3.1 Technical Solutions 
Just as technology may be part of the problem for data protection, the 
technological infrastructure may also form part of the solution. Technological rules 
are becoming a key source of regulation in a network environment.669 The Internet's 
architecture is dynamic and will continue to change. The architecture of the Internet 
can and should be developed in a way that promotes data protection goals. 
To some extent, technological solutions may be able to minimize any conflicts 
over some of the divergences in the laws of the Member States. Anonymity can serve 
to protect citizen's rights and interests. If the network can be structured so that 
anonymity may be maintained for certain activities, but not others, then the 
infrastructure will contain a degree of flexibility that may offer a robust means to 
assure data protection in a complex, on-line environment. 
Otherwise, technical solutions might be used to smooth over divergences 
among Member State laws. For example, the variations in the content of registration 
and user notice are susceptible to automated information brokering. Specifically, 
technical tools such as intelligent agents could be designed to streamline the process 
of filing registrations and providing notice. Such agents might match information 
about a site's practices with the particular disclosures required by the applicable law. 
Browsers might, for example, provide a default notice when personal information is 
transmitted, such as the security warning that often appears when an "insecure" 
document is accessed or transmission is attempted.670 Similarly, an automated process 
might alleviate potential difficulties with registration filings. For example, if 
automated registration is permitted, program routines can be developed to allow a 
real-time compliance system. One such idea might be a program that verifies the 
existence of a registration statement if information is collected or transmitted to 
domain names from within the European Union. Should no registration statement 
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy 
Rules through Technology, 76 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 553 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Reading the 
Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 869 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, 
Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 911 (1996); 
M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First Amendment: Virtual Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 
1996 U. CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 335. 
670 Netscape 3.0, for example, warns of the insecurity of certain activities or sites when 
a user is engaged in an on-line transaction. 
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exist, the program might proceed first to file an electronic declaration with the 
appropriate supervisory authority before actually collecting or processing any personal 
information inbound from the European domain. 
On the conceptual level, for a number of years, the data protection 
commissions in Europe have promoted privacy enhancing technologies (PETS) as a 
potential solution to data protection concerns. Typically, the PETS solution is an 
"either/or" response: anonymity or identity. In the on-line context, however, full 
anonymization may be undesirable in particular circumstances, such as those 
associated with criminal activity where legitimate reasons exist to identify the 
individual. Technologies can, however, also be seen as a way to address various 
concerns in different contexts.671 An infrastructure may be designed to assure that 
only relevant information be collected when "identified or identifiable" information is 
required or may be structured to preclude any processing other than purposes 
compatible with the original goals for the collection.672 
In response to pressure both from the enactment of the European Directive 
and from public hearings in the United States, industry groups are moving forward 
with a number of technical standards that will affect the design of on-line services. 
Yet, from a data protection perspective, the emerging standards have important 
weaknesses. The Open Profiling Standard ("OPS"), for example, is a technical 
standard that enables the easy circulation of personal information between browsers 
and web sites.673 As it is conceived, users would enter a profile of their personal 
information into standard data fields on their browser. Specific items can be tagged 
to authorize or forbid particular uses. The browser would then disclose, to the extent 
authorized by the user, the profile information to web sites being visited by the user. 
While this solution has a certain degree of appeal, it also has significant disadvantages. 
First, the standardization of data fields for profile information can greatly enhance 
data matching. Second, the implementation of OPS may discourage protective 
See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation ofinformation 
Policy Rules through Technology, 76 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 553 (1998). 
For example, information distributed in a "secure" envelope, such as a cryptolope, 
precludes uses other than those originally intended by the distributor of the information. 
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anonymity since it is likely that browser developers will require users to create profiles 
as part of the initial browser configuration. 
Another noteworthy initiative is being undertaken by the World Wide Web 
Consortium ("W3C"). W3C continues to work on the "P3P" standard that would 
allow web sites and users to negotiate the privacy preferences for data collected by 
the web site.674 The initiative is based on the PICS labeling and filtering technologies 
developed originally for the problem of Internet pornography. In these types of 
labeling and filtering initiatives, the design decisions will make fundamental policy 
choices.675 As these examples indicate, technical decisions, architectures, and 
standards can be constructed to promote data protection goals, but will not 
automatically do so. 
Technical solutions will not, therefore, be a panacea, and the development of 
data protection cannot stop because of the emergence of significant technical 
standards. The implementation by network participants will also be critically 
important. For example, although Netscape allows users of Communicator 4.0 more 
control over "cookies" than Netscape 2.0, the default setting for Communicator is to 
accept all "cookies" placed by web sites and not inform users of these information 
practices.676 Where "cookies" are treated as personal information, the default 
implementation contravenes basic principles of European data protection law. 
Similarly, the P3P initiative holds tremendous promise for data protection,677 but to 
date, the development process has been slow and is not yet at a stage for 
implementation. 
674 See <www.w3c.org>. 
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy 
Rules through Technology, 76 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 553 (1998); Joel R. Reidenberg, The Use of 
Technology to Assure Internet Privacy: Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection, LEX 
ELECTRONICA, <http://www.lex-electronica.org> (Fall, 1997). 
Netscape Communications Corporation Submission, FTC Consumer Privacy 
Hearings (June 1997), <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy2/comments2/netscape.htm> 
See generally, Joel R. Reidenberg, The Use of Technology to Assure Internet 
Privacy: Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection, LEX ELECTRONICA, <http://www.lex-
electronica.org> (Fall, 1997). 
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3.3.2 Effective Regulatory Policies 
In reviewing the application of data protection laws to on-line services in the 
Member States, the transposition of the European Directive will not completely 
address a number of critical issues raised for subject matter and territorial jurisdiction, 
transparency, profiling, and security. Many of the unresolved issues derive from the 
particular context of on-line services, namely the existing infrastructure design and 
current development of electronic commerce applications. Legal harmonization of 
data protection principles at such a detailed level in a dynamic environment will be 
cumbersome. In the face of a changing infrastructure, the political considerations will 
be significant and the length of time necessary to consider the issues and to complete 
the adoption process for any new directive will be excessively long. For example, the 
process to adopt and implement the European Directive took eight years from the 
initial proposal to the date for transposition into the national laws of the Member 
States— an extraordinarily long period of time for the rapidly changing on-line 
environment. 
By contrast, the Working Party established under the European Directive 678 
appears well suited to consider these questions of divergence. Many of the 
divergences are susceptible to resolution through consensus on the interpretation of 
basic principles. For example, guidelines on anonymization of personal information 
might be drawn up by the Working Party to address the issues of "identifiable" 
information and data minimization. The Working Party might also address uniformity 
in the content for notice and registration statements and uniformity in mechanisms to 
satisfy these requirements electronically.679 
Yet, policy guidelines standing alone will not be sufficient to assure data 
protection in the network environment.680 Technical decisions have a rule-making 
678 See European Directive 95/46/EC, art. 29. 
Uniformity in this sense means a standardization of descriptions and type of 
information required to be disclosed and, in the context of electronic notices or registrations, a 
technical standard that specifies the data fields and locations. 
This combination of techniques is recognized in the current draft of the ISDN 
Directive. See Common Position (EC) No. 57/96 adopted by the Council on 12 September 1996 
with a view to adopting Directive 96/ / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector, in 
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capacity and, consequently, have fundamental regulatory implications for the types of 
personal information circulating on the Internet and for the ways such information is 
processed.681 The technical infrastructure arrangements for on-line data flows may 
enhance or frustrate data protection principles. At the same time, data protection 
rules may themselves cause unintended infrastructure arrangements. If Germany 
requires explicit notice of "cookies" and Belgium or the United Kingdom does not, 
then service providers may seek to locate processing activities in Belgium or the 
United Kingdom. 
For the on-line environment, the most effective approach for fair information 
practices will combine substantive data protection rules and principles with technical 
arrangements that allow the most efficient and least intrusive compliance. On-line 
services will increasingly require technical and regulatory differentiation. A few key 
technical design principles have already been identified by the Berlin Group of national 
data protection supervisory authorities: 
• sensitive data must be encrypted 
• information and communications technologies must enable users to 
control and give feedback with regard to his personal data 
• anonymous access to on-line services should be available 
• secure encryption methods must be a legitimate option for Internet 
users 
• "quality stamp" certification should be explored to improve 
transparency for users.682 
particular in the integrated services digital network (ISDN) and in the public digital mobile networks, 
Recital 7. In addition, the International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications 
has also stated that "it is mandatory to develop design principles for information and communications 
technology and multimedia hard- and software which will enable the individual user to control... his 
personal data." Data Protection and Privacy on the Internet: Report and Guidance (Berlin, 19th Nov. 
1996). 
681 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 
EMORY LAW JOURNAL 911 (1996). 
682 Internet Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, Data 
Protection and Privacy on the Internet: Report and Guidance (Berlin, 19 November 1996). 
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These principles reflect that technical arrangements might narrow the scope of issues 
faced by legal regulation. For example, to the extent that access to on-line services 
is anonymous, few, if any, issues arise with respect to the collection and storage of 
transaction records. To maximize this narrowing feature of technical rules, data 
protection must include as a goal the development of technologies that allow for 
flexibility in different contexts and a 'marge de manoeuvre ' among the Member 
States, but also impose mandatory rules on information flows when derogations 
would violate citizen's rights. This nuanced approach, which uses technical 
rules to accomplish regulatory objectives, offers data protection officials a robust set 
of instruments to achieve policy goals.683 The primary tools are: 
(1) persuasion that can be used to pressure industry to develop 
appropriate technical rules and mechanisms;684 
(2) participation by data protection officials in the work of standards 
organizations that can promote mechanisms to assure the policy 
objectives of data protection;685 
(3) funding through programs, such as ESPRIT, that may be used to 
develop technologies that assure data protection;686 
(4) procurement by public bodies that has a substantial influence on the 
development of private markets and that may be used as a concerted 
tool to promote data protection goals;687 
(5) regulating behavior by imposing liability that can be used as an indirect 
stimulus for the development of technical rules to assure data 
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy 
Rules through Technology, 76 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 553, 587-591 (1998). 
684 Id., at 588-89. 
685 Id., at 589. 
Id. 
Id. For example, all government purchases of browser software might require that 
particular data protection policies be implemented in the browser. 
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protection in network environments;688 
(6) regulating standards that assures particular data protection rules are 
not circumvented.689 
As these tools reflect, the Lex Informatica, or policy rules through technology, will 
increasingly mean that creation of political choices will be made in the selection of 
protocols and standards. This phenomenon is well illustrated by the Internet labeling 
and filtering projects for data protection. The terms and criteria used to label data 
protection practices express political judgments.690 Specifically, the translation of data 
protection principles into technical specifications reflects judgmental choices rather 
than specific expressions dictated by the drafting of the data protection principle. 
Moreover, this politicization of technical choices will be an inevitable fact of the 
Information Society. 
Data protection regulators, namely the Commission and the national 
authorities, will have to combine the set of six instruments listed above if an effective 
regulatory policy is to emerge. No single approach will successfully work in the on-
line environment. For example, the regulation of behavior in the on-line environment 
will still necessitate an appropriate technical capability and the regulation of a standard 
should not pre-empt future technological developments. 
For the European Union, the European Directive already offers a significant 
mechanism to address data protection through such forms of technological rule-
making. Many issues might effectively be resolved through the existing procedures 
dealing with codes of conduct.691 The European Directive expressly contemplates 
that the Member States and the Commission: 
must encourage the trade associations and other representative organizations 
Id., at 590. For example, the French telecommunications law holds service 
providers liable if they fail to offer subscribers filtering mechanisms. 
689 I d 
See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Use of Technology to Assure internet Privacy: 
Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection, LEX ELECTRONICA, <http://www.lex-
electronica.org> (Fall, 1997). 
691 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 27. 
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concerned to draw up codes of conduct so as to facilitate the application of 
this Directive, taking account of the specific characteristics for the processing 
carried out in certain sectors, and respecting the national provisions adopted 
for its implementation.692 
This existing legal basis provides an avenue to seek consensus among the Member 
States on technical mechanisms that make data protection possible and widespread 
in the on-line environment. In effect, the technical rules and protocols that determine 
information flows are "codes of conduct" in precisely the same way that trade 
associations draft policy guidelines.693 However, unlike traditional industry codes of 
conduct, these technical rules and protocols have self-executing force; they will be 
dispositive for the structure ofinformation flows on the network.694 In approaching 
the technical system designs as "codes of conduct," the Commission, Working Party 
and national supervisory authorities have a clear mandate to participate actively in a 
variety of fora not traditionally associated with data protection, such as the 
International Organization for Standards.695 
In sum, to assure data protection that fairly considers all of the principles 
contained in the European Directive in the context of the on-line environment, the 
European Union's data protection officials must have political input into the technical 
infrastructure decisions that affect the nature and characteristics of data flows. 
Groups such as W3C and the other standards bodies increasingly have the equivalent 
of regulatory power in connection with data protection policy. To continue to have 
an effective role in data protection, the Commission and the Working Party will need 
to develop significant technical expertise and pursue data protection through a 
692 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 61. 
Professor Lessig even refers to the constraints of rules and laws embedded in 
software as the 'code'. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY LAW 
JOURNAL 869, at 896 (1996). 
694 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy 
Rules through Technology, 76 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 553, 572-573 (1998). 
The International Organization for Standards is presently considering the Canadian 
proposal to adopt a privacy standard along the lines of the Canadian standard. Canadian Standards 
Association, Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information (1996). 
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broader range of regulatory policy instruments than the traditional legal directive 
approach. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1 
DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Jurisdiction: Scope of "Personal Information" 
Definition of 
Information as 
"Identifiable" 
(e.g. dynamic IP 
address or e-mail 
address) 
Special exclusions 
Special inclusions 
Anonymity/ 
Pseudonymity 
Belgium 
Broad 
Yes 
(e.g. public data, 
distributed database?) 
No 
Encouraged 
France 
Broad 
No 
Yes 
(e.g. log files, 
cookies) 
Encouraged 
Germany 
Contextual 
No 
Yes 
(e.g. anonymous/ 
pseudonymous data) 
Required 
United Kingdom 
Contextual 
No 
No 
Encouraged 
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TABLE 2 
DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Jurisdiction: Scope of "Personal Information" 
Effect of the Directives 
Definition of 
Information as 
"Identifiable" 
(e.g. dynamic IP 
address or e-mail 
address) 
Special exclusions 
Special inclusions 
Anonymity/ 
Pseudonymity 
Directive 95/46/EC 
Incomplete Convergence 
Limited Convergence 
(e.g. journalists, households) 
No effect 
Encouraged indirectly 
Directive 97/99/EC 
Incomplete convergence 
(Billing data only) 
Incomplete Convergence 
(E.g. call tracing) 
Some convergence 
(i.e. "traffic data"; CLI) 
Encouraged 
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TABLE 3 
DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Jurisdiction: Registration and Supervision 
Declaration 
Obligation 
Detailed 
Declaration 
If server located 
in Member State 
If information 
on foreign web 
sites is 
accessible from 
within Member 
State 
Exemptions from 
Declaration 
Simplified 
Declarations 
Registration 
Filing 
Fees 
Electronic Filing 
Belgium 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Variable 
On Disk 
France 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
N/A 
Not yet 
Germany 
Yes 
Yes 
Unclear 
No 
No 
No 
Not yet 
United Kingdom 
Yes 
Yes 
Unlikely 
No 
. Yes 
Fixed 
Yes 
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TABLE 4 
DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Jurisdiction: Registration and Supervision 
Effect of the Directives 
Declaration Obligation 
Detailed Declaration 
If server located in Member 
State 
If information on foreign web 
sites is accessible from within 
Member State 
Exemptions from Declaration 
Simplified Declarations 
Registration Filing 
Fees 
Electronic Filing 
Directive 95/46/EC 
Incomplete Convergence 
Convergence 
Incomplete convergence 
Some convergence 
Convergence 
No effect 
No effect 
Directive 97/66/EC 
No effect 
No effect 
No effect 
No effect 
No effect 
No effect 
No effect 
161 
TABLE 5 
DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Transparency 
Notice for Direct 
Collection 
Notice for Indirect 
Collection 
Content of Notice 
Special Notices for On-
line Sen'ices 
Special Consent for 
Internet 
Access Fees 
Belgium 
Yes 
Yes 
Detailed 
No 
2.5 ECU 
France 
Yes 
No 
Detailed 
Purposes and 
Risks 
Yes 
3.0 ECU 
(public sector) 
4.5 ECU 
(private sector) 
Germany 
Yes 
Yes 
Detailed 
Cookies 
Reforwarding 
Anonymity 
Options 
Yes 
No 
United Kingdom 
Yes 
Perhaps 
Detailed 
Explicit notice of 
additional purposes 
for sensitive data 
No 
15 ECU 
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TABLEÓ 
DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Transparency 
Effect of the Directives 
Notice for Direct 
Collection 
Notice for Indirect 
Collection 
Content of Notice 
Special Notices for 
On-line Services 
Special Consent for 
Internet 
Access Fees 
Directive 95/46/EC 
Convergence 
Convergence 
Incomplete Convergence 
No effect 
No effect 
No effect 
Directive 97/66/EC 
Incomplete Convergence 
(E.g. traffic data) 
No effect 
No effect 
Limited Convergence 
(e.g. on-line directories) 
No effect 
No effect 
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TABLE 7 
DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Profiling and Sensitive Data 
Sectoral 
Finality rules 
Automated 
Decisions 
Consent 
required for 
processing on-
line sensitive 
data 
Belgium 
Yes 
(e.g. consumer 
credit profiles) 
No specific restraint 
Advanced, perhaps 
written 
France 
Yes 
(e.g. Internet 
sites' disclosure 
of finality) 
Prohibited 
Advanced, 
Written 
Germany 
Yes 
(e.g. pseudonymous 
profiling on-line) 
No specific restraint 
No special 
requirements 
United Kingdom 
No 
(But, some limits 
through "fairness" 
and consent 
principles 
No specific restraint 
No special 
requirements 
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TABLE 8 
DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ONLINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Profiling and Sensitive Data 
Effect of Directives 
Sectoral Finality 
rules 
Automated 
Decisions 
Consent required 
for processing on-
line sensitive data 
Directive 95/46/EC 
Authorizes 
Convergence 
No specific effect 
(Special protections apply generally) 
Directive 97/66/EC 
Convergence 
No effect 
Convergence 
(i.e. subscriber billing data) 
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TABLE 9 
DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Security 
Obligation to 
provide 
security for 
on-line 
services data 
Regulation of 
Digital 
Signatures 
Cryptography 
Key Escrow 
Belgium 
Yes 
Not yet 
Law enforcement 
access for 
communications 
contents 
Under 
consideration 
France 
Yes 
Not yet 
Licensed 
Regulations 
pending 
Germany 
Yes 
Voluntary 
Unrestricted 
Under consideration 
United Kingdom 
Yes 
Not yet 
Unrestricted 
Under consideration 
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TABLE 10 
DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Security 
Effect of the Directives 
Obligation to provide 
security for on-line 
services data 
Regulation of Digital 
Signatures 
Cryptography 
Key Escrow 
Directive 95/46/EC 
Convergence 
No effect 
Encourages 
No effect 
Directive 97/66/EC 
Convergence 
No effect 
Encourages 
Limited Convergence 
( i.e. any mandator}· features other 
than those required by law 
enforcment may not impede the free 
circulation of equipment) 
167 
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